The Genocide Convention Before the ICJ: Judicial Protection of Fundamental Values Between Tradition, Innovation, and the Risk of Futility

This article assesses the International Court of Justice’s recent judicial practice concerning the Genocide Convention, which is at stake in several highly sensitive contentious cases. The Court relied on its previous case law, notably on the seminal Advisory Opinion of 1951, to address issues both of standing, in South Africa v. Israel, and of jurisdiction ratione personae in Sudan v. UAE – which it removed from the General List in light of the UAE’s reservation to Article IX of the Convention. It also took a cautious approach to jurisdiction ratione materiae in Allegations of Genocide (Ukraine v. Russia), and refused to adopt provisional measures in Nicaragua v. Germany. However, it did not shy away from exercising its jurisdiction under Article 41 of the Statute, adopting several provisional measures in South Africa v. Israel. As in previous recent cases, these provisional measures have had virtually no effect on the ground. The evolving practice on intervention under both Articles 62 and 63 of the ICJ Statute, while raising a number of questions and new problems, testifies to a fairly broad agreement among States that the Court can nonetheless play a role in the prevention and repression of genocide.