La manomissione delle sentenze Meroni. Per una lettura originalista della più nota giurisprudenza in materia di delega di poteri nell’ordinamento dell’Unione europea

This article revisits the landmark Meroni jurisprudence of 1958, traditionally viewed as the cornerstone for defining the limits of power delegation to EU agencies. Over time, Meroni has been construed as imposing an immutable ban on delegating discretionary powers beyond the EU institutional framework. The paper challenges this reading, arguing that it stems from a gradual ‘tampering’ — a layering of doctrinal and institutional reinterpretations that have detached the rulings from their original logic and context. Adopting an originalist approach, it reconstructs Meroni’s theoretical structure through the Court’s reasoning, the original case documents from the EU Archives, and the legal opinions of the EU institutions’ Legal Services. It shows that the alleged prohibition on delegating discretionary powers arose from the specific features of the ECSC system — though not primarily those highlighted in existing legal debates. Finally, by identifying Meroni’s core principles, the article argues that Meroni embodies a genuine théorie de la délégation de pouvoirs, not a rigid constraint on any delegation.