This article addresses the problem of the ‘time of the history of philosophy,’ contending that any attempt to reconstruct the philosophical past necessarily presupposes an implicit conception of temporality. Its central claim is that the history of philosophy should not be regarded as a neutral chronicle of doctrines but as a domain in which philosophy reflects upon its own temporal condition. Distinct historiographical models—from Renaissance humanism to seventeenth-century systematisation, from Hegel’s dialectical narrative to historicism and twentieth-century hermeneutics—embody different ways of conceiving the relation between philosophy and time. By examining these approaches, the article underscores both the methodological difficulties and the philosophical stakes inherent in comparing thinkers across historical distance. It argues that the legitimacy of such comparisons rests not on reducing thought to isolated opinions or to the immediacy of the present, but on acknowledging the horizon in which past, present, and future coexist. The aim is not to produce a comprehensive historybut to elucidate how the question of time informs our understanding of philosophy itself. In doing so, the article contributes to ongoing debates concerning the status of philosophical historiography and defends the view that the history of philosophy mayfunction as a living resource for engaging with contemporary philosophical issues.
The Time of the History of Philosophy
Trudu Maurizio
2025
Abstract
This article addresses the problem of the ‘time of the history of philosophy,’ contending that any attempt to reconstruct the philosophical past necessarily presupposes an implicit conception of temporality. Its central claim is that the history of philosophy should not be regarded as a neutral chronicle of doctrines but as a domain in which philosophy reflects upon its own temporal condition. Distinct historiographical models—from Renaissance humanism to seventeenth-century systematisation, from Hegel’s dialectical narrative to historicism and twentieth-century hermeneutics—embody different ways of conceiving the relation between philosophy and time. By examining these approaches, the article underscores both the methodological difficulties and the philosophical stakes inherent in comparing thinkers across historical distance. It argues that the legitimacy of such comparisons rests not on reducing thought to isolated opinions or to the immediacy of the present, but on acknowledging the horizon in which past, present, and future coexist. The aim is not to produce a comprehensive historybut to elucidate how the question of time informs our understanding of philosophy itself. In doing so, the article contributes to ongoing debates concerning the status of philosophical historiography and defends the view that the history of philosophy mayfunction as a living resource for engaging with contemporary philosophical issues.I documenti in SFERA sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
