La posizione di Friedrich Eduard Beneke nella costellazione neokantiana

In this paper, I argue that F.E. Beneke holds a distinctive yet pivotal place within Neo-Kantianism in virtue of integrating psychological empiricism into the Kantian framework. Analysing his 1831 work, I contend that Beneke anticipates the Neo-Kantian revival by calling for a return to Kant’s empirical roots, challenging the dominant idealist and metaphysical trends of the time. I identify three key areas of his critique of Kant: contradictions in the pure forms of intuition; the problematic objectivity of causal connections; and the rejection of intellectual intuition. By advancing empirical psychology as the foundation of philosophy, I demonstrate how Beneke diverges from mainstream Neo-Kantian schools, emphasising empirical and psychological dimensions over idealist concerns. Ultimately, I show that his critique of both Kant and post-Kantian idealism grounds a philosophy rooted in the empirical study of consciousness, positioning him as an unconventional yet significant figure within Neo-Kantian thought.