To what extent do self-deception and delusion overlap? In this paper we argue that both self-deception and delusions can be understood in folkpsychological terms. ―Motivated‖ delusions, just like self-deception, can be described as beliefs driven by personal interests. If selfdeception can be understood folk-psychologically because of its motivational component, so can motivated delusions. Non-motivated delusions also fit (to a large extent) the folk-psychological notion of belief, since they can be described as hypotheses one endorses when attempting to make sense of unusual and powerful experiences. We suggest that there is continuity between the epistemic irrationality manifested in self-deception and in delusion.
Self-deception, delusion and the boundaries of folk psychology
Bortolotti L
Primo
;
2012
Abstract
To what extent do self-deception and delusion overlap? In this paper we argue that both self-deception and delusions can be understood in folkpsychological terms. ―Motivated‖ delusions, just like self-deception, can be described as beliefs driven by personal interests. If selfdeception can be understood folk-psychologically because of its motivational component, so can motivated delusions. Non-motivated delusions also fit (to a large extent) the folk-psychological notion of belief, since they can be described as hypotheses one endorses when attempting to make sense of unusual and powerful experiences. We suggest that there is continuity between the epistemic irrationality manifested in self-deception and in delusion.I documenti in SFERA sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
