In this brief commentary, we examine the account of thought insertion provided by Jordi Fernandez in his book, Transparent Minds. We highlight some of the strengths of the account, and raise one main objection to it. In mainstream philosophical accounts of thought insertion, people who report the delusion are thought to have ownership of the alien thoughts, but to lack a sense of agency with respect to such thoughts. Fernandez correctly identifies the limitations of mainstream accounts of thought insertion and articulates a promising alternative. As he does so, though, he relies on the claim that alien thoughts are beliefs, and we challenge that claim. People with thought insertion do not commit to the truth of the content of the alien thought.
Are alien thoughts beliefs?
Bortolotti L.;
2015
Abstract
In this brief commentary, we examine the account of thought insertion provided by Jordi Fernandez in his book, Transparent Minds. We highlight some of the strengths of the account, and raise one main objection to it. In mainstream philosophical accounts of thought insertion, people who report the delusion are thought to have ownership of the alien thoughts, but to lack a sense of agency with respect to such thoughts. Fernandez correctly identifies the limitations of mainstream accounts of thought insertion and articulates a promising alternative. As he does so, though, he relies on the claim that alien thoughts are beliefs, and we challenge that claim. People with thought insertion do not commit to the truth of the content of the alien thought.I documenti in SFERA sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
