Die grundlegende Rolle des Fichteschen Hingeben-Konzepts in der Transzendentalphilosophie von Lask

This contribution aims to address the productive appropriation of the Fichtean concept of ‘Hingeben’ by Emil Lask. Lask utilises this concept to overcome Rickert’s conception of the subject. Therefore, in the preliminary phase, I examine the general outlines of Rickert’s reception of Fichte. Subsequently, I reconstruct the concept of ‘Hingeben’ within Lask’s and Fichte’s philosophies. I then aim to understand what aspects of the Fichtean position find their way into Lask’s philosophy. Finally, I demonstrate how the concept of ‘Hingeben’ allows Lask to radicalise the transcendental perspective, i.e., the inquiry into the conditions of the possibility of knowledge through an understanding of the structures of subjectivity, in a non-empirical form of reality. This prevents transcendental philosophy from realising itself exclusively in a self-reflective exploration of the structures and forms of consciousness.