The aim of this note is to study waste reuse and recycling innovations in strategic environments. Due to the presence of widespread externalities, cooperation can help improve efficiency in equilibrium outcomes but requires the involvement of all players. Moreover, cooperation may differ when players’ actions are strategic substitutes or strategic complements, as in the prisoner’s dilemma and stag hunt games, respectively. Empirically, waste innovation practices for a sample of Italian firms are analysed with the aim of detecting the importance and nature of cooperation.
Conditional cooperation in game theory: an application to reuse and recycling innovations
Bertarelli S
2024
Abstract
The aim of this note is to study waste reuse and recycling innovations in strategic environments. Due to the presence of widespread externalities, cooperation can help improve efficiency in equilibrium outcomes but requires the involvement of all players. Moreover, cooperation may differ when players’ actions are strategic substitutes or strategic complements, as in the prisoner’s dilemma and stag hunt games, respectively. Empirically, waste innovation practices for a sample of Italian firms are analysed with the aim of detecting the importance and nature of cooperation.File in questo prodotto:
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