In Bitcoin, if a miner is able to solve a computationally hard problem called proof of work, it will receive an amount of bitcoin as a reward which is the sum of the fees for the transactions included in a block plus an amount inversely proportional to the number of blocks discovered so far. At the moment of writing, the block reward is several orders of magnitude greater than the sum of transaction fees. Usually, miners try to collect the largest reward by including transactions associated with high fees. The main purpose of transaction fees is to prevent network spamming. However, they are also used to prioritize transactions. In order to use the minimum amount of fees, users usually have to find a compromise between fees and urgency of a transaction. In this paper, we develop a probabilistic logic model to experimentally analyze how fees affect confirmation time and miner's revenue and to predict if an increase of average fees will generate a situation when the miner gets more reward by not following the protocol.
Studying transaction fees in the Bitcoin Blockchain with probabilistic logic programming
Azzolini D.
;Riguzzi F.
;Lamma E.
2019
Abstract
In Bitcoin, if a miner is able to solve a computationally hard problem called proof of work, it will receive an amount of bitcoin as a reward which is the sum of the fees for the transactions included in a block plus an amount inversely proportional to the number of blocks discovered so far. At the moment of writing, the block reward is several orders of magnitude greater than the sum of transaction fees. Usually, miners try to collect the largest reward by including transactions associated with high fees. The main purpose of transaction fees is to prevent network spamming. However, they are also used to prioritize transactions. In order to use the minimum amount of fees, users usually have to find a compromise between fees and urgency of a transaction. In this paper, we develop a probabilistic logic model to experimentally analyze how fees affect confirmation time and miner's revenue and to predict if an increase of average fees will generate a situation when the miner gets more reward by not following the protocol.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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