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F.I.S.I.A assessment and the territorial impact.

**Measuring and comparing the policy efficiency and effectiveness of the U.A on informal areas in
Tirana and Durrës region.**

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policies through land management, and economic and financial tools.
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PREFACE

The research presents a peculiar mix between complexity theories, fractal studies, agglomerations and spatial justice issues for the informal settlements studies.

Traditionally, informal settlements studies have been caught and described by political orientations and by academics with a political background. The scientific and non-biased research has been often corrupted financially, or merely applied by bureaucrats who don't know how the revenues are distributed - and so the spatial justice.

From one side, there is the interpretative approach, calling the informal settlements in hundred names, blaming colonialist state, the post-socialist condition and the city unaffordability and other macro data - meanwhile the violation of the individual rights happens on daylight.

From the other side, the bureaucrats and elected representatives, who add laws and regulations, cut funds and actors from the decision making, thinking that the laws and policies drawn by them will be followed by the single citizens and/or communities.

We strongly and actively admit that only the persistent work on this vacuum can fill the gap in-between.

Firstly, we need an independent, sensitive, and responsive evaluation system (1). Then an algorithm to make it work (2), and later the description of the territorial code (3).

(1) For responsive evaluation system the research proposes Responsive Focused Evaluation (R.F.E) - a mix of three evaluation theories/phases.

(2) For a sensitive algorithm the research proposes the Final Investment on the Single Informal Area (F.I.S.I.A) - if it's negative, as usually it is, it means that the city expansion has a high cost. The ethical use of this evaluation system is focused to reverse the positivity approach, on financial outcomes, to a sensitive description of the hindering factors - those which can not get a legalization permit.

(3) For description of the territorial code the research proposes the policy efficiency and effectiveness of the Urban Agenda for the Legalization, Urbanization and Integration of the Informal Areas and Settlements in Albania.

Later the city governance and decision making models may vary on territorial specificity of the area. Such are the land occupied, the settlement dimension, the urbanization indicator, and the hindering factors.

The last declaration goes to future decision makers and research institutes.

The author condemns any misuse or abuse of F.I.S.I.A assessment for unconstitutional actions, like evictions or intimidation, without guaranteeing the needed political coverage of housing policies and alternatives, or the economic resources to face the market price on the city.

The abuse of F.I.S.I.A assessment on planning tools and taxation may harm and segregate further your city since it sees only economic resources for housing and urbanization - and no further, unless it considers the hindering factors as a sensitive part of the assessment.

Only the ethical use of it, on a micro scale, can lead to possible solutions for the hindering factors to housing legalization, and toward a responsive evaluation.

Artan Kacani

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ABSTRACT IN ENGLISH

The first time that the U.A on Legalization, Urbanization, and Integration of the informal areas and Settlement was introduced is in 2006. From 2006 to nowadays many laws and regulations have shaped the U.A. On the early stages it is essential to understand the political and economic condition - the institutional vacuum to deal with the rural areas outside the yellow line was an unclear situation on who is responsible, see (Aliaj, Shutina, & Dharmo, 2010). At the same period (2009) the cognitive resource of the municipalities to get the cartographic data was taken off. The regional agency took over all these competencies and including the economic resources - in open violation to article 13 on the Albanian constitution and local autonomy. The political resource that once was of the municipalities, to define the informal areas and the regulatory frame, went to higher and centralized administrative levels, such as A.L.U.I.Z.N.I (regional agency).

In 2014, new different fees were introduced regarding the settlements raised for economic function and use. Many small informal markets closed their activities, and only big investments had the possibility to pay a higher fee than housing purposes, such as hotels, factories, and resorts. Facing this dynamic and repressive condition to vulnerable housing tenure the research proposes a "phase zero" of assessment and analysis. Three theories of policy evaluation have been used in one, called Responsive Focused Evaluation. The novelty of R.F.E is that evaluates the policy content from resources focused, differently from the classic evaluation on outcomes and outputs. By focusing on the economic resources, the implementation step of R.F.E suggests to look at probabilistic cases of failure or regular process of legalization. Four hindering factors are identified, and more than twelve factors on territorial impact, land fragmentation, and densification. The first four hindering factors can be assessed in one single formula called F.I.S.I.A, with the legalization revenues and urbanization costs to give the policy efficiency and effectiveness. Instead, the territorial impact gives variations on an analytical tool for the informal areas.

The research question is addressed to the second part, policy implementation, which focuses on economic resources. How much are the costs of the objectives set by the UA, legalization, urbanization and the hindering factors?

The results give different levels of efficiency and effectiveness ratio. Higher the efficiency gradient is, higher will be the urbanization cost and so the need to call political resources in action, or exogenous resources - and vice versa. This can vary from the size of the informal area and the urban morphology. Higher the effectiveness gradient is, higher will be the hindering factors and cost, and so the need to call cognitive resources and independent actors in the U.A for the endogenous resources. The separation of these two indicators, efficiency, and effectiveness is essential to get a more responsive and sensitive policy decision process on revenue's reversibility and future investments.

Keywords: Phase "0", Responsive Focused Evaluation, F.I.S.I.A Assessment, Hindering Factors, Legalization Revenues, Territorial Impact.

ABSTRACT IN ITALIAN

La prima volta che L'Agenda Urbana sulla legalizzazione, l'urbanizzazione e l'integrazione delle aree e degli insediamenti informali è stata istituita è stato nell'anno 2006. Dal 2006 ad oggi, molte leggi e regolamenti hanno cambiato e influenzato quest'agenda urbana.

Per capire le prime fasi, di costruire in maniera informale, bisogna avere un quadro generale riguardo la condizione politica ed economica che passava il paese in quei anni. Il vuoto istituzionale per affrontare le aree rurali al di fuori della linea gialla, che definiva il limite dell'area urbana, creava una situazione poco chiara su chi è responsabile, vedi (Aliaj, Shutina e Dharmo, 2010). Nello stesso periodo (2009) è stata tolta la risorsa cognitiva che i Municipi avevano per ottenere e gestire i dati cartografici. L'agenzia regionale ha assunto tutte queste competenze, comprese le risorse economiche - in aperta violazione all'articolo 13 della Costituzione Albanese e sull'Autonomia Locale. La risorsa politica che un tempo era del Consiglio Municipale, per definire le aree informali e il quadro normativo, è andata a livelli amministrativi più elevati e centralizzati, come ad esempio A.L.U.I.Z.N.I (agenzia regionale) e K.K.T (Consigli degli Ministri).

Nel 2014 sono state introdotte nuove tariffe riguardola destinazione d'uso del suolo. Piccoli negozi informali hanno chiuso le loro attività, e solo i grandi investimenti hanno avuto la possibilità di pagare una tariffa più elevata di quella abitativa, come alberghi, fabbriche e resort. Affrontando questa condizione dinamica e repressiva riguardo gli insediamenti informali e la loro vulnerabilità abitativa, la ricerca mira a una "fase zero" di valutazione e analisi sui diritti, attori, leggi e regolamenti.

Tre teorie sulla valutazione delle politiche sono state utilizzate in una, denominata Responsive Focused Evaluation. La novità di R.F.E è che valuta il contenuto della policy dalle risorse che gli attori hanno, con focus su una specifica risorsa, in questo caso quello economica. A differenza della classica valutazione su risultati e outputs, R.F.E suggerisce di vedere una seconda teoria - quella focalizzata sulle abilità degli attori di usare queste risorse, chiamata Empowerment Evaluation.

Concentrandosi sulle risorse economiche, la fase di implementazione di R.F.E suggerisce di esaminare i casi probabilistici di fallimento, o in regola per ottenerela piena legalizzazione dell'insediamento informale. Nella tesi vengono identificati quattro fattori di blocco e più di dodici fattori sull'impatto territoriale, sulla frammentazione del suolo e sulla densificazione.

I primi quattro fattori di blocco sono stati valutati in un'unica formula, denominata F.I.S.I.A, con l'obiettivo della legalizzazione includendo i costi di urbanizzazione, e così di garantire un'agenda urbana efficiente ed efficace. Invece, l'impatto territoriale è uno strumento analitico per le aree informali per capire l'impatto della frammentarizzazione e densificazione del suolo.

La domanda di ricerca è rivolta alla seconda parte, Empowerment Evaluation, che si concentra sulle risorse economiche. **Di quanto ammontano gli obiettivi espressi dell'Agenda Urbana per la legalizzazione, urbanizzazione includendo i fattori di blocco?**

I risultati danno diversi livelli di efficienza ed efficacia. Più alto è il gradiente di efficienza più alto sarà il costo di urbanizzazione e quindi la necessità di chiamare risorse politiche in azione, o risorse esogene - e viceversa. **Questo può variare dalle dimensioni dell'area informale e dalla morfologia urbana. Più alto sarà il gradiente di efficacia più alto saranno i fattori e i costi che ne impediscono, e quindi la necessità di chiamare risorse cognitive e attori indipendenti nell'agenda urbana per le risorse endogene.** La separazione di questi due indicatori, efficienza ed efficacia è essenziale per ottenere un processo decisionale più sensibile e responsabile sulla reversibilità delle entrate e sugli investimenti futuri.

Parole chiave: fase "0", valutazione focalizzata e responsabile, valutazione F.I.S.I.A, fattori di blocco, entrate di legalizzazione, impatto territoriale.

ABSTRACT IN ALBANIAN

Që nga viti 2006 deri më sot, shumë ligje dhe rregullore kanë ndryshuar Axfordën Urbane për Legalizim, Urbanizim dhe Integrim të Zonave dhe Ndërtimeve informale në Shqipëri. Në fazat e para, të ndërtimit në mënyrë informale, është e rëndërishtme të kuptohen kushtet ekonomike dhe politike që vendi po kalonte. Boshi institucional për të përballuar zhvillimin në zonat rurale krijoji një situatë të paqartë mbi përgjegjësitë përtej vijës së verdhë që përcaktonte limitet e zhvillimit urban. Për më shume mbi këtë bosh, vakum, shih (Aliaj, Shutina, & Dharmo, Between energy and the vacuum, 2010).

Ndërkoh në vitin 2009, me ndryshimet ligjore në Axfordën Urbane, u hoqën **burimet njohëse** që Bashkitë kishin. Kjo nënkupton evidentimin në territor, hartëzimin dixhital, verifikimi me kartelën e pasurisë, dhe shumë informacione të tjera të lidhura me planet vendore.

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Në vitin 2014 risi ligjore të ndryshme prekën çështjen e përdormit të tokës në bazë të funksionit ekonomik. Shumë dyqane të vogla kanë mbyllur aktivitetet për të evituar kosto të larta në legalizim, dhe vetëm investimet e mëdha si hotele, resorte apo fabrika kanë mundësinë të paguajnë një tarifë të legalizimit me karakter ekonomik.

Duke shqyrtuar këtë gjendje dinamike dhe represive ndaj brishtesise ligjore, kërkimi studiomor synon një "fazë zero" të vlerësimit dhe analizës.

Tre teoritë mbi vlerësimin e politikave, të zhvilluar nga autorë të ndryshëm, janë përmbledhur në një të vetëm me karakter 'fokusin' dhe 'përgjegjshmërinë'. Risia e 'Responsive Focused Evaluation' është që vlerëson përmbajtjen e politikave me fokusresurse të përcaktura. Kjo dallon nga vlersimi klasik mbi rezultatet- 'outputs' dhe 'outcomes'.

Fokusimbi burimet ekonomike, zhvilluar në fazën e implementimit të R.F.E, sugjeron të shqyrtojë rastet probabilitetë aftesisë për të marrë legalizim apo jo.

Studimi i probabiliteteve për arrirë në 'Assessment' dhe në 'Impact' të A.U është një risi për rastin specifik në Shqipëri.

Katër llojet e faktoreve bllokues nëse do të shiheshin nga diversiteti ligjorë që kanë do prodhonin një listë të gjatë rregullash planifikuese dhe ligjore. (tabela 12). Për të mos rënë në këtë grackë huluntuese teza përdor fillimisht probabilitetin e aftesisë për të arrirë legalizimin e dy burimeve territoriale, parcela dhe ndërtimi - dhe krijon katër variabla.

Rezultati i probabilitetit jep 4 situata të dështimit apo marrjes së legalizimit, të përshkruara si më poshtë.

1. S fails, P* fails - Hinderling factors Outside the Land.

(Shembull i ndërtimeve në zona të rëndësisë Kombëtare apo të vecantë të përcaktuar nga P.P.V).

2. S ok, P fails - Hinderling factors On the Land.

(Shembull i ndërtimeve në pronësi të palëve të tjera, jo publike, apo ndërtimeve të dhëna familjeve gjatë regjimit komunist).

3. S fails, P ok - On the single settlement.

(Shembull i ndërtimeve që nuk përmbushin kriteret e ndërtimit, si catia, hapësirat të pa përfunduara ne ndertimit).

4. S* fails, P fails - on the Single Household.

(Banori i ndërtimit informal nuk ka mjaftueshëm të ardhura për procesin e legalizimit).

Këta katër faktorë janë përmbledhur në një formulë të vetme, të quajtur F.I.S.I.A. **Kjo formulë shpreh vlerën e të ardhureve nga legalizimi në një zonë informale të përcaktuar, dhe kostot e urbanizimit duke përfshirë koston e cdo një nga katër faktorët bllokues.**Gërshtimi i të ardhurave me kostot e A.U garantojnë një politikë eficiente dhe efikase. Përtej këtij vlersimi empirik, impakti i territorit është një mjet analitik për zonat informale.

Pyetja kërkimore shtrohet në pjesën e dytë të Responsive Focused Evaluation, Empowerment Evaluation, dhe përqëndrohet në burimet ekonomike.

Sa është kosto eobjektivavete A.U për legalizim, urbanizim dhe faktoreve bllokues?

Rezultatet shprehen per nivele të ndryshme të eficenses dhe efikasitetit.

Sa më e lartë është gradientii eficenses aq më e lartë është kostoja e urbanizimit dhe si rrjedhojë nevoja e thirrjes së burimeve politike në veprim, ose resurseve eksogene. Kjo mund të ndryshojë nga dimensionii i hapësirës informale dhe nga morfologjia e saj.

Sa më e lartë është niveli i efektivitetit aq më lartë janë kosto e faktorëve bllokues, dhe kështu rritet nevoja për të thirrur burime njohëse dhe aktorë të pavarur në Axhenden Urbane për të identifikuar resurset endogjene.

Ndarja e këtyre treguesve, eficienta dhe efikasiteti janë të domosdoshëm për të marrë një vendimmarrje më të ndjeshme dhe të përgjegjshme në lidhje me kthimin e të ardhurave në zonat informale dhe politikave të ardhshme mbi investimet.

Fjalë kyçe: Faza "0", Vlerësimi i fokusuar i përgjegjshëm, Vlerësimi i F.I.S.I.A, Faktorët pengues, Të hyrat nga legalizimi, Ndikimi territorial.

1

STATEMENT

Informal Settlements and Practice

1.0 STATEMENT.

1.1 Informal Settlements, constitutional and regulatory problems.

According to the Albanian constitution, the legal tenure of a settlement is defined by three main procedural commitments, 1) by inheritance, 2) as a gift, or, 3) by purchase. The legalization of the informal settlements, to obtain a regular legal tenure, is not expressed at all, although it happens as a public administrative process. However, this fact does not make the process unconstitutional. Other forms to obtain a legal tenure are expressed indirectly. Such are those prescribed by the Civil Code. This procedural commitment, to obtain a legal tenure through the civil code administratively, is named legalization. In different countries dealing with the procedural commitment of the informal settlements, there are different administrative and legal frames.

For example in Italy, the procedural commitment passes through two nailed and well defined administrative and legal frame processes. The first is named 'condono edilizio' and the second 'sanatoria edilizia.' The first is related to the procedural commitment that brings to a legal tenure but without planning and territorial regulations considered. It is essentially a civic commitment, which in many cases as in Albania, stands on land owned by third parties, or by the national government. Actually in Albania on legalization process are only last cases - in national land ownership. The second, 'sanatoria edilizia,' aims to restore the informal construction with fiscal and financial means. It is necessarily a process that requires a readjustment process of the informal settlement to the planning and building regulations and constraints.

The existence of these two processes, civic and regulatory legalization, is essential to understand the hindering factors that lay behind the slow legalization process in Albania. It is not essential to understand how it happens in Italy rather than what is institutionally divided by procedural commitments since Albania and Italy are two different countries with different culture and economy. The exploration of the diversity that hinders the legalization process by these two procedural commitments, civic and regulatory, is a standing point of the research.

Almost 15 years from the U.A for the Legalization, Urbanization, and Integration of the Informal Areas and Settlements in Albania both procedural processes has been up to one single actor, name A.L.U.I.Z.N.I - a regional agency created for the U.A direction.

Many critiques has been risen to public transparency, responsibility, efficiency and effectiveness, unconstitutional practices or direct corruption.

In the end, we can assume that the legalization, beyond the diversity of the processes - civic or regulatory, it is a constitutional and legal procedural commitment. The way how these legal commitments are addressed defines if the procedural commitment is constitutional or not. Indeed the spatial and wealth distribution is in the stake, and we cannot define the condition of the system, democratic or not if we do not see the procedural commitments.

1.2 Informal settlements in Albania. Constitutional and regulatory problems.

Informal practices in Albania are a historical process that started in the early '90 with the fall of the old totalitarian communist regime. Only in 2004, the political focus saw the necessity to frame it as legal practice by a specific U.A. It was called 'Legalization, Urbanization, and Integration of the Informal Areas and Settlements. Now-days the three objectives, legalization/urbanization/integration, are the competence of regional agencies which holds the name of the three objectives with the acronyms, A.L.U.Z.N.I. Each region has various agencies, and only Durres and Tirana cover a total of 8050 ha, divided into 55 informal areas of different size and morphology. Most of them located in city outskirts.

Many authors have described this last process, the location of informal practices, on the historical, cultural, juridical-political and economic phenomenon. The technical and financial has been part of an obscure process to the public arena, sometimes conflicting data have been reported from public authorities. In many cases, some areas have gained more attention for electoral reasons rather than following a rational decision making on the wealth distribution and territorial justice.

The same process also happens for the compensation of the old landowners.

A half assumption is that slower is the legalization process, slower is the ability to have full urbanization, or to have compensation, and all this has territorial consequences and influences the public revenues. Both, territorial consequences and public revenues, are the technical and financial matter. Moreover, technical and financial matter influences the decision making of a centralized U.A to few actors. A.L.U.I.Z.N.I agency is promoter, director, gate-keeper, of the entire U.A. Indeed this process has created an unbalanced distribution of the

political, economic and cognitive resources among different public authorities; such are the newborn municipalities.

In a first analysis of the actor's network from 2006 to 2016 many competences has been taken off from the municipalities. Such are i) the preparation of the cartographic survey of the informal areas. ii) decision making signed to the municipal council to define the technical regulations about the informal area, and iii) a fixed and arbitrary revenue's reversibility from the legalization fee to urbanization objective has been declared (20%) - competence of the municipalities although some areas have gained more attention for different reasons.

On this matter, the unconstitutionality of the legalization process stands not on the nature of its policy but the procedural matter of the single laws. However, the U.A and its procedural commitment have violated article number 13 on the Albanian Constitution, on local autonomy.

1.3 The political agendas to the legalization, urbanization and integration U.A.

In 2006 procedural commitments for the U.A on Legalization, Urbanization, and Integration of the informal areas and Settlement were introduced. From that moment to now-days many laws and regulations have shaped the U.A. The first laws and regulations that have been applied were those connected to cognitive resources, and cartographic detection and measurements. In this phase, it is essential to understand the political and economic condition. The institutional vacuum to deal with the rural areas outside the yellow line¹ was an unclear situation on who is responsible.

If we want to get to a more in-depth analysis of the cause-effect that brought to informal practices, we should see the economic, political and juridical processes that has shaped the Albanian governments and vice versa - how governments have influenced the U.A and consequently the economic and political condition of those inhabitants living in informal areas.


For the juridical and constitutional frame, it is crucial to start from 1998 - the last time that the Albanian Constitution was revised regarding ownership (article 41), and local autonomy (article 13). There's to underline that in that period even if the informal practice was happening the procedural commitment of legalization did not had any legal frame to occur. Later, an additional

¹ the yellow line was the municipal boundary till, defining the urban area till 2009 - with the legal withdraw.

statement on economic frame reinforced the necessity to establish new regulations inside article 41, such as the Civic Code - which opened the legal frame to legalizations.

One of those, economical frame and research, was that regarding informal money and remittances. Here to mention the well know research of the economist Hermine De Soto in 2002. On the consistency of the last consideration of his research, we can assume that a special focused has gone to the material goods that the inhabitants in the informal areas had. Even if it can seem a discriminatory and stigmatizing process, it influenced the political orientation to draw the U.A. Indeed it was the first government Berisha, in picture one (1), that addressed electoral policies toward a legalization process.

On the political frame, we have to assume since the beginning that the process was adopted successfully to the governmental agendas. Now the problem was how to manage it with planning and regulatory laws. The first sign came from an independent institute named Co-Plan, which experienced for the first time a participatory planning and urbanization process. This good experience is also the standing point of the research and the opening to future policies.



Picture 1: The U.A and the Political policies (regulations and legal frame).

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On the political frame, we have to assume since the beginning that the process was adopted successfully to the governmental agendas. Now the problem was how to manage it with planning and regulatory laws. The first sign came from an independent institute named Co-Plan, which experienced for the first time a participatory planning and urbanization process. This good experience is also the standing point of the research and the opening to future policies.

2005 -The first government Berisha was the also the first to draw, adopt and promote the U.A. Starting from the economic and the good practice the government adopted the procedural commitment of legalization in 2006. The challenge was clear, identify and stop the informal practices in the informal areas defined by law - in order to open a legalization and planning process. From the land control aspect, it can be considered as partial since it blocked only the informal areas defined by law. However, from the other side, it represents a territorial approach to deal with informal practices. Due to many hindering processes, on regulatory and planning laws, it appeared impossible to accomplish the full legalization at once for one single area: this even due to the fast and abundant remittances and economical process which influenced the informal practices directly. At the end of the first government mandate, only a few informal areas had the legal statement as so, and the process of self-declaration had started intensively. All cartographic data where developed in the Municipal directory of planning. At the Municipal Council the definition of the regulatory processes. The more these last where added, the more it was impossible to legalize. Many local regulatory plans did not had the expected result.

2009 -On the second government mandate, the focus to the U.A remained the same. Informal practices were also happening in the informal areas and outside. The process of legalization faced many hindering factors on the regulatory frame and juridical frame. Although these legal constraints, the process of identifying and mapping the informal settlements happened almost in all the territory, outside and inside informal areas. In 2009 another process happened on the regulatory frame. The new law on "Territorial Planning" changed the perspective on how municipalities should manage the land inside the boundaries. At the same period, the cognitive resource of the municipalities to achieve the cartographic data was taken off. A.L.U.I.Z.N.I, the regional agency, took over all these competencies and resources. Also, here comes the first critique to article 13 on the Albanian constitution and local autonomy. The political resource that once was of the municipalities, to define the informal areas and the regulatory frame, went to the higher administrative level, such are Qarku and A.L.U.I.Z.N.I.

2013 -At the end of the second and last Berisha government mandate self-declaration where 269.841, instead of the legalization it was 33.823 per self-declaration. Only 12% at national scale. The reason for low effectiveness, 12%, is more evident with the increasing number of informal practices, although remittances were in a decrease.

The new elected government Rama I, saw the opportunity of the work done till this phase as a guideline to put in a formal condition other agendas, such as the electricity and water supply sector. Although many settlements did not have the legalization, they were recognized as the formal householders. Many cases are those where there's no urbanization and water, and electricity supply was managed informally by the inhabitants like taking it from the public lights or adding new canalization system till to the main center.

In order to increase the effectiveness, and in front of an increasing number of self-declarations and informal practices, the new government took off the informal area approach and started to legalize informal settlement also outside the informal areas. In front of an unconstitutional condition, where the legalization process was happening outside the informal areas, the new government saw again the necessity to revise and redefine the informal areas — creating the result that we have today, 55 informal areas around Durres and Tirana for a total of 8050 ha.

If from the juridical and public revenues it was a success the regulatory frame was becoming more complex. New regulations on legalization fee were introduced to the U.A. Many of them had a territorial impact on more profound land fragmentation in order to avoid a high fee. Different fees were introduced regarding the settlements raised for economic function and use. Many small informal markets closed their activities, and only significant investments remained, those who could pay a higher fee than housing purpose, such are hotels, factories, and resorts.

Now-days we can assume that these last processes of legalization, economic purposes, has been the primary priority process of legalization, this also due to high public revenues that can be generated by land conversion and taxation.

2017 -The number of self-declaration increased for a total of 314.789 at the national scale. Moreover, settlements legalized up to 100.394. From the effectiveness point of view, it shows a real success, less than 32% were already legalized. From the efficiency point of view, it means more revenues for the retribution of the old landowner and the urbanization and integration objective of the U.A. However, the success stands not on the real territorial and planning problem solving, since the regulatory frame has been more complicated, but due to the decision making and selection for the legalization. **The exploration of the missing revenues, by the hindering factors or regulatory and planning constraints is one of the objectives of the research.**

From the political point of view, we can assume that the U.A has been centralized to higher administrative levels in an unconstitutional process, changing the decision making to satisfactory criteria, and consequently invested ad-hoc in urbanization and integration objectives of the U.A.

1.4 The importance of an independent scientific evaluation.

As described above, it was the analysis of the economic frame, made by an economist, and the good experience of Co-Plan that gave the first signs to the political and practical openness.

From the economical point of view, it was assessed the informal dimension of living in those settlements. On the beginning of the 21st-century surveys on the informal, goods, remittances and cash flows, gave a vision which captured the public interest of decision makers. Since then, 2006, U.A has been focused mostly on cognitive resources (collecting data) and economic resources (revenues and costs). **If then the private condition, informal, become a public interest why the public condition cannot be to the private? Indeed the developers need always information on where the future public future investments are going to be focused, and in most of the cases, information is a privileged condition to specific areas or stakeholders. The importance of assessing the public policy efficiency and effectiveness consists first on this unbalanced territorial condition and distribution. Not responsive neither transparent.**

What we need is a micro scale which works on the legal and regulatory frame for the legalization tenure. For this, it is essential to rely on local authors and experiences. The first sign comes from the experience of a local institute for habitat development, named Co-Plan.

Co-Plan financed the construction of the sewer system in one of Bathore neighborhood as a pilot project, in the Tirana outskirts.

Co-Plan, identified, planned, opened and graveled four kilometers of public road space, which are no availed for future road and infrastructure investments. This was achieved through 10 intensive community meeting and 18 group meetings, and individual meetings with each concerned family. Main roads were opened and the neighborhood was subdivided into groups of 10-15 families, each electing one representatives for dealing with the project. Some 200 families were involved in the project, 70 local residents and 20 local drivers have been employed for three months at a differentiated time schedule. As a result 11 small economic activities as shops, telephone service, and timber supply

have started. Thanks to these interventions, the Urban Land Management Project showed interest to extend its activities, starting with sewage and water supply.

(Co-Plan. Center for Habitat Development, 2000, p. 29).

The main aim of the research is to get back on these two good experiences, by highlighting those key factors that opened the political and technical process toward an urban maturity of the agenda and policies.

Now-days that many governments have adopted unconstitutional regulations and complex regulatory acceptance processes for the legalization, it remains even more evident the need to restructure the U.A. The title of measuring and comparing indeed consists in finding the smallest unit to evaluate the policy effectiveness and efficiency. A first assumption is that the revenues from the legalization fee are not enough to accomplish the urbanization process and this due to many reasons.

- Firstly due to unconstitutional revenue's reversibility to informal areas, wealth distribution. (*exogenous reasons*)
- Secondly, by the withdraw of the informal area as a priority planning tool for the U.A. (*exogenous reasons*)
- By many hindering factors on regulatory processes that have been the draw in a timeline of almost ten years of U.A. (*endogenous reasons*)
- Also, by different urban morphology that a single informal area might have from the others. (*endogenous reasons*).

The first to reasons are strictly political and financial, and the last two are technical issues.

The first reasons are going to be addressed thank to objectives that target the decision-making models and their implementation and utilization. The last two are beyond the decision making and more closely to a scientific and technical matter. It is up to independent institutions to investigate territorial justice, and it impacts. This phase is considered as phase "0" of the policy evaluation and design.

1.5 What is to be done.

Beyond the administrative costs expressed in resources, the process of legalization, urbanization, and integration of informal practices seems a process of infinite self-reshaping and tactics due to legal constraints, firstly to the land by creating a more profound fragmentation and secondly to

the mobility network and spaces. This perpetual condition has effected in a way or another all the informal areas by creating a fractal problem on these two issues, land fragmentation, and low mobility network. While this impact can be seen as a cost for the municipalities, on urban transport, waste management, energy consume, water supply and other local priorities.

To understand better the wealth distribution the research gives a formula to measure cost benefits from the legalization fee to the urbanization costs, called F.I.S.I.A (Final Investment for the Single Informal Area). By measuring different areas, it is possible to compare F.I.S.I.A and to understand which area can achieve the urbanization process and which not - with the given legalization fee for each informal area. The deduction of the revenues, from the legalization fee, on urbanization costs and hindering costs, for each of four factors, gives the final investment of the single informal area (F.I.S.I.A). This measurement can lead to the policy efficiency and effectiveness of the single informal area. Later, on the formula, annual taxes can be added on the formula.

The comparison of the policy efficiency and effectiveness between areas can be expressed in a gradient, ratio, on the regional scale.

Before to get on this dimension of measurements it is important to highlight some starting conditions. The 55 informal areas in Tirana and Durres region are designed arbitrarily, and it is possible to find the smallest, 11 (ha) in Tirana close to Blloku, and the largest 750 (ha) in ex-swamp of Durres city. Indeed the research by maintaining the same informal areas embarrasses the rationality of the decision with limited knowledge of territorial problems and hindering factors. Future policies on reshaping these informal areas can take place in the future, but only after understanding and considering hindering factors and urban morphology.

As described above the centralized decision making has been drawn by bounded rationality and satisfactory criteria. The research objectives are to;

- 1) open a political discussion on decision making models, (evaluating policy content).**
- 2) to measure territorial resources and their technical ability or constrains to get a legalization process, such is the settlement and the land occupied (evaluating policy implementation), and**
- 3) to compare different areas by their ability to generate revenues in proportion with urbanization costs (evaluating policy impact).**

In order to achieve each aim the research focuses on public policy evaluation methods and their state of the art. The first theory used to understand the nature of decision making is Theory-Driven Evaluation. Thanks to the linear methodology, described in this theory, the policy evaluation gives a clear line guide to identify the real actors involved, their stake on resources, and their distribution. In state of the art, this theory has been criticized for being too complicated, if not "bean counting" process in the outcomes and outputs. For this reason, the research will follow a second theory in public policy evaluation, Empowerment Focused Evaluation. This theory also answers to the second aim of the research, measuring. Land occupied, settlement size and urbanization dimension from each informal area are the territorial resources which are measured in order to evaluate revenues from legalization fee and costs on urbanization. From the methodological point of view, the units in meter square (m²) and euro (€) are the only quantitative tools used in the research. At first sight, the process seems rather easy, but the legal constraints and the cultural background of the informal practices have created a great diversity which influences the legal tenure of the inhabitants and the revenues from legalization fee directly. The exploration of this diversity gives a more sensitive and empiric evaluation of the revenues. Four macro hindering factors have been identified starting from those territorial resources which influence the revenues, land occupied and settlement size from the probabilistic results. Each territorial resource has two probabilistic chances, or fail to get legalization, or gets it. The result is;

1. Land fails-settlements gets it. These cases are related to those circumstances where land has private ownership. The whole process of legalization fails, and so revenues and consequently urbanization and compensation to private landowners. This the first macro hindering factor.
2. Land fails - settlement fails. These cases are related to those circumstances where land should not be used for building purposes at all. This the second macro hindering factor.
3. Settlement Fails - Land Fails. These cases are related to those circumstances where settlement is located outside the occupied land, on public or private land. On territorial impact, it has consequences on land fragmentation and mobility. This the third macro hindering factor.
4. Settlement Fails - Land gets it. These cases are related to those circumstances where settlements are built in informal practices to proper land owned, such is densification. The hindering factors can rely on legal constraints of the physical condition of the settlement, such

are, i) with windows and door closed, or ii) with a roof on it or not. This the fourth macro hindering factor.

Each of the four macro hindering factors has the corresponding costs for different areas. The assessment for each hindering factor, four, is a loss of public revenues, and so on urbanization, expropriation of the old landowners, and integration policies.

1.5.1 Thesis content and proceedings.

The thesis starts with state of art. It starts the historical background of the policy evaluation and analysis that has been developed in the last century till now-days. Three theories or approaches have been taken on consideration. The geographical background comes from both continents, Europe and USA. The difference between the three theories can also be seen as evaluation steps, starting from the policy content, implementation, and impact. The constant use of these evaluation steps can lead to a more responsive and sensitive evaluation. This model of evaluation it has been called Responsive Focused Evaluation.

RFE as evaluation work on two directions, 1) on the understanding of the policy nature, and 2) on the territorial resources and users. State of the art closes the final remark on the need to see different approaches not in a conflict between them but rather as a complementary process on policy evaluation studies. The thesis limitations of the last two theories, EE and UFE, are those related to social interaction in order to get a closed and participatory process. Indeed the process of evaluation of these two focused theories is going to see only the economic resources and their territorial meaning. Instead of the first theory, THDE or linear model of evaluation is focusing on the actor's network and their interaction.

Methodology. To understand the policy nature the research is based on the linear evaluation or the theory-driven evaluation. It follows consecutive research of policy interventions, determinants and outcome, and outputs². The total number of laws and regulations that have been integrated into the U.A are 28 and has been collected and reflected in the institutional decision arena (table 10). The list of regulations and laws that have been integrated into the U.A in the last ten years are listed in the bibliography as V.K.M (decision taken directly from the central government).

² for further information see table 10 "Institutional decision arena"

Since it is not possible to rise scientific research questions on policy content, and total outcomes and outputs, the research focuses on specific theories, such as the empowerment evolution - a micro scale to understand conceptually the hindering factors that exist on the territory. Policy implementation and evaluation is the scale needed to rise also the research question³To understand better the hindering factors, the methodology takes the two territorial resources to see their probabilistic results to fail or get the legalization. The results are four different forms of hindering factors. From the methodological way the probabilities are a similar approach of Prisoners Dilemma⁴. The four macro hindering factors are an approach to assess the missing investment of the single informal area, called F.I.S.I.A. (for further information see 6.1.2)

Differently from the assessment of the F.I.S.I.A by macro hindering factors, it is possible to analyze also the territorial impact. It knows the probabilistic chances of transition from settlement to parceling and latter to urbanization. (for further information see 6.2.2). The diversity showed on this chapter in pictures expresses the probabilities of transition from settlement to land parceling and latter to urbanization, as reduction or extension or densification - and it creates a more responsive agenda to single applicants.

The territorial impact differently from the assessment (F.I.S.I.A, with four macro hindering factors) is not a process that can be measured, but it gives a physical interpretation of where its possible to open a participatory process of public authorities with the private actors, such can be the single inhabitants or architects contracted.

F.I.S.I.A is the product of all possible revenues on expressed objectives, such as urbanization, and possible hindering costs. If it gives negative value, it means that there is a high tenure vulnerability. Moreover, if it gives a positive value, it means their problems with spatial justice should be considered in order the attention to third objective of the U.A, integration of informal areas. This last phase of the evaluation is called 'Operating with informal areas,' and it raises the need to express in a communicative tool the ratio and difference among informal areas. As the thesis title, the research aims not only to measure but also to compare. For this reason, it has been chosen the policy efficiency and effectiveness of the U.A.

The nature of the U.A. Two publications have been done on the frame of the linear evaluation, or THDE, and policy centrality and density. The first in an adverse condition on territorial

³By how much are the cost of expressed objectives, urbanization, and those on territorial impact, such are the hindering factors?

⁴ Prisoner's Dilemma or the payoff matrix.

development between the gas industry and extensive agriculture in Semani River, considering the environmental impact.

The second publication⁵ sees directly the U.A and its nature of interaction among actors involved in the legalization and urbanization process. From the actor's network, the research speculates on different levels of interaction asking what would happen if the centrality and density increase? Six different scenarios have been drawn, 1) by bargaining Political Resources. 2) by bargaining economic resources 3) by bargaining cognitive resources, 4) changing centrality, 5) change Density, 6) work with endogenous resources. For further information see 'Policy Pluralism and Democracy.' (5.2.1).

Since it not possible to change the policy nature and all the cultural and political condition the research focuses on specific evaluation, those of the economic resources, the research will investigate on the last scenario, number six(6). So measuring and comparing the policy efficiency it is not a matter of the policy analysis or the political nature, but of the distribution of the economic resources among actors to accomplish specific objectives, such as the legalization and urbanization on the informal areas, it is.

The research question is addressed to the second part, policy implementation, which focuses on economic resources. **By how much are the cost of expressed objectives of the UA, legalization, urbanization, and those on territorial impact, and the hindering factors⁶?**

Measuring the U.A.As expressed in the methodology the measurements follows two directions, the policy assessment and the territorial impact. To explore the policy assessment and possible hindering factors the research follows a probabilistic approach, and the result is F.I.S.I.A. The territorial impact instead knows the probabilistic chances of transition from settlement to parceling and latter to urbanization.

The third⁷ publication gives the synoptic approach to simulate an assessment of the F.I.S.I.A in the informal areas of Shkoder, starting from the database of the General Regulatory Plan drafted recently, in 2016, by POLIS University of Tirana.

⁵ Kacani, A. (2017) Opening to future scenarios for the urbanization and integration of informal settlements in Albania - Interdisciplinary Journal of Research and Development "Aleksandër Moisiu" University, Durrës, Albania Vol (IV), No.2.p159. www.uamd.edu.al/new/multimedia/publikime/25_Artan_Kacani.pdf

⁶ four macro hindering factors.

⁷ Kacani, A. (2018) Defining the hindering factors of the informal settlements in the general regulatory plan of Shkoder municipality - Projecting Shkodër. Operative fragments in-between lake, river and sea. Observatory of Mediterranean Basine. pg 38 - 47.

During the Erasmus period at University of Minho⁸, Faculty of Architecture in Guimarães, the focus of the research went to more sensitive measurements of territorial impact. The lesson learned is of two matters, on the decision making (on the revenue's reversibility from taxes), and the multiple conditions of informal irregularities such are land fragmentation (by reduction or extension, or settlement development, and mobility, mainly infrastructure).

On the decision making the Portuguese regulations suggest that the local units should pay housing taxes as much as the investments needed to accomplish specific objectives of the General Regulatory Plans - for example, put in infrastructure. There's so little to compare the informal settlements in Albania with Portugal. However three territorial resources are word wide practiced unless we are talking about barracks, slums, or shantytown, 1) the land fragmentation, 2) settlement development and 3) urbanization.

For the Spanish author, José Martínez Rubio, the morphology of the urban growth is a matter of order between these three territorial resources, land, settlement and infrastructure, (for further information see Picture 18). This approach opened to the investigation of the informal irregularities.

To be more realistic on the Albanian context the local authors such as Prof. Dr. Besnik Aliaj⁹ suggest to start from the regular informality and its order - differently from José Martínez Rubio's cases. It is based on this order, settlement-parceling-urbanization. Simply it would be written S>P>U. And the transition phases from one to another will consider both practices, 1) parceling processes and/or 2) settlement development, and written for example S>P>P+>U. The sign (+) means for extension and (-) for reduction. A fourth proceeding paper¹⁰ shows a diversity of more than twelve probabilistic informal irregular settlements, starting from the three transition phases.

Operating with the informal areas. The last step of evaluation, which goes to policy impact, start from these three elements and expresses the need to use the information of F.I.S.I.A on an informal scale for the whole region of Tirana and Durrës. Now that the measurement units are already known the question remains how to use it?

⁸ February - June 2018.

⁹(Aliaj, Shutina, & Dharmo, Between energy and the vacuum, 2010)

¹⁰ Kacani (2018) Land tactics and territorial impact in the informal urban growth in Albania. A+P.

From the indicators of good governance, two principles are on high risk, the efficiency of the objectives of the U.A and the effectiveness. Higher are the hindering factors, higher will be the costs - and so consequently the ability to achieve the second objective of the U.A (effectiveness) and by how much (efficiency)?

In order to work firstly on endogenous resources, the research asks what if revenue's reversibility changes in order to achieve effectiveness and efficiency (as the Portuguese decision-making model suggests), and not anymore in an arbitrary way?

There's much to criticize the shape of the informal areas, but there's to underline that these are all exogenous factors - not related anymore to hindering factors but planning.

Two proceeding papers have been published and presented in different Conferences. The first¹¹ held on 2017 at POLIS University of Tirana - on ENHR2017 Conference (European Network for Housing Research). It analyses the various decision making on revenue's reversibility on single informal areas.

The second¹² proceeding paper held at POLIS University was more significant on the result and simulations of F.I.S.I.A in two closed informal areas at Durres outskirts. The first area needs more or less than two times more the total revenues to accomplish urbanization costs. Moreover, in these cases, exogenous resources should be activated. For the second area, only 75% of revenues reversibility from legalization fee is needed to accomplish the urbanization objective.

In both cases endogenous resources should be considered.

Thesis importance and divulgation.

The importance of a Responsive Focused Evaluation in the U.A is also useful to understand the policy cycles and their decisional making model. Now-days the policy maturity can be considered at the phase minus one (-1) where decisions are made not on the evaluation of the single informal area but on the satisfactory criteria of the single applicant to get the legalization tenure. To advance in an incremental approach, it's needed a rational model assessment, empiric

¹¹ Kacani, A. Andoni, D. Shtylla, A. (2017) Enclosing the Legalization, Urbanization and Integration policy of informal settlements in Albania. - Conference proceedings. European Network for the Housing Research, Tirana ENHR2017. Workshop, Metopolitan Dynamics: Urban Change, Markets and Governance. pg 95. Media Print. ISBN 978-9928-08-314-2.

www.enhr2017.com/assets/enhr-abstracts-book.15.09.20172.pdf

¹² Kacani (2018) A synoptic policy efficiency analysis on the informal areas in Albania. Comparing two case studies on Durres. - Conference proceedings. Tirana Architecture Week, TAW2018. ISBN 978-9928-4054-2-6.

and responsive on the revenues and costs. This phase can be considered as the ‘thermometer’ before the targeted policies could take place, such can be on those on Energy Poverty, Local Capacities and other Housing Policies.

The reallocation of cognitive resources, with the political veto of the municipal council about the informal areas and integration of F.I.S.I.A assessment, would increase the policy effectiveness and efficiency - and at the same time solve an unconstitutional condition on local autonomy. (Article 13 of the Albanian Constitution). After this process of resources allocation and F.I.S.I.A assessment, two directions are essential.

- Changing the decisional model, from satisfactory criteria to area priorities in order to accomplish the second objective inefficient way. The revenue's reversibility to urbanization should change following the informal area efficiency. Differently, are called exogenous resources and requires political resources.
- Moreover, explore different solutions to the hindering factors and cost on the territory throw academics and independent research institutes in order to increase policy effectiveness of the U.A. Find solutions to living in vulnerable conditions and purpose to public authorities and local inhabitants with their consensus and participation. Differently, are called endogenous resources and can be identified through the territorial impact in any country where informal areas are settled. The identification of territorial impact and assessment is an independent matter to research institutes and academics.

Both directions are crucial for the evaluation content, implementation and use efficiently and effectively the urban policies.

2

STATE OF ART ON POLICY EVALUATION

Theory | Methodology | Research Question

2.0 DEFINITION OF POLICY ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION POLICY.

Every institution, public or not, that commits evaluation, including government agencies, has evaluation policies. Sometimes these evaluation policies are defined, at other times they are not. However, evaluations are guided by policies, whether the actors involved recognizes it or not.

In the absence of written evaluation policies, actors often goes straight to the decision without negotiate, or reclaim to other actors on what consists their evaluation policies. Or, informing themselves about evaluation good practices.

One of the critical definitional questions about policy has to do with the difference between a policy and a guideline, or a policy and a theory. Standards, guidelines, and theories become policies only if and when they are consciously adopted to guide decisions or actions about evaluation and when the actor institutes consequences for encouraging or enforcing them.

For William Jenkins a policy is;

“a set of interrelated decisions taken by a political actor or group of actors concerning the selection of goals and the means of achieving them within a specified situation where those decisions should, in principle, be within the power of those actors to achieve”-
(Jenkins, 1978, p. 15)

For other authors public policies are rather a set of decisions that are taken by public authorities – some of them define public policies as an “*authoritative allocation*” as (Easton, 1953), others a “*purposive course*” (Anderson, 2003). What we understand from the definitions above is that various authors see the decisional process from different perspectives of the decisional process, but what they have in common is the “implementing” process of actions, as (Cochran & Malone, 1994) define;

“Public Policy consists of political decisions for implementing programs to achieve societal goals”.(Cochran & Malone, 1994, p. 29)

From these two perspectives of evaluation policies, we can admit that the authors sees the decisional process as a static process and not as a mutual one that changes during the implementation. However, what problems of effectiveness suggest is that policies fail and the determinants of the policy implementation can change the decisional process/model. This critical

point of view will be discussed on the analytical process of the policy analysis/evaluation by setting two different anchor periods of the U.A on Legalization, Urbanization, and Integration of the Informal Areas in Albania. (First Objective). But what is policy analysis? Are there differences on the policy evaluation?

Policy Analysis:To answer this question, let's see again the definition of Charles L. Cochran and Eloise Malone on their work on Public Policy: Perspective & Choices:

“Policy Analysis describes investigations that produce accurate and useful information for decision makers”.(Cochran & Malone, 1994, p. 1)

So, according to this view, the policy analysis is a product generated from the investigation, but is there a chronological way on how to investigate?

In the next chapter we will discuss the two main branches of Policy Evaluation and what makes them different in a chronological way on how to investigate. Till now we can agree with Prof. Hank Jenkins-Smith that;

“Policy analysis is a set of techniques’ and criteria with the which to evaluate public policy options and select among them...to rationalize the development and implementation of public policy...and as the means to greater efficiency and equity in allocation of public resources”.(Jenkins-Smith, 1990, p. Intro)

From this point of view, we have a first objective of the investigation related to the chronological way on ‘how to’ – which is related to **policy efficiency** and **effectiveness**. But how can we define the equity on the allocation of public resources? For William Dunn, the first important thing is to identify the problem and then the evaluation (if it should consist in policy efficiency or/and effectiveness).

“Policy analysis is an applied social science discipline which uses multiple methods of inquiry and argument to produce and transform policy – relevant information that may be utilized in political setting to resolve policy problems”.(Dunn, 2003, p. 2)

So, this social discipline is not only a matter of ‘for what’ but also “when” and “with what.” For “when” the next chapter will give a general description of the Albanian context of the U.A for the Legalization, Urbanization, and Integration of Informal Areas. To answer the question “with what,” let's see the process of Policy Evaluation and what makes it different from the Policy Analysis.

Policy Evaluation: For different authors, the difference between policy evaluation and policy analysis is not always clear. This difference for others is not only a methodological and chronologic (in phases) matter but also a process which requires measuring the dimension of the problem by comparing and reconfiguring the different patterns of relationships among actors involved in the decisional process or elements that constitute the evaluation criteria.

So for Norberto Bobbio, an Italian philosopher of law and political sciences and a historian of political thought, the Policy Evaluation should be seen as

“An analytical construct that identifies the essential elements of the decisional process and therefore the decision maker, his cognitive features, the activities of research for a solution, the modalities and the criteria of the choice and most of all... the relations among these different elements” -(Bobbio, 1996, p. 13)

Starting from this definition, we can highlight some of the keywords that drive the chronological way on how to investigate.

Decisional process: as we mentioned above, the decisional process is not a given context, but created by the pattern and the interaction among actors. It can be different for different decisions, and it can change during the process of decision, or even during the implementation by creating an unexpected impact – all those processes strictly related to the policy efficacy.

Decision maker: for decision maker we should take into consideration the role of the actors, their objectives if they are content related or procedural, and how many of them are. It is not only the participation criteria to make the decision makers, but also the relationship between actors.

Cognitive Features and Activities: what puts these actors in a relationship between them is not only the criteria of being part of the decisional process but also the resources that these actors change or activate in order to get to the results.

Relation: actor’s network, density, and centrality can explain to us if we have to do with an open or closed decision-making process – and also compare the decisional processes.

It does not seem natural at all, but what remains crucial is the linear process that the author gives us in order to read the whole policy. Problems on the efficiency of effectiveness can vary, and different actors can get in and out at the same time. Indeed Victor Hugo in his masterpiece “Les Misérables” defines the decision making as

“the straight line, a respectable optical illusion which ruins many a man”
(Hygo, 1862, p. 1969)

This negative implication of the actors would not happen if not for a broader aspect of the decision making which is strictly connected to the wellbeing of the public authorities and the society in its general point of view. Indeed Keneth Minogue, a British conservative political theorist, in his book “Lawyers vs. Politicians” highlights the importance of the decision making as a process that should be transferred from one actor to another, in order to make the decentralization happen.

“Changes to parliamentary procedure won't transform the lives of the people whom I represent. Decentralizing, devolving decision-making and renewing civil society will” - (Minogue, 2002) on Lord David Blunkett (Secretary of State for Work and Pensions in UK).

Below on table number one (Table 1) a first classification of the two processes for a policy life and reading.

policy analysis	policy evaluation
Descriptive	Enumerating
Process (on going)	Condition (quantitative)
Values as a social agreement.	Economic Value or other forms.
What to measure:	What to measure:
Density and Centrality of Actors.	Tax Revenues/Cost and M2 Area etc.

Table 1: Comparing ‘Policy Analysis’ with ‘Policy Evaluation’

2.1 Public Analysis/ Evaluation Policies: Where/When does It Come From?

Evaluation as an investigative tool to measure processes that have happened in a given place, timeline and with players with their resources, was applied for the first time during the 17th century. According to (Krugman, 1994) who studied this period, he inferred that the need for evaluation began as a historic moment to understand the competitiveness between state and market. The first example is a similar S.W.O.T analysis which was applied for the first time during the 17 century by Dutch merchants, in order to understand the internal problems and strategies. We also need to point out that municipalities were born only one or two centuries ago as an administrative and political instrument to govern the local scale and to collect taxes, which

before was only a competence of the church - here to mention the Holy Roman Empire the peasants revolts in the 15 century and the role of the municipalities.¹³

With the complexity added, state market, the need to evaluate becomes even more important. Only on the 19th century evaluation began to be used from other external studies for different purposes.

Some authors credit S.W.O.T to Albert Humphrey, who led a convention at the Stanford Research Institute (now SRI International) in the 1960s and 1970s using data from Fortune 500 companies.(Vliet, 2010)

A group of researchers from the French 'Laboratoire d'Analyse et de Modélisation des Systèmes pour l'Aide à la Décision' in their book on "Evaluation And Decision Models With Multiple Criteria" defines four reasons on why policy evaluation is needed, (Bouyssou, Marchant, Pirlot, Tsoukias, & Vincke, 2006):

1. Policy evaluation ideas are also applied in Economics (comparison of a bundle of goods); This section is strictly connected to the economy and sees and compares various equities accumulated in the free market.
2. Decision under uncertainty (comparing consequences under multiple states of the nature); This reason is related to the uncertainty, loss of effectiveness, and other shifting policies that lead to a loss of cognitive resources. In Theory Planning¹⁴ there are different models in planning culture, but also in planning executive. By changing the Theory Planning, the decisional model also changes. This section will be explored in 'Evaluating Policy Content' chapter (Policy pluralism and democracy).
3. There are Inter-temporal decisions (comparing consequences on several time instances); Inter-temporal decision is taken in order to increase effectiveness and efficiency of a policy. Usually this kind of evaluation is needed after a general analysis in order to see and analyze the trends.
4. Social Justice (comparing welfare distributions among individuals); This kind of evaluation is connected to those processes which require a good definition of justice, welfare and other

¹³ see (Blissett, 1999), or "Stadtluft macht frei"

¹⁴ Theory Planning is the body of scientific concepts, definitions, behavioral relationships, and assumptions that define the body of knowledge of urban planning. There are eight procedural theories of planning that remain the principal theories of planning procedure today: the rational-comprehensive approach, the incremental approach, the transactive approach, the communicative approach, the advocacy approach, the equity approach, the radical approach, and the humanist or phenomenological approach.

forms of policies that are followed by the actors involved in the policy implementation. Such analysis should be put in different scales in order to understand what is fair and what is not. For a better analysis on social welfare, it would be significant if the research is conducted outside the process in order not to be influenced by different actors¹⁵ and their work. This topic; **outside** or **inside a policy, with** or **without** the actors interested in the policy evaluation, will be a strong question and decision in itself on this chapter and on the theory definition of this research. (Setting Epistemological questions)

For Herbert Simon the process of decision making and evaluation is a complex matter that should be seen from different perspectives and a ‘problem definition’ is only a starting point.

“My research career has been devoted to understanding human decision-making and problem-solving processes. The pursuit of this goal has led me into the fields of political science, economics, cognitive psychology, computer science and philosophy of science, among others”.(Simon H. , 1947, p. Intro)

2.2 Historical Background.

In this chapter we will see some historical moments when the policy analysis/evaluation has been used to in order to change public impact on specific policies and programs. The first is related to those policies that have general and horizontal effect on the population.

The First World War signed this multiform use of evaluation, firstly on the impact of the soldiers returned from the war front, and later to medicaments used after the chemical weapons that characterized this war. It should be pointed out that a historical and a cultural consciousness was rising from mass destruction, causing an impact on human health and the society;

“Bombardment, barrage, curtain-fire, mines, gas, tanks, machine-guns, hand-grenades - words, words, but they hold the horror of the world.”. Erich Maria Remarque (1929), All Quiet on the Western Front. pg.150.


On this evaluation policy it’s clear that the definition of the problem is well addressed, but at the same time *difficult to find for outcomes and outputs* since different persons would have different causes from the war policy and war program. On this consideration comes the first critique to the policy evaluation: *The undefined Outcomes and Outputs could bring to arbitrary evaluation.*

¹⁵ Actor are all those public or private agencies that are involved in an evaluation process and later on decision making action.

In Europe during WWII, thanks to processes of policy evaluation, soldiers' morality and propaganda techniques have been put into question (Stouffer, 1949). In this case, the objectives are closer to the target group, but at the same time, it faces the irrational approach of the targeted group – which in its case acts without a clear program or plan.

In 1944 Swedish homemakers and home economics teachers established the Home Research Institute, HFI. Here scientists performed experiments on kitchen equipment and methods. The purpose was to develop new and improved products and better working conditions. In this case study, the objectives are close to the actor that should play the role. The evaluation sees and analyzes step by step the process in kitchens by defining which processes should be improved. In this case, we see the opposite of the evaluation made on propaganda impact – although it does not have clear objectives, the Output and Outcomes can be measured by defining the processes to improve evaluation in continuity. In the USA the social science profile of the evaluation was even more evident, during 1930-40s, cost efficiency of control on food and studies on eating habits has been conducted.

The end of the WWII, 'Marshall Plan' in Europe and worldwide, brought a new era of the public policies – those related strictly to the basic needs of the inhabitants, such as housing, employment, health, etc. This historical event, known as welfare state or welfare policies, couldn't have passed unobserved by those who in this period studied policy analysis or policy evaluation. For many years starting from the '80s, these policies have been critiqued under political ideology and financial cuts and public expenditure. However, what remains crucial from this period of policies are the addressed policies to improve the wellbeing of the inhabitants. The picture below shows four families of different sectors that a national state can follow. It is certain that the sectors are not only those in the picture, and housing is only one of them. In this research, the political family will not be analyzed since there are different policies and conditions followed. But, as we will see in the next chapters the policies followed for the U.A on Legalization, Urbanization and Integration will be strongly critiqued on the frame of policy analysis evaluation and decision making. Picture number two (Picture 2) shows four families of different sectors that a national state can follow. For sure that the sectors are not only those in the picture, and housing is only one of them. In this research, the political family will not be analyzed since there are different policies and conditions followed.



Picture 2: Tax-Payers for the Political Systems.

On these political considerations, the policy analysis is a relatively young field of study and we cannot define a political system by only one Agenda. Traditionally, institutions and the processes of public policymaking were the primary concern of social scientists and political scientists, but not in Albania.

In 1951 Harold Lasswell introduced the concept of “the policy sciences”. From various authors their work is often cited as the foundation for the evolution of how public policies are studied. Over time, the traditional approach expanded to include analysis of the content and process of actual policies, a discipline that is now commonly referred to as *policy analysis*. Thanks to the improvements of the study conducted by these authors and many others, it’s possible not only to analyze public policies, but also to understand the level of plurality in the decision making – that is, the process of democratization or not of a public policy. Questions arising for the research in this field are usually oriented towards a 'cause-effect' analysis, starting from the objectives, to the means and to the outcomes.

A convenient way to describe an act of communication is to answer the following questions: Who? Says What? In Which Channel? To Whom? With What Effect? (Lasswell,

The Structure and Function of Communication in Society. The Communication of Ideas., 1948, p. 117)

If we get back to the historical cases explained in this research many questions would rise. What was supposed to be done with the Chemical Weapons? What was supposed to be done with the Propaganda Technique? What was supposed to be done with the “Kitchen Equipments”? What was supposed to be done with the “Welfare Policies”?

The first two historical examples show a general interest since it was in wartime and what was supposed to be done is clear that it is related to the winning – no matter how.

The last two historical examples are strictly related to specific equipment or Welfare Policies and had specific Objectives and Means.

As we see at the end of the Decisional Making process the answering to the questions on “what objectives,” “means” and “outcome” can lead us to a deeper reading of the decisional context.

The more defined are the objectives and means the more there will be the outcomes.

From this perspective, the research will focus on the measurable objectives that the U.A on Legalization, Urbanization, and Integration has. As we will see, many objectives are at a vague definition, and such are those related to the media campaign to reduce the informal practices. So the Policy Evaluation will be conducted to those processes connected to the Territorial Planning tools and considering only what the Agenda has supposed to do since the drafting and policy design process.

Table number two (Table 2) puts in a column the historical phases described in the research by a cross-cutting analysis on the kind of decision making that brought to those policies.

	Chemical Weapons	Propaganda Techniques	Kitchen Equipment	Welfare Policies
What?	General	General	Specific	Specific
Objectives	No (not clear)	Yes (Irrational)	Yes (Rational)	Yes (Rational)
Means	Not Defined	Defined Partially	To Define	Defined
Outcome	Examples	Examples	Specific	Specific
Decisional Model	Garbage Can Model.	Limited Rationality	Incremental Model	Rational Model
What to Conduct	Policy Analysis	Policy Analysis	Policy Evaluation	Policy Evaluation

Table 2. From historical case studies to the ‘Decisional Models’.

2.3 Theories In Policy Evaluation.


As evaluation policy has changed in various years and geographic areas it's important to answer not only on 'why', as the examples given in the previous chapter, but as well on epistemological matter; what makes it happen? For this reason Bachtler - Wren gives a first introduction.

The complexity of evaluation from the divergent interests involved is deepened by the fact that it can appear in many forms. The guidelines and working documents that act as regulations only create the framework, while the national and regional environment, the institutional system and the nature of the execution are all different. The culture of evaluation and the administrative capacity for such tasks also differs between member states. While there is a strong tradition of evaluating regional development in the northern European states, in southern states, such as Greece and Italy, the specialized evaluation has not yet become an integral part of the administrative system.

(John Bachtler, 2006, p. 149)

In the research both approaches are going to be crucial in the evaluation steps, a) the guidelines and working documents, and 2) the institutional/policy nature - starting from this last.

These two differences are also recognized from epistemological questions.



Picture 3: Synthetic scheme of the main epistemological tendencies facing the question of knowledge.

Considering this separation in the epistemological questions, various authors have created and developed different theories. Starting from different theoretical approaches and geographic diffusion, many authors developed their methodology to conduct policy evaluation on political science.

To the first question "Is it possible to reach any knowledge?" we see a strong distinction which various authors describe as "behavioralism" and "post-behavioralism" approaches. From one side the question "with which known tools?" answers the "behavioralism" approach, and from the other side, the question "which is the object of the knowledge?" answers the "post-behavioralism" approach.

- Behavioralism is associated with the rise of the behavioral sciences, modeled after the natural sciences. According to (Grigsby, 2011, p.15)

The origins of behavioralism are often attributed to the work of University of Chicago professor Charles Merriam, who in the 1920s and 1930s, emphasized the importance of examining political behavior of individuals and groups rather than only considering how they abide by legal or formal rules.

This means that behavioralism claims it can explain political behavior from an unbiased, neutral point of view.

- Post-Behavioralism, described by (Chaurasia, 2003) also was known as neo-behavioralism (or neo-behaviouralism)

was a reaction against the dominance of behaviorist methods in the study of politics. One of the key figures in post-behaviouralist thinking was David Easton, who was originally one of the leading advocates of the "behavioral revolution." Post-behavioralists claimed that despite the alleged value-neutrality of behaviorist research, it was biased toward the status quo and social preservation rather than social change.

Authors in post behaviouralism neglect the importance of policies by focusing instead on political system.

The differences between the first and the second dimension will be confronted at the last session of this chapter in order to understand which is the case that would define the problems and solutions in policy effectiveness and efficiency to the U.A on Legalization, Urbanization, and Integration of Informal areas. As we will see below, three different methodologies have been drawn following each dimension.

On the one hand, the Theory-Driven Evaluation, strictly related to the behaviouralism and the other two on post-behaviouralism; Utilization-focused Evaluation and Empowerment Evaluation. As mentioned above, the thesis research will not enter on this philosophical debate, but will instead accumulate more knowledge as possible for the Informal Areas and Settlements. The distinction and the innovation in the theoretical framework will focus on the order for the evaluation processes.¹⁶, from **Evaluating Policy Content**¹⁷, **Evaluating Policy Implementation**¹⁸ and **Evaluating Policy Impact**¹⁹.

Table number three (table 3) puts in a matrix the difference mentioned above among behavioralism and post with the respective theories.

Public Policy Evaluation in:	Behaviouralism	Post-behaviouralism
Geographic Area in Use.	UK, USA	France, Germany
Period of Theory Definition.	1920-'30 in USA.	1950-'60 in USA.
First Authors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Charles Merriam, • Harold Lasswell. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • David Easton
Lastbooks/publications by Author.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Huey-Tsyh Chen. (2006) • Bruno Dente. (2014) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • David Fetterman (2007) • Michael Quinn Patton.
Theory Name.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Theory Driven Evaluation. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Empowerment Evaluation. • Utilization Focused Evaluation.
Fields Applied. How to conduct it.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Political Science, • Computing Data. • Unbiased, Neutral. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Political Science, • Values to Societal Relevance. • Systems.
Order of Evaluation process.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evaluating Policy Content. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evaluating Policy Implementation • Evaluating Policy Impact.

Table 3: Index of Theory: Two Theoretical Branches. Geographic Area, Period, Authors and the Field Applied.

¹⁶ the Order of Evaluation process constitutes the theoretical structure of the research.

¹⁷**Evaluating Policy Content:** Does the content clearly articulate the goals of the policy? Evaluating the development of a policy helps to understand the context, content, and implementation.

¹⁸**Evaluating Policy Implementation:** Was the policy implemented as intended? Evaluation of policy implementation can provide important information about the barriers to and facilitators of implementation and a comparison between different components or intensities of implementation.

¹⁹**Evaluating Policy Impact:** Did the policy produce the intended outcomes and impact? Within injury prevention, the intended impact may be a reduction in injuries or severity of injuries. However, it is important to evaluate short-term and intermediate outcomes as well.

2.3.1 Evaluating the Policy Content: Theory-Driven Evaluation (TH.D.E)

Evaluating policy content may seem a biased analysis if it is not declared since the beginning of the research that it refers only to regulations and the Law, or to the U.A that are supposed to do. Policy content would be the consistency of the various actors and their diversity in action and objectives. However, here, on the diversity, two significant problems arise; on the one hand, the cooperation process that actors are involved in, and on the other, the final results that this diversity generates. This consecutive process is described by Rossi as follows;

...the findings of "no effects" have been interpreted as reflecting the failures of the social engineering efforts embodied in the programs, an assertion that we simply do not know enough to be able to design programs that are effective in achieving given goals or that can be effectively implemented on a mass scale.

(Rossi, 1976).

For (Scriven, 1972) and other authors, this ineffectiveness is also due to the evaluation process that various actors take in order to understand their weaknesses and opportunities.

The failures of programs reflect the failures of evaluation methods, insisting that the research paradigms employed contain built-in obstacles to finding effectiveness.

(Scriven, 1972)

For this reason it is important always to ask if the content clearly articulates the goals of the policy, its implementation and the underlying logic for why the policy will produce such intended change? Evaluating the development of policy helps to understand the context, content, and implementation. They become evaluation policy when actors decide it is going to use this approach or adopt this theory in doing evaluations; failing to do so will bring consequences.

These two characteristics of policy—consciousness, and consequence—are not always consistent within an organization. The Theory-Driven Evaluation described by (Chen, 1990) rises two epistemological questions which he calls as action model.

Why does the intervention affect the outcomes? Which he calls (change model).

And, "How question": How are the contextual factors and program activities organized for implementing the intervention and supporting the change process?


Picture four (Picture 4) explains the linear process for each of the questions. With number 1 Intervention and 3 Outcomes, it is possible to understand the explicitly, or not, of the objectives

and the plurality of the actors giving measurable outcomes, or not. Determinants represent the process in which actors interact, their actions and how this 'reality' performs.



Picture 4: The linear model of the Theory-Driven Evaluation (Th.D.E). By Chen (1990)

The more actors are involved in the process, the more complex action would be. This evaluation expresses the effectiveness of the policy. In order to measure this complexity various authors, such as (Dente, Understanding Policy Decisions., 2014) suggest to create a matrix of the Institutional Decision Arena based on the linear model given by the Theory Driven Evaluation. In the picture below (Picture 5) the index of each process on the methodology will constitute this matrix.



Picture 5: Index for the Complexity Matrix. Evolution of the Linear Model for the Public Policies. By Dente (2014).

The evolving from "the Linear Model" to an "Index of the Complexity Matrix" for each process of the evaluation needs a further clarification on the final impact. To begin, there is a need to draw a distinct line between policy outputs and policy outcomes. Policy outputs are the things produced by actors in pursuance of policy decisions and guidelines. The concept of outputs focuses one's attention on such matters as amounts of taxes collected, miles of high ways

built, welfare benefits paid, price-fixing agreements prosecuted, traffic fines collected, or foreign-aid projects undertaken. Outputs usually can be readily counted, totaled, and statistically analyzed. Examining outputs may indicate, or seem to indicate, that a lot is being done to implement a policy. Such activity, however, sometimes amounts to nothing more than what Professor William T. Gormley, Jr., calls "bean counting". Agencies, under pressure from legislators, interest groups, and others to demonstrate results that

"may focus on outputs, not outcomes, in order to generate statistics that create the illusion of progress." (Gormley, 2014)

If the percentage of students graduating from universities in a state increases, does this tell us anything about the quality of education that they are receiving?

Policy outcomes, differently, are the consequences for society, planned or not, deliberating governmental actions or inactions. Macro analysis on city inaffordability of Social welfare policies can be used to illustrate this concept. Indeed, it is relatively easy to measure welfare-policy outputs, the average level of benefits, and the number of actors assisted. But what are the outcomes, or societal consequences, of these actions? Do they increase spatial and territorial justice?

Both Indicators "Outputs" and "Outcome" will be considered in this research in order to have the impact of the U.A on Legalization, Urbanization, and Integration of the Informal Settlements.

2.3.2 Evaluating the Policy Implementation: Empowerment Evaluation (E.E).

Determinants are an important process in the Policy Implementation. Resources²⁰, and Policies²¹ and various Roles²² that actors play (action model)²³, produce the outcomes and show the policy effectiveness and efficiency. But, not always the results express the realisation of the primary objectives - disappointing actors involved in the evaluation.

There is a commonly held perception that many program evaluations tend to show few, if any, outcomes. This has led to tremendous dissatisfaction and disappointment with programs and with program evaluation. (Fetterman & Wandersman, 2005).

²⁰ Resources, (Dente, Understanding Policy Decisions., 2014)

²¹ Policies, (Dente, Understanding Policy Decisions., 2014)

²² Roles, (Dente, Understanding Policy Decisions, 2014)

²³ (Chen, 1990).

David Fetterman from Stanford University in the United States of America initially developed empowerment evaluation in 1994. Its roots are found in community psychology, action anthropology and participatory and collaborative approaches to evaluation. (Fetterman & Wandersman, 2005, p. 28) defines empowerment evaluation as:


... an evaluation approach that aims to increase the probability of achieving program success by

(1) providing program stakeholders with tools for assessing the planning, implementation, and self-evaluation of their program, and

(2) mainstreaming evaluation as part of the planning and management of the program/organization.

This characteristic of Empowerment Evaluation speaks about the importance of a continuing evolution for a better decision making process. As we saw on the 'Policy Content', evaluation is a final result of the impact, but not a process that should occur in the implementation phase. Fetterman (2001) outlines three steps in conducting an empowerment evaluation, through a series of workshops with as broad diversity of stakeholders as possible, but maintaining a predetermined theory and without influence from the evaluator;

1) Developing a Mission and Vision, 2) Taking Stock, and 3) Planning for future. (Picture 6).




Picture 6: Empowerment Evaluation Theory (E.E). By Fetterman & Wandersman, (2007).

These three processes of empowerment evaluation represent the diversity in the implementation and show a fundamental critique of the first theory on the linear model. Both theories are developed separately and represent the separation from the 'behavioral' approach to the 'post-behavioral'.

The first gives final result "On Output/outcomes," the second focuses on the degree of cooperation among actors and what they exchange. But, if the Empowerment Evaluation is considered in the 'Determinants' factors of the Linear Model, it may give answers to the inefficacy and inefficiency of the public policies. Picture seven (Picture7) shows a graphical continuity among these two evaluations. On this consideration, we can assume that the

development of the evaluation theories has developed to a more focus oriented approach. Traditionally focused evaluation on "Outputs" and "Outcomes" seems a descriptive process rather on the content. It does not give explanations on why the 'reality' is how it is and describes only the systematic inefficiency the inefficacy of the public policies. Shifting the evaluation form "On Content" to "On the Action" by considering the roles, the resources and the policies²⁴ change also the knowledge on epistemological reference, from "which is the object of the knowledge" to "with which tools it's possible to achieve this knowledge".

The aim is for empowerment evaluation to become an ongoing cyclical process that is embedded into programs, leading to continual improvement, organizational learning and change. (Fetterman & Wandersman, 2005, p. 192)



Picture 7: Empowerment Evaluation Theory (E.E) as a Determinant in the Linear Model.

²⁴the determinants indicators by Dente, 2014.

The three-step empowerment evaluation approach is described below. What remains essential in this research by applying an Empowerment Evaluation is the need to share common problems that a policy might face in the action phase and to identify solutions where actors see conflicts. As we will see below in the Methodology and Research Question, 'The U.A on informal settlements and areas is the complex policy that will be analyzed in this research.

Step.1 Developing a mission and vision involves developing statements that capture the mission and vision or unifying purpose of the program. The aim is to reach consensus on key phrases in the statements, which are seen as representing the values of stakeholders and the agreed purpose and long-term outcomes of the program. This process is undertaken even when an existing mission and vision statement exists.

Step 2: Taking stock This step involves brainstorming, then rating the most important program activities to be evaluated and discussing the ratings in groups. This provides an opportunity for baseline data on the program and its strengths and weaknesses to be assembled.

Step 3: Planning for the future Realistic goals for each of the key activities are identified, together with strategies that will help reach these goals and the forms of documentation or evidence (i.e. surveys, checklists, minutes of meetings, etc.) that will enable progress towards these goals to be monitored..

(Fetterman & Wandersman, 2005, p. 93).

2.3.3 Evaluating Policy Impact: Utilization Focused Evaluation (U.F.E).

Evaluating Policy Impact does not refer to Outcomes and Outputs, but rather to the question 'how the actors, users, achieve the necessary knowledge for the decision making.' Do they use it? Misuse, disuse or refuse it? To answer to these questions, Michael Quinn Patton developed Utilization-Focused Evaluation (UFE). It is an approach based on the principle that an evaluation should be judged on its usefulness to its intended users.

“Intended users are more likely to use evaluations if they understand and feel ownership of the evaluation process and findings [and that] [t]hey are more likely to understand and feel ownership if they've been actively involved. By actively involving primary intended users, the evaluator is preparing the groundwork for use”.

(Patton, 1996, p. 22).

This theory as the Empowerment Evaluation has been developed separately and both this theory and Utilization-Focused Evaluation show the necessity to focus on the determinants of the Linear Model. For other actors, this process is so crucial that it requires extra abilities and actors in order to perform it.

In our experience, evaluation professionals using UFE for the first time require mentoring support. . . . [DECI supported] a team approach where evaluation mentors coach and mentor project-based evaluators and project implementers — and everybody learns together.

(Ramírez & Brodhead, 2013, p. 5)


That is called walking the talk. As the authors describes

'The talk' is all about genuine collaboration, mutual understanding, shared ownership, and engaged learning. The walk (practice) is about engaging in evaluation processes to achieve the desired outcome of intended use by intended users.

(Ramírez & Brodhead, 2013)


According to (Patton, 1996), many processes should occur in order to have this genuine collaboration. In the picture below (Picture 8) only 5 (five) of the evaluation keywords have been produced. From the theoretical point of view, Utilization-Focused Evaluation is a unique kind of evaluation, because it leads to responsible analysis passing from the statement of knowledge, to a situational analysis and later to a decision making. These consecutive steps may be seen even as an agenda which should occur before the decision is made. As we will see in the Policy Content Chapter, decisions ad-hoc are very usual for the public authorities involved in the U.A of the Legalization, Urbanization, and Integration of the Informal Settlements and Areas in Albania.

*Utilization Focused Evaluation
(Michael Quinn Patton, 1996)*



Picture 8: Steps to Utilization-Focused Evaluation Theory (U.F.E). by Patton (1996).

The picture below (Picture 9) explains the role of the Utilization Focused Evaluation on all theories analyzed in this chapter. By maintaining a focus oriented on Empowerment and Utilization, it's possible to have a better explanation about the inefficacy and inefficiency of the U.A. From the epistemological point of view, it brings the post-behavioral analysis to behavioral and so on empirically measurable.



Picture 9: From Content Retailed to focus on Empowerment and Utilization.

2.4. Toward a 'Responsive Focused Evaluation'.

Starting from picture 1: "Synthetic scheme of the main epistemological tendencies facing the question of knowledge," there are two ways to gain knowledge. Answering to "With which tools?" and "which is the subject of the knowledge?" we can classify the three theories analyzed in this research, TH.DE, E.E, U.F.E. The analysis below will give direct connections to these epistemological questions to these theories. The multiform of these theories will constitute what in this research will be called "Responsive Focused Evaluation." Due to a series of critiques analyzed above, and below, the new theoretical structure will propose 3 Steps for a sensitive policy efficiency and effectiveness.

Picture 5 and 6 show the structure and the proceeding of the "Responsive Evaluation Theory'.


From the academic point of view, each step described separately is not a novelty for scholars engaged in Policy Evaluation, but the structure and order of Evaluation process, which constitutes the theoretical model for sensitive research on policy effectiveness and policy efficiency.

A better explanation of these theoretical diversities and epistemological approaches, behavioral and post-behavioral, is given since the beginning of the early '60. The second approach, which authors usually call "Policy Analysis" attempts to study policy itself as an object and to produce understanding and normative knowledge for the policy process. According to(Lasswell, The future of political science, 1963, p. 25), which is the first author to theorize the Policy Evaluation, there are different methodologies and branches from the Political Studies;

1. *Multi-Methods*
2. *Multi-Disciplinary*
3. *Problem Focused*
4. *Concerned to map the contextuality of the policy process, policy option and policy outcomes. Whose goal is to integrate knowledge into an overarching discipline to analyze public choices and decision making.*

The novelty of the Responsive Focused Evaluation is that brings three theories in one, including all the five branches mentioned by Lasswell. The research will follow the consecutive steps, 4, 3 and 2, 1. For number 4, Theory-Driven Evaluation will lead the UA evaluation on policy content. For number 3, Empowerment Evaluation, and (1) and (2) in Utilization-focused theory, on policy

implementation and policy impact. The picture below (Picture 10) explains the correlation between theories and evaluation approaches.



Picture 10: Steps to a 'Responsive Evaluation Theory'.

For other authors this process is called "Policy Design".

A Policy Analysis study generally tries to identify the different elements which compose public policy—for example, instruments, problems, causes, consequences, laws, decisions, public concerns, and so on—to understand the link between them or/and to propose some new connections. Inside Policy Analysis, we can group different subcategories like “Policy Design”, which contribute to produce “clear connections between the assumed causes of the problem being addressed, the instruments used to attempt to remedy this situation, and an understanding of what desirable outcome would be”(Peters & Pierre, 2006, p. 3).

First Step: Evaluating Policy Content.

Is it possible to evaluate the policy efficiency and effectiveness from the first theory (TH.D.E) in the Policy Content? If yes with which tools?

Thanks to the behavioral analysis from the given 'Index of Complexity Matrix' given by (Dente, Understanding Policy Decisions., 2014), it's possible to understand which actors are involved in the specific agenda, their objectives, resources and policies that they follow, concluding with the 'outcomes' and 'outputs'. This process faces a critical position on data limitation and effects that a policy would generate - even if they can be estimated or quantified they are not part of the evaluation. The communication of these data on 'outcomes' and 'outputs' are usually too complicated to be understood by citizens due to the complexity of the units to evaluate. Meetings, periodical publications and reports from public authorities are not a quantitative matter and so can not reflect the policy efficiency and policy effectiveness – or, if yes, they would be partial. For this reason, the "*Responsive Focused Evaluation*" suggest to direct question to the focused evaluations - next step.

Second Step: Evaluation Policy Implementation.

Focused evaluation means to bring to the center of the process the determinants that make a policy effective, efficient, or not. According to some authors, such as (Balducci, 1991), policy evaluation should give a particular attention to effectiveness, otherwise the results...

(Outcome and Output assessments) of an entire project or program could be at risk. Examples explain that the typical cases are when there's an animated path by different actors, each bringing its interest. Or, there's by a road marked by discontinuity, recursive moments, stall phases. A track of knowledge is limited and has insufficient knowledge called to interact. There's a journey in which the definition of the solution turns out to be part of the process, partial results, never definitive.

These realities create the basis for the post-behavioral analysis undermining the real evaluation of public policy. By understanding the actor's role, their policies, and resources, defined as determinants in the Theory-Driven Evaluation we can highlight the stakes, potentialities, and weaknesses. On the methodology, a probabilistic approach will drive to the hindering factors.

Third Step: Evaluating Policy Impact.

Last, but not least, the Utilization-Focused evaluation is an essential phase for a 'Responsive Evaluation.' It calls in action specific actors and responsibility. By doing so, it is possible to

understand the diversity in post-behavioral approaches among actors. How rational is it their decision making? How do they use this knowledge? For a 'Responsive Evaluation,' the decision making is not an ad-hoc action, it requires simultaneous surveys and repetitive interaction among actors.

2.4.1 'Responsive Focused Evaluation' in Good Governance and Decision Making.

For this reason, to not have an ad-hoc condition, we can assume that the decision-making analysis is needed. It reflects the degree of good governance and directly the policy efficiency and effectiveness. According to (Dente, Understanding Policy Decisions., 2014) since WWII four decisional models have been defined in the complexity of the decision making.

The Rational Model

Basically, according to the rational model, the individual who has to make a decision should: 1. Prioritize his/her values and goals; 2. know all the possible means to reach the goals; 3. Evaluate the consequences of each alternative; 4. Calculate the costs associated with the choice of all the available alternatives; 5. Choose the alternative, able to maximize the benefits and to minimize the costs²⁵.

According to (Bobbio, 1996) this first model promises to “create a space taken away from politics”, in which essential choices, not the ones on big options and general goals, but the ones representing the heart of public policies, can be made exclusively at a technical level without requiring long and hard debates. Making the right decision is just a matter of technically defining the form and the parameters of an equation and inserting data in a computer²⁶.

The Bounded Rationality

According to Herbert Simon (Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences) in “Administrative Behavior”, published right after the end of the Second World War (Simon H. , 1947),

“the rationality of an actor lies not the fact that he is omniscient, that he/she knows all the objectives, all the alternatives, all the consequences of each alternative, but the fact

²⁵(Dente, Understanding Policy Decisions, 2014)

²⁶(Dente, Understanding Policy Decisions, 2014)

that his/her behavior is at least potentially purposive, aimed at reaching a goal, even if this is not completely defined at the beginning of the process.

The decision maker will try to behave consistently, but will inevitably suffer from a series of intellectual limits. In such a situation, the rational decision maker looks for satisfying courses of actions, or actions that are “good enough” on the basis of the information he has, avoiding any pretence of optimization, i.e. of maximization of the effectiveness of the solution²⁷.

Incremental Model

The starting point of Charles Lindblom, the scholar who proposed the incremental model, in an article dated 1959 significantly titled “The science of muddling through” (Lindblom C. E., 1959, p. 356), is that the close observation of policy making processes highlights the following recurring features; 1. the values, objectives and empirical analysis of the action to be carried out are not distinct, but closely linked; 2. since aims and means are not distinct, the analysis of the appropriateness of the means required to reach the aims is often limited; 3. the test a “good” policy must pass is typically the fact that different analysts agree on its adoption, without necessarily agreeing that it is the most appropriate means for a shared objective; 4. the analysis is drastically limited in the sense that (a) important and possible consequences are neglected, (b) important alternative policies are neglected and (c) important values are neglected; 5. a series of subsequent comparisons reduce or eliminate any trust in the theory.

What Lindblom’s model suggests is that there’s a huge step forward to the formulation if the decision making process is conducted by one decision maker or many of them- by emphasizing the fact that the choice emerging from the decisional process is almost never an act of will of the single decision maker, but the product of social interaction²⁸.

Garbage Can Model

This model states that in all decisional situations where there is ambiguity at the level of objectives (badly defined by the actors), of the usable technology (that isn’t very clear), and of actors’ participation (that tends to vary in time) the decision derives from the accidental meeting—mediated by the intervention of contingent factors—of problems,

²⁷(Dente, Understanding Policy Decisions, 2014)

²⁸(Dente, Understanding Policy Decisions, 2014)

*solutions, participants and opportunities of choice. This is the core of the model proposed by James March and Johann Olsen in 1979 that they called ‘‘garbage-can model’’.*²⁹

The authors explain the metaphor as follows:

‘‘Suppose we view a choice opportunity as a garbage can into which various problems and solutions are dumped by participants. The mix of garbage in a single can depends partly on the labels attached to the alternative cans; but it also depends on the what garbage it is produced at the moment, on the mix of cans available and on the speed with which garbage is collected and removed from the scene’’ (James March, 1976).

Conclusions

In the decisional models described above criteria of the decision differs from one model to the other, but what remains constant in all the decisional models are the three processes of an action: objective – means – result. These three processes also describe the linear model of the decision making or policy evaluation defined by Chen. Each of these three processes is a crucial element for the definition of the decisional model. Table four (table) analyses all the decisional model from the perspective of the objectives, means (if they are defined) and outcomes/output (if they are defined).

RATIONAL MODEL	BOUNDED RATIONALITY	INCREMENTAL	GARBAGE CAN
Objectives	Objectives	Objectives	Objectives
Means	<i>unknown</i>	Means	<i>unknown</i>
Output/Outcome	Output/Outcome	<i>unknown</i>	<i>unknown</i>

Table 4: Comparing the 'Decisional Models'

The decisional models described above are essential at the last phase of the policy evaluation, that referred to policy impact - as defined by R.F.E. As we will see the revenue's reversibility is a crucial element to understand if the actors reflect or not in the base of the evaluation. The laws say that revenue's reversibility is not responsive to what happens to the territory. Neither to the urban morphology, neither to those who can not get a legalization permit - so less revenues. The

²⁹(Dente, Understanding Policy Decisions, 2014)

percentage of 20%, defined by law, as revenue's reversibility is arbitrary and shows a Bounded Rationality decision-making model.

At last, we propose, an indicative way on how to get a fair distribution to hindering factors, urbanization and other territorial priorities on a social and administrative matter. F.I.S.I.A assessment is the first tool to go beyond the Bounded Rationality decision-making model to an Incremental model. Once measured the territorial resources into the fee, revenues, and costs, resetting the revenue's reversibility is such an arithmetical matter. Communicative maps on policy efficiency and effectiveness show better the diversities that exist among different informal areas.

Conclusions on Policy Evaluation. What is responsive focused evaluation (R.F.E)

Responsive Focused Evaluation is a combination of three theories in policy evaluation studies. It starts with the idea that it is fundamental to gain knowledge of different phases from the evaluation. Moreover, each phase follows a consecutive process of theories developed in different periods.

THDE, Theory-Driven Evaluation, Huey-Tsyh Chen. (2006) and Bruno Dente (2014), is recognized as a linear evaluation of policies. In this theory, research questions are posed as "who does what, with what resources, with what kind of policies, and with what results?"

The theoretical description of these authors seems to guide but also to reflect on the results. In the case of informal settlements in Albania, different data emerged showing contradictory conditions over time. Some authors have defined this theoretical research process as "bean counting" and as such erroneous.

For this reason, the thesis does not neglect this theory, but takes part in it and goes on to the second theory of urban policy evaluation, focused on the evaluation on empowerment.

EE, Empowerment Evaluation, developed by (Fetterman & Wandersman, 2005), criticizes THDE and its inability to provide noticeable evaluation results. The authors argue that policy evaluation should start from the resources of the actors in order to make them viable by different actors.

For this reason, this second theory of the thesis will be seen as a complementary part to the first, THDE, to continue in the search for effectiveness and efficiency of the UA.

Economic resources, those necessary to achieve the second objective, urbanization, are at risk, and this is for some factors that can be measured in the territory. The hindering factors for legalization are a result of **a probability of four (4) failing categories (Figure 15)**. The result is four, because there are two territorial resources which generate revenues from the legalization process, the **occupied land**, and the **settlement surface**.

F.I.S.I.A is a numerical evaluation that demonstrates a positive or negative result. If it is negative, it means that public revenues from legalization are not sufficient to bring urbanization, since the hindering factors are high. If positive, it means that the second objective of the urban agenda has been achieved and now politics must move forward to the third objective of the urban agenda, the integration of informal areas. In addition to empirical measurements, it is important to measure the territorial impact that informal settlements have on the territory, ($S > P > U$) and it is transitory phases.

UFE - for authors like Michael Quinn Patton, evaluating the usefulness of a policy is the key to success in evaluation theories. So the question is how this information will be used. Starting from the elements that influence F.I.S.I.A, such as costs and public revenues, it is possible to express effectiveness and efficiency in different territorial gradients.

3

METHODOLOGY

Theory | Scale | Units | Time

3.0 METHODOLOGY

Responsive Focused Evaluation, as described in the last chapter, is a process which does not neglect the three theories of policy evaluation, but instead reinforces the necessity to follow step by step. "It may seem as an onion when we use different equipment on each layer, in order to look for specific components. To do so, we need different tools". For this purpose, the research will follow three of them: scale, units and time.

Scale: the matter of scale is an essential tool in order to know the dimensions of measurements. It may vary in different contexts, but what remains crucial in research it is the necessity to define one.

Units: once defined the scale, the Units are another tool which permits us to express the research in values. They may vary from one case to another, depending on the nature of the policy under evaluation.

Time: is a valuable tool to understand the tendencies, behavioral issues dynamism and compare them. It depends on the nature of the societal dynamics or of public policy. All these tools, as we will see below, will be considered separately for each of the steps in the Responsive Focused Evaluation and will constitute the analysis of the research limitations.


3.1 From 'Responsive Focused Theory' to a methodology for the Informal Areas and Settlements in Albania.

Informal settlement in Albania has been settled since the earliest '90s till nowadays, in 2018. There are various estimations on this process. On simple research on internet we can find contradictory data on settlement legalized and those not. Reports of A.L.U.Z.N.I agency usually are not reliable on compressive outputs and outcomes, and they are used to be a political tool for elections and direct public corruption. The role of a gatekeeper that this actor has increased this last process, public corruption.

Meanwhile, the agency was publishing reports on informal settlements somewhere this practice was happening for real. So we cannot be sure if the final goal of the agency is to legalize all the informal settlements. Other actors should be involved!

The first step of the Responsive Focused Evaluation goes to this research; who are the actors? Which is their role? What resources do they have? Moreover, what policies do they follow? As declared on the introduction of the methodology, these questions will be expressed on defined scale, units and time. While informality occurs, different actors may see it as an opportunity or a risk. As the national state level collects the most significant part of the legalization fee, municipalities face the problem of urbanization and tax collection. Starting from this statement, The Focused Empowerment Evaluation will be useful to show the weaknesses and the opportunities of each actor and express them in values (units). The disparities the one municipality may have with the national level influences the urban spatial justice and wealth distribution - the main territorial planning principles.

According to the steps of evaluating each theory is going to give significant units and indicators for the RFE evaluation. The picture below (Picture 11) shows the three steps, the respective theory and the units chosen for the methodology.



Picture 11: Methodology for the 'Responsive Evaluation Theory'.

3.2 Phase 1: Evaluating the Policy Content.

The first is the **Theory-Driven Evaluation (TH.D.E)**, theorized by Huey-tsyh Chen in 1990. It sees the '**Interventions-Determinants-Outcomes**' as a consequential process in which researchers can evaluate the policy effectiveness. But, why the policy effectiveness? Since the beginning of the research, it has been useful to make an 'outside' research in order to understand what's the real U.A on Legalization, Urbanization, and Integration and to not be influenced by opinions and other political interpretation. In this process, all the actors have been listed in the Public Institutional Arena, as well as their resources and policies that they should use for the U.A.

Outputs and Outcomes have been listed according to each actor, the correspondent policy and resource that may have to accomplish specific public duty. Although theory on (R.F.E) suggests that these data may not show the real policy efficiency and effectiveness, some of them are irrevocable. In order to have unified measurements, it has been chosen to work on the first step of 'Evaluation Policy Content,' the scale of the Tirana - Durrës Region. The identification unit is the 'informal area.'³⁰ expressed in (ha). (Picture 11)

As we will see in the 'Research Question,' a cost-benefit analysis for the policy efficiency will be made, and the units expressed in Euro (€) are going to be an essential element to evaluate. The research focuses on two main units (ha) and (€). From the linear process, it is possible to identify the actors, their resources and their ability to generate revenues in order to get the second objective of the U.A, urbanization, set in regulations and law. Outputs and Outcomes, even if in large, they are assessed according to these two units.

In order to understand the decisional process, which actor - get's "what?" and "when?" an 'institutional decisional arena' raises the needed questions on matrix.

The table below, table five, explains how the methodology can be applied in a single matrix in order to understand the 'Interventions-Determinants-Outcomes.' For further explanations³¹, the theory will be focused on determinants; role; specific goal; policy; and resources.

³⁰ Informal Areas are homogenous legal statement of settlements and neighborhoods defined as 'informal areas'. In 2016 are reported by law to be 277 informal for a total of 205 ha spread around the outskirts of the big cities such as Tirana, Durrës, Shkodër etc, including around 300.000 families. For more details on 'informal areas' and their legal status see law. 9482 (03.4.2006). article nr.13.

³¹critiques on the unreality of 'outcomes' and 'outputs.'

According to (Dente, Understanding Policy Decisions, 2014), each of these determinants has a specific meaning in public policy evaluation.

For '**Actor**' in the decision making, we should understand only those actors who are called in action thanks to public law or regulation. By the actions implied for them in the U.A, the '**Role**' can be determined. Roles might be many, and they may change during a decisional making process. As we will see in the next chapter (Limits, scale units and time), it is possible to understand this change of roles only thanks to an evaluation on different periods and by confronting the actor's network (chapter five). For public policy, we should intend all those regulations and actions that are written on the U.A on Legalization, Urbanization, and Integration of Informal Areas. Four of them have been listed; distributive policies³², regulatory³³ and constituent policies³⁴. Each specific role determines as well the kind of public resource that an actor might have. Economical³⁵, Legal³⁶, Political³⁷ or Cognitive³⁸. This methodology is going to be applied in evaluating policy content step "the nature of the U.A". Table number five (Table 5) puts the institutional decision arena in one matrix of evaluation, or the "Linear evaluation"

name	Promotor, Director, etc.	Law, article and regulations.	Distributive, Redistributive, Regulatory and Constituent.	Legal, Economical, Political and Cognitive.	Report, Studies and journals etc.	Report, Studies and journals etc.	Estimation in unit.
Actor	Role	Specific Goal	Policy	Resources	Output	Outcome	Units in €, ha

Table 5: Institutional Decision Arena.

³² Redistributive policies are concerned with changing the existing distribution or allocation of resources or benefits.

³³ Regulatory policies are core part of the OECD's work and other international organization, touching aspects in every sector of the economy and affecting the everyday life of business and citizens. It is important that governments ensure that what they do in economic and social affairs is efficient and effective. Through the use of regulations, laws, and other instruments, governments intervene in the economy in pursuit of their objectives.

³⁴ Constituent policies creates executive power entities, or deal with laws.(Dente, Understanding Policy Decisions, 2014)

³⁵ Economical resources consist of the ability to mobilize money or any form of wealth in order to modify other actors' behavior. (Dente, Understanding Policy Decisions, 2014)

³⁶ Legal resources can be seen as advantages or disadvantages, attributed to particular subjects by legal regulations and in general by legislative and administrative authority's decisions.(Dente, Understanding Policy Decisions, 2014)

³⁷ Political resources are the amount of consensus an actor is able to get. It can refer to the whole population or to specific social groups involved in the various public policies. (Dente, Understanding Policy Decisions, 2014)

³⁸ Cognitive resource is related to data management and knowledge.(Dente, Understanding Policy Decisions, 2014)

The next phase for the analysis of the determinants is going to be focused on **Actor's network**, their resources and role in the U.A on legalization, urbanization and integration of informal areas and settlements.

As we will see below in the next chapter, time is going to be a significant measurement in order to understand the shifting role of the actors in more than 10 years of U.A. According to various authors, such as (Dente, Understanding Policy Decisions, 2014) this measurement can come through a process of counting the number of relationships in exit and the total number of actors involved. By doing the actor's network on two different periods and by measuring the centrality and density of U.A, (t1) and (t2) it is possible to understand the shifting role of the actors and the resources called in action.

$$\text{centrality} = \frac{\text{HIGHEST NUMBER OF RELATIONS IN EXIT BY THE MAIN ACTOR WHO HAS MORE RELATIONS}}{\text{TOTALRELATIONSINEXITBYALLTHEACTOR}} =$$

from 0 to 1 the highest centrality level. , it can be measured on (t0) and (t1) by a survey of the law on regulations emerged.

$$\text{density} = \frac{\text{TOTAL RELATIONS IN EXIT BY ALL ACTORS}}{\text{NUMBER OF ACTORS}^2 - \text{NUMBER OF ACTORS}} =$$

from 0 to 1 the highest centrality level. , it can be measured on (t0) and (t1) by a survey of the law on regulations emerged.

Formula A: Measuring policy centrality and density from the actor's network. (Dente, Understanding Policy Decisions, 2014)

Indeed for (Coleman, 1956), *the existence of multiple centers of power and avenues of status attainment is a central ingredient in maintaining the freedom-order balance among actors.*


For many other authors, this research can create and open a new discussion on public decentralization and governance. As stated in the introduction, the Responsive Focused Evaluation will follow an accurate policy efficiency analysis and effectiveness, two main principles of Good Governance³⁹.

The picture below shows some examples of an actor's network in a specific agenda or project. Five different conditions have been illustrated, in order to explain better the de/centralization and density dynamism.

Case (A) shows a high centrality level, where all actors called in action have to deal directly with one main actor. The second case, (B), the centrality and the interaction among actors are at the

³⁹ Good Governance defined by World Bank

same level but with one difference, that two of the peripheral actors face competences and duty among each other. Case (C) shows a condition where the decision-making process is centralized among two actors, and there's a high polarization among other actors. The last two cases, (D) and (E), show a better condition of cooperation with the only difference that the first has a lower level of cooperation and under these conditions, actors should act in line with each other. Picture twelve (Picture 12) illustrates the five cases of actor's network and the differences condition of centrality and density.



Picture 12: Actor's network on different conditions of de/centralization and density.

3.2.1 Data Survey From Laws, Regulations And Reports.

The research for the policy content will be focused on a survey on laws and regulations drafted and approved for the informal areas and settlement since 2006. From this perspective, the methodology and the epistemological question would be on behavioral approach, even if many critiques can be made from the cultural background of the public institutions to follow the laws and regulations strictly. Indeed, many critiques as well are directed to an inexistent law of rule and a high bureaucracy and corruptive public practice.

In order not to fall into a biased methodology, the research on policy content will follow a behavioral approach, what if actors follows the U.A? What we know from the various theories of evaluation is that each specific regulation calls in action different actors, with the meaning resources and policy, and this brings to outcomes and outputs. Only at this moment it is possible to have a post-behavioral survey on why actors did, or not, do specific actions for the expected results. This consecutive process as described, from actors to outputs and outcomes, and not vice versa, will bring in mind the importance that policies determine politics - an essential assumption from (Lowi, 1972).

From the historical point of view, the U.A on Legalization, Urbanization and Integration of Informal Areas and Settlements has been a slow and bureaucratic process. But as we see on the list, many changes have been evolved in more than 10 years.

Law no. 9482, dated 3.4.2006 On the Legalization, Urbanization and Integration of Informal Settlements and Areas.Later changes with, Law No. 9786, dated 19.7.2007, law no.9895, dated 9.6.2008, law no. 10 099, dated 19.3.2009, law no. 10 219, dated 4.2.2010, law no. 141/2013, dated 2.5.2013, law No. 50/14, dated 14.5.2014 and with law 62/2015, dated 11.6.2015

Below we see these laws classified in different periods with the most significant regulations and changes, or simply called VKM⁴⁰ in Albanian law.

In 2006 five significant regulations have been adopted in the law on U.A.

- On the adoption of a plan for legalization, urbanization and integration of informal settlements.
- To establish procedures for the collection, processing and management of data of informal settlements, and to the establishment of the database.
- On the manner of filling and storing data on informal settlements.
- On the approval of the manual of drafting and presentation of graphic materials.In 2007 more specifications have been added on to the existing ones.
- For the registration of informal settlements. Onlyin 2008 for the first time we see a regulation related to the administration of revenues and cost.

⁴⁰ V.K.M acronym of a Decision taken by the Council of Ministries, usually it is related to the each specific 'informal areas', it defines the perimeter and the number of settlements included, by law from 1 to 5ha. 7 National Territory Council or K.K.T is made representative of five ministries: Environment, Transport, Urban Planning, Energy and Finance

- On the definition of general rules for the storage and administration of cartographic information obtained from digital aerial photography of the territory of the Republic of Albania.
- Use of the Revenues from the Legalization fee. With the new changes with the first Government Rama 2014⁴¹, new changes have been introduced. Unlike Rama's government, in the first government of Berisha⁴² during 2005- 2009, the U.A deals with the adjunctions of the settlements and different conditions on informality. Basically the other changes are on data and revenues management.
- On determining the procedures for legalization of informal settlements, lateral or vertical additions.
- On the determination of the favorable price of the sale of land for informal settlement, with mixed or/and residential functions.
- On determining the procedures of factual evidencing of the informal settlements / additions in constructions with permits, bodies and documentation for proposing and approving informal areas.
- On Determining the Method of Collecting and Managing Revenues from Informal Settlement fee.

And in 2015,

- On the determination of the criteria, procedures and documentation applicable to qualifying informal settlements, lateral and/or vertical additions, with construction permission.
- On the determination of criteria, procedures and form of legalization permit.

The law and regulations listed in this chapter are going to be the main font for the 'Institutional Decision Arena', in chapter five.

3.2.2 Limits: Scale, Units and Time.

As we know from all the theories mentioned above, Outputs and Outcomes may be too biased and unilateral declarations if no data have been considered. For this reason, the methodology will give a short description on where what and when. Even if the analysis of the institutional decision arena is going to be made on the national scale, as law and regulations are, the outcome

⁴¹ First Rama Government 2014, from Socialist Party of Albania.

⁴² First Berisha Government 006, from Democratic Party of Albania

and outputs will be focused on Durres and Tirana Region. From this perspective, it would be a heuristic approach, "what would be the result if everything happened according to the law?".

Scale is the first dimension to take into consideration the methodology. Even if there have been significant changes on the levels of the public administration to the lowest ones, municipalities, the informal areas have always been a competence of the Regional Agency for Legalization, Urbanization, and Integration of Informal Settlement and Areas. During ten years of centralized management, new areas have been added, and others have been split to make new smaller ones. While this might be true for the region of Tirana, in Durres the biggest informal area named Keneta⁴³ has remained the same. Now-days, in 2017, there are a total of 55 informal areas in both regions. There are no reasons to explain the public reshaping of these informal areas, but many can rely on urban expansion, and/or due to the decentralization of the regional offices in different parts of the city. While these might be arbitrary, the need to reshape and think about these informal areas even from the urban morphological perspective is essential. As we will see, many hindering factors for a legalization process stand on the urban morphology, and in the relation between settlement, land, and infrastructure. For this reason, the Responsive Focused Evaluation is going to bring two different scales, the regional one, (Picture 13), and the single informal area – the latter is going to be part of the analysis on the policy implementation and empowerment evaluation.

⁴³ Keneta - where the three assessment scenarios will focus on.



Picture 13: Fifty-five Informal Areas in Durrës and Tirana Region.

Unit expressed in this research are going to be based on (ha). Since the methodology is going from top-down, even indicators of infrastructure, land occupied and settlements surface are going to be in (ha). For further details, see Limitations of Empowerment Evaluation, 3.2.2. For the first policy content evaluation it's important to focus on the single area and its dimensions defined by specific governmental law. Table number six shows all the informal areas⁴⁴ in Durrës and Tirana regions and their dimensions expressed on (ha). The variety of the dimensions goes from 40 (ha) to a maximum of 700 (ha). The next table (Table 6, and 7) shows the allocation of these informal areas and the total land declared as an informal area in the two regions, respectively 8820 (ha).

⁴⁴ Informal areas defined by law.

Informal Areas	ha	Total Informal Areas for the Municipality of Tirana (ha)
Tirane 1	65	
Tirane 2	36	
Tirane 3	118	
Tirane 4	33	
Tirane 5	47	
Tirane 6	191	
Tirane 7	257	
Tirane 8	123	
Tirane 9	108	
Tirane 10	64	
Tirane 11	222	
Tirane 12	88	
Tirane 13	11	
Tirane 14	64	
Tirane 15	48	
Tirane 16	90	
Tirane 17	88	
Tirane 18	172	
Tirane 19	113	
Tirane 20	33	
Tirane 21	17	
Tirane 22	75	
Tirane 23	37	
Tirane 24	226	
Tirane 25	180	
		2506
Informal Areas	ha	Total Informal Areas for Paskuqan (ha)
Paskuqan	672	672
Informal Areas	ha	Total Informal Areas for the Municipality of Kavaje. (ha)
Kavaje	205	473
Kavaje	170	
Golem	32	
Synej	66	

Informal Areas	ha	Total Informal Areas for the Municipality of Kamez (ha)
Kamez	536	
Kamez	240	
Kamez	402	
Kamez	208	
Kamez	268	
Kamez	329	1983
Informal Areas	ha	Total Informal Areas in the small villages outside Tirana. (ha)
Vora	74	
Vora	41	
Vora	71	
Berxulle	165	
Berxulle	88	
Kashar	160	
Kashar	250	
Preze	140	
Preze	44	
Preze	50	
Ndroq	71	
Peze	30	
Peze	20	
Peze	25	1229
Informal Areas	ha	Total Informal Areas in the small villages outside Tirana. (ha)
Dajt	130	
Dajt	123	
Farke	107	
Farke	165	
Farke	13	538
Informal Areas	ha	Total Informal Areas for the Municipality of Durrës. (ha)
Durrës 1	754	
Durrës 2	25	
Durrës 3	377	
Durrës 4	38	
Durrës 5	224	1418

table 6: List of 'Informal Areas' in Durres and Tirana Region in (ha).

Informal Areas for Group	ha	Total Informal Areas for Tirana and Durres Region. (ha)
Total Informal Areas for the Municipality of Tirana	2506	
Total Informal Areas for the Municipality of Kamez	1983	
Total Informal Areas in the small villages outside Tirana.	1229	
Total Informal Areas for Paskuqan	672	
Total Informal Areas in the small villages outside Tirana.	538	
Total Informal Areas for the Municipality of Kavaje.	473	
Total Informal Areas for the Municipality of Durres.	1418	8819

table 7: Total 'Informal Areas' in Durres and Tirana Region in (ha).

Time is going to be a significant methodology to understand the shifting policies that have occurred in almost 10 years of U.A. A half assumption is that where urbanization and integration

policies have failed, the number of informal settlements (or informal practices of building) has rapidly increased - including informal areas defined by the Council of Ministries⁴⁵ (V.K.M).

In order to understand the shifting policies that have occurred in a historical process of legalization program by the Regional Agencies and by the National Territory Council 7 (K.K.T), it has been chosen to work on two anchor times, one (t1) in 2006 and the other (t2) in 2016. General Problem, Specific Goal (what), Program (how), Resources (with what), Output and Outcome, are going to create a main based matrix to read the A.L.U.Z.N.I general program.

3.3 Phase 2: Evaluating Policy Implementation.

The second methodology would focus more on sensitive data and the possible analysis on the implementation phase. To do this, it's important to understand who has advantages, and who does not have them, on this U.A, inside the public institutions. Unlike the first phase, a focused evaluation would be needed to get on details of resources that actors exchange, or not, among them. **Empowerment Focused Evaluation theory** developed by David Fetterman for Stanford University considers the '*Developing a Mission and Vision – Taking Stock – Planning for the Future*' as a step which brings different actors into a more win-win game, possibilities to interact or bargain, etc.

In our case, the methodology on developing a mission and vision, on the U.A is strictly related to the three components of the law, legalization, urbanization and integration on informal areas. Even in this case the analysis and assessment is going to be based on heuristic approach and not biased survey, such as settlements on environmental constraints, but with legalization obtained. As we will see on the research question, the main aim of the research is to look for an accurate and sensitive measurement on the U.A and for this reason only the legal frame will be considered on the methodology. The stock expressed in the theory is going to be translated into revenues and cost, considering the hindering factors of a legalization as hindering cost. On this consideration the second phase, focused evaluation, fills the gap of the first analysis on macro scale in outputs and outcomes.

Conflicting Policies is a term to identify those policies listed in the institutional decision arena, determinants in the linear evaluation, which tend to create a conflicting condition on whose responsibility on economic resources, technical, legal and cognitive it is. The methodology

⁴⁵ Council of Ministries it is made by members of ministries and the prime minister, which by proposal of lower public institutions approves the 'Informal Areas'.

will conduct the first analysis and direct it on a smaller scale and focused, by measuring each component of revenues, cost and other costs, such as the hindering factors.

3.3.1 Revenues, Costs and Hindering Costs.

Revenues, costs and hindering cost are going to be keywords for a more sensitive data in order to manage the policy implementation. And what we suppose to find in the institutional decision arena is that each actor has different revenues, costs and hindering costs among them. For this reason it has been thought that an introduction on this unbalanced distribution of actors, cost-benefit, should be done on the institutional decision arena. Actors with conflicting policies are going to be listed in order to have a more balanced of this distribution, cost-benefits, from the U.A.

For Revenues the methodology in this case will focus on those policies on the U.A listed in the chapter 3.2.1 that generates economical benefit for the public administration, such as the legalization fee, the land price etc.

For Cost the methodology will focus on the institutional decision arena and find those policies which require costs from the actors in the implementation phase of the U.A. As we will see, municipalities and the regional agency are going to be the main actors with such requirements.

Hindering Costs differently from the cost charged from the U.A are those not directly related with the public institutions, but strongly influences the revenues. In most of the cases are charged to the single informal settlement holder or of public interest. This category includes all those factors on how for one reason or another the legalization process does not occur. This is due to legal restrictions and environmental constraints. The methodology to investigate on different hindering costs will be based on the main policies drafted from the U.A in 10 years, and listed in the methodology chapter 3.2.1. In order to have a more clear classification of cost due to the hindering factors written on laws, the methodology is going to regroup each law and regulation in four macro factors with specific costs, respectively named: "Outside the Land", "On the Land", "On the Settlement" and "on Single Family". Since it's the most sensitive data on the policy efficiency and effectiveness, a specific attention will be given to the economical values in order to have a linear cost benefit of the U.A and later, policy efficiency and effectiveness.

From this perspective, a first methodological formula to describe the total sum of revenues, costs and hindering costs can be as follow.

Final investment on single informal area = Revenues - Urbanization - Hindering Costs.

Formula B: Measuring final investment on the single area.

3.2.2 Limits: Scale, Units and Value.

According to the **Scale of revenues, costs and hindering costs**, the methodology limits will be of the single informal area. For this reason, three scenarios from Keneta Durrës informal areas have been chosen. The three scenarios chosen shows a first methodology how to conduct and assessment on all the region of Durrës and Tirana for the 55 informal areas.



Picture 14: Three scenarios from the Informal Areas in Durrës and Tirana Region.

As we will see from the institutional decision arena, each actor has its own revenues, cost and hindering cost, and this final investment is going to be measured on single informal areas. To do this, units and values have been taken as a reference on the Albanian context.

For **Units of Revenues** we should understand all those incomes from taxes and fees for the public authority measured as territorial assets and expressed in meter square (m²). Mainly, on the U.A they are generated from the legalization process as a single fee, expressed on Euro (€), on land surface and settlement surface. Other **Value from Revenues** are complications when the settlements have different purposes from housing, such as socio-economic activities etc.

Reference number one⁴⁶ and two⁴⁷ express the price of meter square per land and building taken from the U.A, respectively from VKM nr. 488, dated 22.7.2014 "On the determination of the convenient price of the sale of land for informal settlement, with mixed or/and residential functions".

For **Units of Cost**s described by the U.A, they are going to be strictlyretailed to investments in infrastructure, and it's going to be expressed in meter square, m2. For the **Value of the Cost** a reference from the Albanian context⁴⁸ would be taken.

The most sensitive and innovative process of measurement are the **hindering factors**. From the territorial perspective they can be measured by the land occupied, settlement surface in meter square and number of families. For each of the four macro hindering factors, one hindering factor has been identified which can rely on legal constraints on the land or the settlement, or both. Picture 11 shows the four probabilities that may occur in the urban development inside the informal areas. They will be described better in the Policy Implementation chapter.

3.2.3 Probabilistic methodology for the Hindering Factors.

The Methodologytakes the two territorial resources, land and settlement, and analyse their probabilistic chance to fail on legalization. Each probability, four, will be considered macro hindering factor. While the micro hindering factors are the single legal constraints, the macro hindering factor identifies the hindering factor by two resources, land and settlement.

From these considerations, land has two probabilities, fail to get or get the legalization, the same for the settlement. Each of these four conditions gives four results of combination of land and settlement. Here we have to highlight that in order to get the legalization, both land and settlement should exist on the territory. Table number eight (table 8) shows the results of the combinations among land and settlement.

	Settlement (Gets Legalization)		Settlement (Fails to Get Legalization)	
Land (Gets Legalization)	- 1	-1	0	- 3
Land (Fails to Legalization)	- 3	0	- 2	- 2

Table 8: Methodology to identify the Hindering Factors for the Legalization on Land and Settlement. (From the 'Prisoner's Dilemma' in Game Theory)

⁴⁶Reference 1 see table 9

⁴⁷Reference 2 see table 9.

⁴⁸ Albanian context for the urbanization costs is referred to various project of public administration, reference number 3. It may vary from 100€/m2 to 150€/m2 for the informal areas. **Reference 3 in table 9.**


Picture fifteen (Picture 15) shows in a conceptual description the output of the payoff matrix from "Prisoner's Dilemma".

First probabilistic result is land and settlement can get the legalization process but there are hindering factors outside the land that do not make the process to get the legalization. This macro hindering factor is called "Outside the Land".

The second probabilistic result is that settlement can get the legalization process but the land has legal constrains. This macro hindering factor is called "On the Land".

Third probabilistic result is that land can get the legalization process but settlement has legal constrains. This macro hindering factor is called "On the Settlement".

The last probabilistic result is that both and land settlement has legal constrains to get a legalization process. This macro hindering factor can is called "On the Single household".



Picture 15: Four macro hindering factors to get the legalization.

For the first macro hindering factor, a measurement will be carried out for the **land occupied** and the **settlement surface** and for value, 25Euro per land⁴⁹ occupied and 250Euro per meter square of settlement raised⁵⁰ referring to market price. This calculation allows us to have a clearer idea on revenues and divide which are the potential settlements on legalization and which are not.

For the second macro hindering factors, only the **land occupied (ha)** will be measured. In order to give solution to land conflicts and other forms of public expropriation the **value** will be

⁴⁹ VKM nr. 488, dated 22.7.2014 "For the determination of the favorable price of the sale of land for informal settlement, with mixed or/and residential functions".

⁵⁰ According to the Law Nr.8561, dated 22.12.1999 the value for the expropriation should be according to the initial investment. On this consideration there's to estimate only the value of the building construction.

considered as **market price**, respectively 100€ per meter square⁵¹, a medium for the informal areas.(reference 5 in sheet table1).

The third macro hindering factors are those who rely on settlement conditions and the need to total rebuild it or partially adjust it. The measure can be expressed in **meter square for settlement** and valued according to the **market cost**, respectively 250 euro/m2. (reference 6 in sheet table1). The fourth and the last hindering factor is related to the economical inability of the single occupier to pay the legalization process. On these consideration, the measurement will focus on the price of **the land per meter square**, as defined by the U.A, and the price for the registration of **meter square of settlement**, defined as well by the U.A. (see reference 7 on sheet table 1).

3.2.4 The Territorial Impact of the informal urban growth transition in Albania.

According to (Aliaj, Shutina, & Dhamo, 2010) the process of providing legal tenure/legalization or tenure for the informal settlement comes after the urbanization. While this might be true, unfortunately, for some informal areas, the urbanization has never come, although the legal tenure/legalization, has been given by the public authorities. From this theoretical perspective it's important to highlight the three elements of the informal practice which we are looking for a legalization process; a) setting a settlement , b) occupying a land , c) put in infrastructure . While the existence of this processes might be present and observed, the alternation is not at the same direction, as examples suggests⁵².

In some cases (S) and (P) has occurred, but not (U). In some circumstances this process has left space for a second (P) process, which can be described as (S)>(P)>(P). This probabilistic process has been object of observation and research even in other countries by various authors. Some of these are described as urban utopias, other as local theories born from informal practices. But, even when they are urban utopias they show their impartiality in the realization.


This research focuses on identification of these diversities that happens during the transitions phases of growth from the first informal practice in the land - named as regular informality.

⁵¹ According to various land market price of land it has been chosen a medium of 100€/m2 inside the informal areas.

⁵² For (S) - setting a settlement. For (P) - parcelling. For (U) - put in infrastructure,Urbanization.

Regular Informality. According to the theory the growth transition in Albania has followed three phases, (S) setting a settlement, (P) Parceling and last (U) Urbanization. For methodological reasons this will be expressed $S>P>U$. This order of the three phases represents how the informal growth has been sprawled in the agricultural land, without the urbanization. Other cases of informal growth are located in urban areas, where infrastructure exists. Respectively in industrial areas, central urban areas, and Soviet blocks.

For the territorial impact of the growth transition, two processes on land and settlement are identified, such as; fragmentation and densification. Picture number sixteen (Picture 16) shows in a diagrammatic way the probabilities that these two growth transition processes have.



Picture 16: Territorial Impact on Fragmentation and Densification. On (x)land expansion or/and reduction, on (y) densification on land and settlement.


1) land fragmentation by expansion, on (x). In this category are all those informal practices that have occurred during the growth transition from $S>P>U$. It is signed with (+). For various reasons the Land or/and Settlement can't get a legalization permit.

2) land fragmentation by reduction, on (x). In this category are all those informal practices that have occurred during the growth transition from $S>P>U$. It is signed with (-). The impact of this practice creates marginal and open spaces in between.

3) densification on land. In this category are all those informal practices that have occurred during the growth transition from $S>P>U$. Second settlements are raised with the previous one in the same land where legalization has been already given.


4) **densification on the settlement. on (y).**In this category are all those informal practices that has occurred during the growth transition from S>P>U. New surface has been added to the existing settlement, vertically or horizontally.

Below the diagrammatic illustration (Picture 17) of the three growth transitions and their impact on land fragmentation and densification in agricultural areas.



Picture 17: Informal urban growth transitions in agricultural areas.

The description above is only considering the informal growth in the agricultural areas. There's to underline that a big part of the informal areas are also close to the city centres - where urbanization was already. For methodological reasons and for the complexity that it has the territorial impact on urban areas will not be investigated, but rather identified as an informal practice on existing settlement. Picture number eighteen (Picture 18) shows one transition phase for each for the three contexts in urban areas.



Picture 18: Informal Urban Growth transitions in Urban areas

Table number nine (Table 9) shows in a vertical way the Albanian theory of the regular informal growth, and on the horizontal row transition of each process.

Only (S) Agricultural area Setting a Settlement	S.1 Land Occupation	S.2 Hazardous Area	S.3 Half Built (no inhabitants)	S.4 Hazardous Building (with inhabitants)
S>P Agricultural area Setting a Settlement and Parceling.	(S)>(P)>(P+) Fragmentation by land expansion.	(S)>(P)>(P-) Fragmentation by land reduction.	(S)>(P)>(S) Densification on exiting parcel.	(S)>(P)>(P-)>(SP) Densification on new parcel.
S>P>U Agricultural area. Setting a Settlement, Parceling and Put in Infrastructure.	(S)>(P)>(P+)>(U) Fragmentation by land expansion with urbanization.	(S)>(P)>(P-)>(U) Fragmentation by land reduction with urbanization.	(S)>(P)>(U)>(S) Densification on exiting parcel with urbanization.	(S)>(P)>(U)>(SP) Densification on new parcel with urbanization.

Table 9: Methodological process to explore the diversity of transitions phases.

3.2.5 Sheet table for the Cartographic Survey and Assessment.


The sheet table one (Sheet Table 1) shows a simple way how to present and illustrate in one single map the revenues, cost and hindering cost. Thanks to this sensitive calculation of the investment on single area we can have an assessment of the U.A. The colors and the areas are chosen randomly, but sheet table 1 offers a schedule on how to operate on each informal area.

The values expressed in each Reference, from one to seven, are experimental values to conduct the research. Many of them refers to actual market price, such is urbanization, others to declared fees for legalization, for land and settlement legal tenure.

SHEET TABLE.

REGIONAL SCALE, INFORMAL AREA, HI DENDERING FACTORS AND VALUE.


INFORMAL AREAS IN DURRES AND TIRANA REGION




SINGLE INFORMAL AREA __NR.



FOUR MACRO HINDERING FACTORS



CARTHOGRAPHY



UNITS

	SETTLEMENT SURFACE	<input type="text" value="m2"/>	X	5 €/m2 - Settl. Reference 1
	OCCUPIED PARCEL	<input type="text" value="m2"/>	X	25 €/m2 - Land. Reference 2
URBANIZATION COSTS				
INFRASTRUCTURE				
	STREETS SURFACE	<input type="text" value="m2"/>	X	100 €/m2 - Infrast. Reference 3
HINDERING COSTS				
FACTORS				
	1. OUSIDE THE LAND	<input type="text" value="m2"/>	X	250 €/m2 - Settl. Reference 4
	2. ON THE LAND	<input type="text" value="m2"/>	X	100 €/m2 - Land. Reference 5
	3. ON THE SETT.	<input type="text" value="m2"/>	X	250 €/m2 - Settl. Reference 6
	4. ON SINGLE FAMILY	<input type="text" value="m2"/>	X	250 €/m2 - Settl. Reference 7

Sheet table 1: Total 'Informal Areas' in Durres and Tirana Region in (ha).

3.4 Phase 3: Evaluating Policy Impact.

The last phase of the Responsive Focused Evaluation is going to be considered as described in the theoretical state of the art and on the Utilization-Focused Theory. From the theoretical point of view, this evaluation came as an attempt to building learning in the decision making. For this purpose, the final investment for the single area described in the previous methodology is going to give the policy efficiency and effectiveness of the U.A. Thanks to this complex measurement, described in the methodology, it would be possible to have a more detailed map on the informal areas in the regional scale. While some areas would have a negative final investment, from revenues, costs and hindering cost, other ones would have a high positive value. For this reason, it is crucial to guide the policy efficiency and effectiveness not only in the technical direction but also on the decisional sphere where wealth distribution is on the stake.

It is important to highlight that only after the technical survey, on measurements and values, the decision-making process can take place, the contrary would be fatalistic for the territory and a territorial injustice. For this reason, the Responsive Focused Theory in the last core chapter would go to informal settlements governance and at its principles of planning, such as Efficiency, Effectiveness, and Responsiveness.

The methodology used to answer to each indicator of good governance would be focused on the survey conducted in the second core chapter, where revenues, costs and hindering costs are the main units and values to determine if a single area has a positive or negative final investment. On this last process, the attention will go again to the regional scale and the management of the informal areas starting from the policy efficiency and effectiveness. Last, but not least, it is the decision-making model which should occur in order to have measurable efficiency and effectiveness, in order to monitor and evaluate decisions on the technical perspective.

3.3.1 Regional Governance on Efficiency, Effectiveness and Responsiveness for the U.A on the informal areas.

If in the previous chapter, on Empowerment Theory, we discussed on how to capitalize the final investment in one single formula (Formula B), in this last part we will see how to go to the real research question by giving different patterns of situations on revenues, costs and hindering costs. Formula C and D refers to indicators of good governance such is efficiency and effectiveness.

It's important that the monitoring process should not only occur on one final indicator, such as the final investment on the single area, but to give different conditions in order to be able to address various policies and actors in the decision making.

Taking this into consideration, the policy efficiency of a single area will be measured as a level of different statements, such as: low urbanization, mid, and good urbanization.

The policy efficiency would be = $\frac{\text{VALUE of URBANIZATION COSTS}}{\text{REVENUESFROMLEGALIZATIONFEE}} =$

(1) if $0 < x < 1$ good urbanization.

(2) if $x = 1$ mid urbanization.

(3) if $x > 1$ low urbanization.

Formula C: Comparing policy Efficiency of the U.A.(for single informal area)

While the policy efficiency might call in evaluation the objectives of the U.A, the urban effectiveness is an external process which depends on contingent reasons, such as the hindering costs. They may derive from the urban morphology or the informal practices in the informal areas and are more related to policy impact. A half assumption is that where urbanization has missed the informal practices have flourished in different land tactics to avoid restrictions or the legalization fee. This fractal problem in all the informal areas can be measured thanks to the formula below.

The policy effectiveness would be = $\frac{\text{VALUE of HINDERING COSTS}}{\text{REVENUESFROMLEGALIZATIONFEE}} =$

(1) if $0 < x < 1$ regular informal area.

(2) if $x = 1$ mid regular.

(3) if $x > 1$ high impact on land fragmentation and mobility.

Formula D: Comparing policy effectiveness of the U.A.(for single informal area).

To answer to this fractal problem and to have a more responsive governance it should be clear to all the actors involved, applicants for legalizations firstly, if their settlements can be legalized or not, and if not which should be the next steps to achieve it. The methodological survey to explain the hindering factors impact is going to pass from the theoretical point of view of the forms of urban growth to the real practice in the Albanian Context regarding the laws and restrictions.

Some of these theories on the forms of the urban growth will rely on the research of (Aliaj, Misteri i Gjashte. Cili eshte kurthi qe mban peng zhvillimin dhe integrimin e ekonomise shqiptare ne boten moderne., 2008), which explains the hindering reasons of the Albanian economy in 2008. The other is going to focus on the matrix of forms or urban growth that occurred in the Western Europe in the last century described by Sola Morales in "As formas de crecimiento urbano" in 1994.

3.3.2 On the decision making models.

The decision model is a key element of the Responsive Focused Evaluation and without it, the whole efficiency and effectiveness would not be measurable. It determines the importance of the ground data from the single informal area to specific conditions of hindering factors of settlements. Many solutions, as described in the 'nature of the policies', comes from the national level and never finds action on the real context. For this reason the methodology will consider the planning theories that have occurred in the informal areas, with the specific decision model that they represent, by showing the advantages and disadvantages of each of the models described in the state of art regarding the Responsive Focused Evaluation. The methodology will be based on some good examples experienced in the Albanian context by CO-Plan institute described by (Aliaj, Shutina, & Dhamo, Between energy and the vacuum, 2010).


3.3.4 Limits: Scale, Units.

As described above, the scale will be the single informal area, with its efficiency and effectiveness degree level in regional scale, (Picture 19 and 20). The map is followed by a gradient of efficiency and effectiveness based on formula 2 and 3 and expressed in (%).

According to the map of efficiency the gradient goes from 0 to 1 when the urbanization process improves, but however it remains lower than revenues. From 1 to more, it means that the U.A has fulfilled the objective for the single informal area to bring urbanization. The map is only a methodology of how it would look on different gradients. On core chapter three it would show the real condition of the informal areas chosen for the research.

By combining the two maps, Efficiency Map and Effectiveness Map, it would be possible to approve the first thesis assumption; where urbanization is missing, the informal practices have flourished in different urban forms.

POLICY EFFICIENCY (RATIO)
URBANIZATION COSTS / LEGALIZATION REVENUES




Picture 19: Methodological Efficiency Map: Gradients of the Policy Efficiency for the U.A on Legalization, Urbanization and Integration of Informal Areas and Settlements.

Picture nineteen (Picture 19) shows an example of the effectiveness and differently from the efficiency it's read on the opposite direction to find the best condition. From 0 to 1 it means that the informal area has no or few hindering factors and the impact on land fragmentation and mobility is low. From 1 to more it means that hindering factors for the legalization are more than the regular condition in accordance to the U.A. If so, it means that the whole area should be considered with a particular attention to housing emergencies. In many cases this can be on those areas where there's a high environmental risk and hazardous context. Other cases can be when there's a big part of land owned by third parties.

POLICY EFFECTIVENESS

HINDERING COSTS / LEGALIZATION REVENUES



Picture 20: Methodological Effectiveness Map: Gradients of the Policy Effectiveness for the U.A on Legalization, Urbanization and Integration of Informal Areas and Settlements.

4

RESEARCH QUESTION

Whose stake? How much? How to?

4.0 RESEARCH QUESTION

As mentioned at 1.5 chapter the research question is "**By how much are the cost of expressed objectives of the UA, legalization, urbanization, and those on territorial impact, and the hindering factors?**". Before to get to the research question it is essential to understand the policy content, the nature of the resources that the actors share. On this step of the research, evaluating policy content will ask about the role of the actors and how the shifting policies on UA have evolved in a given timeline changing the centrality and density of the actor's network.

Only after the identification of the resources, it is possible to get to the territorial resources and the possible assessment and impact. In chapter six, evaluating policy implementation it would be given the methodological way to assess the cost of the expressed objectives of the UA, 1) legalization, 2) urbanization called F.I.S.I.A - which stand for Final Investment of the Single Informal Area. For a sensitive assessment F.I.S.I.A also suggest the look at hidden cost, those related to territorial resources and their technical ability or constraints to get a legalization process, such as the settlement and the land occupied.

To understand the hindering factors and the possible assessment the research uses a probabilistic way with an output of four macro hindering factors.

To understand the territorial impact the research uses the theories described by local authors such is (Aliaj, Shutina, & Dharmo, Between energy and the vacuum, 2010).

4.1 Wholestake? Political, Economial and Cognitive resources of the UA.

Objective1) open a political discussion on decision making models, (evaluating policy content).

For a better understanding of the real actors in the U.A for the legalization, urbanization, and integration of the informal areas and settlements, it would be useful to observe it in a timeline and a given position. For this reason, the institutional decisional arena and the actor's network would be studied in two timelines, (t0- 2006) and (t1 - 2016). The changes due to shifting laws and regulations show the real interested actor on this agenda. Revenues and costs are not balanced among actors of various administrative levels, and this has brought to unconstitutional conditions and policy pluralism problems. For this reason, the Responsive Focused Evaluation

shows its limitations in measuring the cost and benefits and also highlights the emergent need to intervene on the decisional models and governance, efficiency and effectiveness on a smaller scale.

4.2 How much? Assessment and Territorial Impact.

Objective: 2) to measure territorial resources and their technical ability or constrains to get a legalization process, such is the settlement and the land occupied (evaluating policy implementation), "We don't know the problem but we can start from policy efficiency and effectiveness" seems a nailed and direct question, but what does it economically mean? The 'dead Capital' defined by Hermine De Soto⁵³ as the first process to Legalization in order to have back an initial revenue for the public authorities has not created the expected result on Urbanization and Integration – and this is due to 'hindering factors'. Nowadays, since the moment that it has been drawn to guide the U.A, it would be provocative and interesting to understand and measure the policy efficiency and effectiveness.

Evaluating policy implementation is the step which where the research question is addressed "**By how much are the cost of expressed objectives of the UA, legalization, urbanization, and those on territorial impact, and the hindering factors?**".

For this reason, a sheet table has been created (Sheet Table 1) in order to understand revenues and costs (investments) for each objective of the U.A. The questions shows a schedule in order to **measure revenues, costs and hindering costs.**

Limitations of this estimation would seem heuristic for reasons where settlements are raised for economical purposes, which in the biggest informal areas more than 80% has housing purposes. If we would want to estimate it should be considered as revenues for the public authorities.

4.3 How to increase? Revenue's Reversibility, Factors and Costs.

Objective: 3) to compare different areas by their ability to generate revenues in proportion with urbanization costs (evaluating policy impact).

The actual situation of the revenues and their reversibility to the territory are not the same if different decisional models are applied. Passing from a Bounded Rationality to a Rational model it invokes the need to assess the territorial resources for a better policy efficiency and

⁵³(De Soto, Gordon, Gedeshi, & Sinoimeri, 2002)

effectiveness. However, before getting to this communicative tool, it is essential to ask how responsiveness and data sensitive can change the urbanization and legalization degree on a single informal area. The research question on this consideration is descriptive-oriented by following the principles of Responsive Focused Evaluation. Questions that are addressed are strictly related to the U.A objectives. How much the revenue's reversibility to accomplish the urbanization process should be? How much are the hindering costs to achieve full legalization of the informal settlement and consequently the total possible revenues that can be generated from e single informal area?

A second part of the Utilization is dedicated to indicators of good governance. Such is the efficiency and effectiveness.

For policy efficiency, it is considered the weight of urbanization costs to revenues for every single area. This may vary from the urban morphology the size of land and settlement legalized without the hindering costs.

Policy effectiveness is the communicative tool to assess the hindering cost weight to revenues and opens an exhaustive discussion on endogenous resources rather than changing the revenue's reversibility.

5

EVALUATING POLICY CONTENT

Nature of the U.A

5.0 EVALUATING POLICY CONTENT: THE NATURE OF THE U.A.

This chapter, as the following three chapters, are named core chapter due to the methodology of the Responsive Focused Evaluation, which as explained in state of the art it passes through three main theories, the Theory-Driven Evolution (THDE), the Empowerment Evaluation (EE) and the Utilization-Focused Theory.

In this first core chapter, it would be used the (THDE) and the linear evaluation model by defining the policy determinants, picture five.

From the Research Question, it answers to a descriptive model of the policy nature since we know that on this phase with the (THDE) the outcome and outputs would be unreal and regulations and laws may not combine with the state of fact. However, epistemological questions stand as an attempt to quantify and measure the policy efficiency and effectiveness, since it sees the benefits and costs of each actor. To overcome these limitations, the research will focus on the single area analysis for the Region of Durres and Tirana, and to the units expressed in (ha).

5.1 Institutional Decision Arena.

The fall of the old regime, the civil war of 1997, the war in Kosovo, and finally the process of joining the European Union, have generated a strong dynamic of social, cultural and economic change ever seen so far if we think about the Ottoman occupation or the Communist Regime. This fast political process, both internally and externally, has left little space for an academic reflection on social/territorial impact and has distorted the political orientation. Beside these fast process problems related to informality has been concentrated in the suburbs of the main Albanian cities - generating territorial and administrative problems.

The policy to legalize, urbanize and integrate the informal settlements and areas is a program approved by a large number of laws and articles that have been changed in almost ten years - since 2004. Also, as we know from various authors, public policies often fail or only partially succeed, and this is more evident in territorial planning policies.

It is, therefore, necessary to evaluate public policies in order to understand if and why they did not succeed. In this phase of the research, the policy evaluation will be nailed through a

structured list of questions from the moment that the law on Legalization started, which will be considered (t1, 2006), to nowadays (t2, 2016).

This research is a first attempt to read the policy development for the legalization of informal settlements and areas in Albania after ten years of open process and to the integration of disadvantaged populations to urban contexts in Albanian cities. From that moment a few projects have had the possibility to design and collaborate with regional offices charged with the implementation of this policy.

But why evaluation on this U.A? According to data provided by (A.L.U.I.Z.N.I Agency, 2016) and the parliamentary report, it seems that the legalization process has really started - after nearly ten years of slow and inefficient bureaucracy. But what happened? Are we dealing with some innovative process such as human resources, organizational aspect, technological or merely the opening of new policies for adoption? If we look at the data of legalized settlements, we see that only in 2014 15295 informal settlements have been legalized, more or less the total amount of legalizations from 2006 to 2013.

If we maintain this dynamism, the year in which the legalization would finish, it would be in 10 or 15 years.

On the one hand, we know that the processes of construction of informal settlements are not directly linked to A.L.U.I.Z.N.I's political-will or other public institutions, but rather by economic, social and cultural background and historical events, which are strictly related to urbanization and inclusion policies. (Aliaj, Shutina, & Dhamo, *Between energy and the vacuum*, 2010). On the other side, as we will see in the following chapters, not all the informal settlements can be legalized.

From this perspective, the other two main lines have occurred in this process. One is related to the positive aspect of the Regional Agency to increase revenues, in order to have for each year a progressive increase of informal settlements legalized. On the other hand, there's the increasing number of self-declarations⁵⁴ of informal settlements.

So, quantifying this process, in order to make a qualitative analysis of the reasons that bring inhabitants to use informal practices in the building sector there is a social, economic and cultural challenge and an interdisciplinary survey will be needed. It is needless to think that the

⁵⁴ self declarations are statements that the householders makes in authorized public institutions by sending pictures of the building and a declaration about the neighboring settlements or landmarks, such as streets, water canals etc

process would ever finish under these circumstances and that policy analysis can be made based on this big data. For this reason, it is essential to rely on the methodology and the scale given for the Policy Content Evaluation, that of informal areas. Fifty-five informal areas of Tirana and Durres region have been analyzed in the institutional decision area in order to have significant outcomes and outputs. As mentioned in the methodology, this research offers an analytical study of the a) Institutional Decisional Arena process, and analysis on 2) Actor's network and their resources - in order to find policies that have helped the informal practices to continue till nowadays. Policy evaluation of the institutional decisional arena, in this case, is useful also to not only understand why informal practices continue but also the shifting policies⁵⁵ - a term that can guide us to a first description on how in ten years policies have changed. A half assumption is that where urbanization and integration policies have failed, the number of informal settlements (or informal practices of building) has rapidly increased - including informal areas defined by the Council of Ministries (V.K.M).

Regarding the Responsive Focused Evaluation and its use on this first phase of the policy content analysis, the outcomes and outputs are not relevant on their particularity rather than the determinants of the policy itself, and these determinants can be found only on the legal changes, or shifting policies that have occurred in 10 years.

Table number ten (Table 10) shows the matrix of the public institutional arena explained on the methodology, (Table 05), for the U.A on Legalization, Urbanization, and Integration of the Informal Areas and Settlements in Albania.

The information used to fill in each specific arena stand on questions related to actors, roles, specific goals, policy, resources, outcomes and outputs and they derive from the laws and shifting laws and policies listed in the chapter 3.2.1.

With the red color in the institutional decisional arena is signed those policies and specific goals of the actors that have been changed or removed due to the shifting policies and regulations.

From a first introduction, we saw that the actors who have profoundly changed the position on this U.A are the Municipalities and their departments of urban planning. Roles as Director, Gatekeeper, and Ally have been centralized to the highest levels of the public actors, such as the

⁵⁵ Shifting policies shifting policies is a key concept to introduce to a specific decisional arena, in which public policies are the subject of the survey.

Regional Agency A.L.U.I.Z.N.I for the legalization, urbanization, and integration of informal areas and settlements.

If we consider in its complexity all specific goals for all the actors involved, we can highlight that those of the Municipal Urban Planning department had conflicting goals in (t0), if not in clear disadvantage. From one side, the K.K.T that has specific goals to legalize and from the other, the social and political local pressure to offer public services and urbanization in an uncontrolled sprawl.

Indeed, local public authorities have been accused of being passive on two laws which call for their responsibility, respectively the first law (Ligji 8378, 22.07.1998) - to stop informal practices in 'informal areas' and (Ligji 9482, 03.04.2006), article 6 - to start the urbanization process right after the legalization process. If we will see again on (Balducci, 1991), definitions cited above on why effectiveness can threat in an irreversible way the final outputs designed since from the beginning of a policy, of the A.L.U.I.Z.N.I program in our case, probably it would be because there's an animated path by different actors, of each bringing its interest. What we are going to see in the efficiency analysis, is that those little resources municipalities had before have been removed to them as well. This conflicting statement can also bring to explanations regarding the continuity of informal practices not only inside the informal areas but also inside the city and around it. In the end, on this analysis, we can add that further empiric data can lead to future research regarding effectiveness failure - but it remains crucial to underline that complementary policies distributed to different actors can bring to breaking processes on effectiveness. In addition to this, the lack of a given timeline as a process of legalization, urbanization, and integration by A.L.U.I.Z.N.I program is one of the reasons for the failure of the effectiveness. However, it would be difficult to measure it since it has been opened and closed several times by the political will and by the elections pressure by actors out by the matrix of A.L.U.I.Z.N.I program and policies, described in the institutional decisional arena - such as the Prime minister. Some of the processes that also influenced the increasing number of legalized settlements came from 2014 when the Albanian PM made changes on(nr.50/2014, Law) by adding article 6 - charging Regional Agencies to make legalizations on those ordinary settlements that have made extensions on the legal land. This adding competence for the regional agency shows a deeper rooting of the centralized government even on matters of lower public authorities such as the municipalities on the building permits and other forms of densification.

To conclude on the institutional arena, we should assume that policies which tend to be in conflicting conditions and the resources are essential elements that prescribe the policy determinants.

On the next chapters, we will see more in-depth how policies influence the territory and what measures should be taken, highlighting their nature. Moreover, on the next subchapter, it would be the centralizing role of the government, thanks to the methodology of actor's network developed by (Dente, Understanding Policy Decisions, 2014), and its shifting role in a timeline of 10 years, t_0 and t_1 .

National Territory Council	Promotor	Gives, or not, the Permission for the Land Privatizing.	Distributive Policy	Political Resources	7952 self declarations processed. (2006-2015)	0,07% of TOT declarations processed. 143484 self decl.	Legalized Settlements or, Hindering Factors (ha)
	Promotor	Receives the Legalization Land Fee.	Distributive Policy	Economical Resources	n/a	n/a	70% of Legalization Fee (€ Public Revenues)
Ministry of Culture	Gatekeeper	Approves, or not, compatibility with Historical Monuments	Distributive Policy	Political Resources	n/a	n/a	n/a
Qarku (Regional Level)	Gatekeeper	Approves, or not, compatibility with Agricultural Land	Distributive Policy	Political Resources	n/a	n/a	n/a
A.L.U.I.Z.N.I regional Agency for the Legalization, Urbanization and Integration of Informal Areas and Settlements.	Director	Approves, or not, the Informal Areas.	Distributive Policy	Political Resources	55 Informal Areas for Tirana & Durres Region.	143484 self declarations for Tirana and Durres Region.	8819 (ha) approved as Informal Areas.
	Ally	Takes technical surveys on informal settlements.	Regulatory Policy	Cognitive Resources	nr. of technical surveys.	nr. of technical surveys / 143484 self declarations.	n/a
	Gatekeeper	Approves, or not, the Technical and Legal Document for the Settlement Legalization.	Regulatory Policy	Political Resources	7952 self declarations processed. (2006-2015)	0,07% of TOT declarations processed. 143484 self decl.	Legalized Settlements or, Hindering Factors (ha)
	Ally	Receives the Legalization Land Fee.	Distributive Policy	Economical Resources	n/a	n/a	30% of Legalization Fee (Euro, Public Revenues)
Municipality Council	Director	Approves, or not, the Informal Areas.	Distributive Policy	Political Resources	55 Informal Areas for Tirana & Durres Region.	143484 self declarations for Tirana and Durres Region.	8819 (ha) approved as Informal Areas.
	Gatekeeper	Approves, or not, the Technical and Legal Frame for the Settlement Legalization.	Distributive Policy	Political Resources	7952 self declarations processed. (2006-2015)	0,07% of TOT declarations processed. 143484 self declarations.	Cadastral Registration of the Settlements or, Hindering Factors (ha)
Municipal Department of Urban Planning	Ally	Stop Informal Practices.	Regulatory Policy	Political Resources	2016 deadline for selfdeclarations.	No more self declarations after that year.	n/a
	Ally	Receives the "Infrastructure Fee"	Distributive Policy	Economical Resources	n/a	n/a	1% of the Land Value. (Euro, Public Revenues)
	Ally	Invest on Urbanization	Re-distributive Policy	Political Resources	TOT (ha) invested on Infrastructure.	% of Investment on Infrastructure System.	(Euro, Public Costs)
	Ally	Takes technical surveys on informal settlements	Regulatory Policy	Cognitive Resources	no of technical surveys.	no. of technical surveys / 143484 self declarations.	n/a
ACTORS	ROLE	SPECIFIC GOAL	POLICY	RESOURCES	OUTPUT	OUTCOME	UNITS IN €, HA

Table 10: Institutional Decision Arena in t0, 2006 and t1, 2016. With red color what has been removed.

5.1.1 The nature of policies.

According to various actors in public science, there are four categories that a public actor can follow: distributive policies, redistributive policies, regulatory policies, and constituent policies. Distributive policies can get various forms on the public role, but for our case, the U.A, it is strictly connected to the process of putting new resources, such as the land, in purchase for housing or economic activities. Even if it is informal and on legalization process, we have a high conversion of agricultural land to urbanization and building purposes - a process that should take place at the municipal level. This 'tolerance,' to let the informal practices happen, to the urban growth might have benefits for the public authorities, and the legalization fee is a constant revenue. However, on the other side, it does not create competitiveness, since we know that distributive policies are usually taken into consideration in underdevelopment circumstances. In the worst scenario, it might create a monopolistic territorial frame to adapt what can't be controlled by formal and institutional practices. This polarization might create a profound disparity of urban areas of the city and seriously harm the public administration and its finances. As **distributive policies** can be found on the institutional arena, they represent the most significant concept of the agenda on legalization, urbanization, and integration, while they are translated directly in revenues. In core chapter two, thanks to the empowerment evaluation, it would be possible to measure them sensitively, also considering the hindering factors for a legalization process.

Redistributive policies as distributive policies they can get various forms in different sectors of the public administration, but in opposition to the first category of the policies, the redistributive focuses on public costs. If in the first case it is the territorial asset, land, which has its cost, for the redistributive policies we should intend a more direct benefit, related to economic resources. It comes as a political will to reposition the revenues in a specific territory or not. In our case, it is the urbanization and the integration objective as stated in the institutional arena and on the U.A. From this point of view, we will see on the next chapter how some informal areas have less investment than others and how it can change, if we focus on the revenues and on a strong political will to determine different decision-making models on the informal areas, by considering them as a planning tool to allocate the redistributive policies.

Regulatory policies differ on how the public authorities manage the territorial assets. They might constitute in law, regulation, decisions, suggestions and direct action to change the

condition. According to the bibliography of the laws analyzed in this research chapter 3.2.1, no significant changes have been evolved to change the situation. Law has been drafted to change the centrality in a benefit for the regional agency, but not to increase effectiveness, to give a legalization document, or to offer responsibility to those who cannot get one.

From this point of view, centralization of the revenues to higher actors has decreased the probability of the old landowners to get e compensation, and on the other side, it has created a spatial injustice on the allocation of the public resources. Other urban forms, as it would be described in the third core chapter, have been settled for speculative reasons, building a second or a third house or only fencing a land without a settlement on it. No specific regulations have been clarified to the inhabitants, and arbitrary selection has left space to corruptive practices.

At last, we can assume that regulatory policies have not happened in order to manage the U.A meanings, but rather to create a bureaucratic apparatus to collect revenues.

Constitutive policies according to (Dente, Understanding Policy Decisions, 2014), these kinds of policies create "*executive power entities or deal with laws*". Constituent policies also deal with fiscal policy in some circumstances.

According to the U.A and laws, it is possible that inhabitants of a single area can be actors in the determination of the investments that they get (revenue's reversibility), and to direct them on specific sectors. However, no further explanations are given on how it can be done.

A good case study that would be considered for the U.A is the experience of Co-Plan⁵⁶ in Bathore and Këneta, Durrës, although it does not represent a constituent policy, a sporadic project in the informal area since the beginning of the urban informality process. From our point of view, the research will know the informal area as a constituent planning tool to address future policies thanks to various planning theories strictly related to decisional models, such as the synoptic planning and the rational decision making. Policy pluralism and democracy, next chapter, is going to give some probabilistic scenarios for the fiscal and scientific guidelines. The table below, (Table 11), shows the four policies described that a public agenda could follow, and as a last consideration we can assume that our U.A is on the distributive policies with severe problems on effectiveness and policy realization and implementation. This last factor would be

⁵⁶ Institute for Habitat Development in Tirana, active since early '90. Their experience is described in (Aliaj, Shutina, & Dharmo, Between energy and the vacuum, 2010).

part of the policy analysis on the Empowerment Evaluation, second component of the Responsive Focused Evaluation.

DISTRIBUTIVE	REDISTRIBUTIVE	REGULATORY	CONSTITUTIVE
Resources activated for the first time.	Resources allocated somewhere else.	Resources under regulatory policies.	New actors to manage Resources.
No competitiveness	No competitiveness	Competitive	Competitive
Under Development	Strong Political will	-	Good Social Structure.

table 11: The nature of policies for the U.A.

5.2 Actor's Network.

Following the Institutional Decision arena, it is possible to draw the actor' network by putting dots for each actor mentioned in the U.A. In our case, there are six, National Territory Council, A.L.U.I.Z.N.I, the Ministry of Culture, District, Municipal Council, and the Planning Department, and later on (t1) only five.

With arrows are signed the resources that they exchange, according to the institutional arena. At first sight, it is clear that the central role of the regional agency in the U.A by measuring it would require the methodology described in chapter 3.2.1 corresponding to Dente theory on the linear evaluation of a policy determinant.

Centrality from (t0) to (t1) has increased by 10% toward A.L.U.I.Z.N.I and its role as director, gatekeeper, and ally with the national territory council. This firstly because from the shifting policies we see that many resources have been removed to the municipal council and to the urban planning department, which significantly in picture 14 means fewer directions to other actors involved in the U.A. As we will see, in the policy pluralism these actions are an open violation of two constitutional articles - territorial justice and local autonomy. The role of District, the mid administrative level which works on direct devolution⁵⁷ process from the ministries, has been cut off during the shifting policies applied in 2014.

The process of centralization has also passed with a restriction on the actor's network, decreasing the density by 0,3%.

⁵⁷ Devolution process is the statutory delegation of powers from the central government of a sovereign state to govern at a subnational level, such as a regional or local level.

Formula A.1 is based on the methodology from formula A and it shows the U.A in practice how it has changed in 10 years.



$$\text{centrality} = \frac{\text{HIGHEST NUMBER OF RELATIONS IN EXIT BY THE MAIN ACTOR WHO HAS MORE RELATIONS}}{\text{TOTALRELATIONSINEXITBYALLTHEACTOR}} =$$

Results in (t0) - 0,4. in (t1) - 0,5. Centrality increases.

$$\text{density} = \frac{\text{TOTAL RELATIONS IN EXIT BY ALL ACTORS}}{\text{NUMBER OF ACTORS}^2 - \text{NUMBER OF ACTORS}} =$$

Results in (t0) - 0,33. in (t1) - 0,3. Density decreases

Formula A.1: Measuring policy centrality and density from the actor's network for the U.A in t0 and t1.



Picture 21: Actor's network for the U.A, from t0 to t1.

While it is essential to understand it on real numbers and percentages (%), it also remains crucial to explain what happened to the actor's resources.

Economic Resources Removed. According to the U.A, and its descriptions on the institutional arena, we can assume that the most significant part of the revenues goes to the National Territory Council and A.L.U.I.Z.N.I agency. For the municipal planning department, it remains only the revenues related to cadastral registration and other cases if the settlement has economic purposes. These two economic resources will be considered the only revenues from the U.A and named 'revenues from the legalization fee' on the next chapter of Empowerment Evaluation. On the other side, we have the public cost that the U.A requires, and the necessity of the planning department to invest and draw proposal and projects for the infrastructure. These projects are considered as one of the most significant costs of the U.A, and together with hindering factors, it will give the final cost of the single informal area.

Political Resources Removed. According to the institutional arena, fundamental political rights have been taken off from the municipal council since it is directed with the votes of the citizens of Durres and Tirana area. The municipal council on these considerations has no veto to decide on the urban growth, although this might influence directly on the public finances and cost. On the other side, there's a political restriction to District resources, to give confirmations on agricultural land converted, but since it is a public authority where representatives are not voted from the citizens, but directly from the government, it does not show risk as the municipal council. This last process is in open conflict with article 13 of the Albanian Constitution on the Local Autonomy.

Cognitive Resources Removed. According to the cognitive resources and their definition, we should assume that on our U.A it represents the updated map based on territorial surveys on housing conditions in the informal areas. From (t0) to (t1) this technical competence has passed from the planning department of the municipality to the regional agency A.L.U.I.Z.N.I.

This condition means that every time that the municipality should draft a single plan, Detailed Plan (DP) or General Local Plan (G.L.P) it should trust on the latest updates of the A.L.U.I.Z.N.I agency, even if many settlements are not legalized already. This uncertainty also influences the strategies and the development plan drafted for the G.L.P.

5.2.1 Policy pluralism and democracy.

Decentralized, decision making, and fiscal responsibility are some of the main keywords that might arise from the description above to the U.A. (Shah, 1994) argues that decentralization of fiscal responsibility contributes to the efficient provision of local public services since

expenditures are matched closely with local preferences and needs. Moreover, accountability is promoted by the clearer and closer linkage between the benefits and costs of local public services. This can change thanks to the study of the actor's network and proposals on centrality and density. Furthermore, (Oates, 1972) emphasizes the principle of subsidiary:

"public services are provided most efficiently by the jurisdiction having control over the minimum geographic area that would internalize benefits and costs of such provision".

Policies, designed from the central administrative level, tends to find mutual agreements (laws, and regulations) with the public institutions of a lower administrative level; such are the new born municipalities or Qarku, ends to create an adverse decision making context, about whose responsibility for the second objective of U.A. These shifting policies, designed by A.L.U.I.Z.N.I program in a timeline of ten years, have been more focused on revenues rather than effectiveness, by creating a more profound fragmentation of the network, limiting the cognitive, political and economic resources of the lower administrative levels, such as the newborn municipalities. On this aspect, two problems arise on this process, and can find solutions by bargaining resources;

1) One on the direction of revenue's reversibility and city administration/governance, and the other

2) On the legal frame - Article 13 of the Constitution of the Republic of Albania, and Article 3.

According to the first 'city administration and governance, the problems are related to those shown at the effectiveness analysis - where outputs of the legalization process for the new municipalities continues to take de facto the development size of the city.

Without cognitive resources on the real estate market, it would be impossible to address housing policies from the institutional level. Other problems are related to the function of the informal settlements, where not all of them are for housing purposes - there's another part for commercial and activity purposes. Such a distinction is crucial to divide cognitive resources with the economic one that can generate outcomes for the municipalities. Both resources are strictly connected with the decisional arena and to the ability of the municipalities to act on urbanization and integration process. These last processes are closely related to public services such as transportation and urban waste management. **The legal frame and the unconstitutional success of A.L.U.I.Z.N.I program, shifting policies, stand on public autonomy frame.** Criticalities that hold the principles of local autonomy have been withdrawn in order to accelerate the process

of legalization. Without cognitive and economic resources, there would not be a political will and so political resources would be scarce.

According to (article 13, 1998) in the Albanian Constitution:

"Local government in the Republic of Albania is based on the principle of decentralization government and carried according to the principle of local autonomy."

Another question arises from the analysis of the utility; four target groups have been defined as in a high-risk condition, on social, economic and policy vacuum. Criticalities addressed from the analysis on the utility show that there's an immediate need to work on target groups that are not involved in the legalization, urbanization and integration program. Social, environmental and economic vulnerability shows the peculiarities on the (article 3, 1998):

"The independence and integrity of its territory, human dignity, rights and freedoms, social justice, constitutional order, pluralism, national identity and heritage national, religious coexistence, as well as coexistence and understanding of Albanian minorities are the bases of this state, which has the duty to respect and protect".

Opening future scenarios for the urbanization, integration of informal settlements in Albania according to various authors that had studied the decisional models we can schematically highlight four models of them.

By bargaining Political Resources; It is possible to add a connection between Municipal Council and Planning Department with the other actors. Abridge can be created among municipality, (e.g., political and technical commissions), with the Regional Agencies and K.K.T in order to get a certain period (annual) sum of funds from land privatization of national land in order to offer basic needs, such as public transport and urban waste management. Positive Aspects: Can open possible solutions to the connection with the city; interurban connection, as well as local services, such as waste management at a municipal scale. By giving back the political resource or its veto, or possibility to take a decision where and on what to spend public money, this scenario can give possible answers to (article 13, 1998). Negative Aspects: It remains a mere cost-benefit from political resources to economical. It would be difficult to understand the real need for public services without cognitive resources.

By Economic bargaining Resources; K.K.T can transfer the land ownership directly, after a special approval from the Municipal Planning Department and under the General Local Plan in law, and its development criteria, to the Municipalities for future settlements on privatization

process for public purposes. Positive Aspects: Possibility to offer future public services inside and in the city outskirts, including policies on social housing in order to answer to (article 3, 1998). Negative Aspects: Less income for K.K.T.

By bargaining Cognitive Resources; Municipalities can open participatory planning programs at the same time of the technical survey as Co-Plan experiences suggest. Positive aspects: Municipalities have significant possibilities to clarify if a settlement has economic or housing function, in order to connect to the flexibility of the real estate market with taxes income and cognitive resources, answer to the unconstitutional condition of (article 13, 1998) and public governance. Negative Aspects: It would take time, and it should take place in a particular time on the historical development of the informal area.

City administration and governance, by changing centrality and density

From the analysis of the effectiveness to the consequences of the city administration and governance, it is possible to change the actor's network and their interaction. Two strategies can be defined; one is related to the centrality, the other to the density.

Change Centrality. Centrality is closely related to the number of interactions that are among actors. On the analysis of the polarized statements of specific goals and its actors, it is possible to start from t2 where the central government acts. Qarku has no veto or political will to decide how much land should be converted to urban area from the agricultural land. This amount can be decided under the K.K.T and by the local specificity that Qarku sees more appropriate on the national policies and strategies, considering that this actor works on the second administrative level and in devolution from the central government. Intersectoral Plans for the national territorial strategy works only on the horizontal level with the various ministries -District can boost for vertical cooperation in order to define the national priorities in the regional scale. Although this solution brings many criticalities of the Qarku and its public function, it can remain a territorial frame to decide the national strategies on legalization, urbanization, and integration.

Change Density. Density, differently from the centrality, is directly connected to the number of actors. By adding new actors on the A.L.U.I.Z.N.I program, it is possible to obtain the objectives withdrawn from the municipalities. They are closely related to the use of the law, but what can change the public administration and territory governance are those connected to cognitive resources and territory survey. Further projects can be boosted to negotiate the responsibilities of

the public sphere in the urbanization and integration process. Last experiences, as those of Co-Plan, expressed below can give an excellent example of the first two processes - legalization and urbanization. In the end, we should underline that further effort should be made on the social aspect. Final remarks: integrate, or give a chance to social innovation? The scenarios suggested above are not exhaustive, but they respond to the analysis and the problems encountered during this policy evaluation research. If the last two scenarios give a broader vision of the combinations that can be taken, the first three scenarios, gives a historical perspective and highly metaphorical - 'if we choose to cut the knot as Alexander the Great did, there would be the risk to lose our ties with the motherland'. In other words; if we do not take into account the work and experience accumulated by the Regional Agencies created in the recent years to meet the demands of the local public autonomy, there's the risk of doing things from the beginning, which can threaten the relationship between public institutions and informal practices.

According to (Cottino, 2009) peripheral areas in the city outskirts are the places where social innovation takes place, unlike the city which is more robust and compact - and this can be explained by land market prices. So giving new possibilities to the 'informal areas' (defined by law) the capability to react in social and economic dimensions remains a crucial point to open new scenarios on social innovation. Law (Ligji 8378, 22.07.1998) which says to stop informal practices in areas approved as 'Informal Areas' can turn to be too repressive. Instead of policies focusing on the 'informal areas' and their 'integration' concept with the city, by exporting revenues, future policies can boost further the intensity of social and economic dimension inside the 'informal areas' defined by law. That would bring to the new experimental field, of planning, and participatory practices supported by public policies and various donors.

From all the scenarios described, the last given by Cottino seems the more appropriate for a research study and more shaped to create social and economic priorities, rather than the bargaining of political resources, and it is more similar to Albanian experiences such as the Co-Plan in Bathore or Këneta.

Although the scenarios given in this last chapter might seem definitive, they would never get so sensitive on efficiency and effectiveness if we will not consider the hindering costs that will be described in the next chapter.

Final remarks on policy content

From the institutional decision arena, table 10, the public actors involved in the (U.A) are many, but only a few are involved. The actors who play the most significant part are those at the highest administrative level, and such is (K.K.T) and (A.L.U.Z.N.I) agency. These last actors play a role as policy promoter, director, gatekeeper, and filter of the (U.A) at the same time. The roles that public actors have, mentioned above, are regulated by law and defined since 2006. Since then, to nowadays, many regulations and laws have been revised. Thanks to the institutional decision arena, table 10, it is possible to distinguish from laws and regulations the nature of four resources, political, economic, legal and cognitive.

The newborn Municipalities have partially **economic resources**, almost 20% for the urbanization for each informal area and revenues generated by legalization fee, and **legal resources**, from the General Local Plans. **Political resources**, the ability to gain consensus, are entirely localized from (K.K.T), and the Municipal Council has no right to define which areas should be legalized and which not. The more informal areas are defined by (K.K.T), due to the informal practices, more would be costs for the municipalities to bring urbanization. The reality shows a territory where the political resources are stronger than the legal resources - defined by the General Local Plans (G.L.P). Indeed many are the cases where cities run for new (G.L.P) in five or seven years. One of the reasons is the territorial incompatibility of the territory with the cartographic and cadastral data. For the municipalities, the missing of the **cognitive resources** is a crucial point of low efficiency on tax collection and wealth distribution (public investments).

What is to be done

The first step is to criticize the outputs and outcomes which have a spatial injustice nature on wealth distribution and unconstitutional nature on article 13 and 41 on the Albanian Constitution. Take the economic resources and focus on the territorial scale of the informal area. Further critique goes to the division by the law of the 55 informal areas. The smallest one of 10 (ha) is at Tirane city center (Blloku), and the biggest in Durres city outskirts (Keneta), 750 (ha). The last phase opens various scenarios by bargaining economic resources and transactive planning among actors. From all the scenarios described, the last given by (Cottino, 2009) and Co-Plan experience in Bathore, seems the more appropriate for a research study and more shaped to create social and economic priorities on a small scale starting from the endogenous resources. For this reason, RFE suggest passing from (TH.D.E) to (E.E), in other words, getting on the territorial scale to identify which conditions generate public revenues from the legalization and which not.

6

EVALUATING POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

Measuring the U.A

6.0 EVALUATING POLICY IMPLEMENTATION: MEASURING THE U.A.

In this second core chapter, the thesis research will answer the question "How much?" by defining the economic resources from the institutional arena described in the first core chapter. Since outcomes and outputs described in the first agenda are too general, in the institutional decision arena, the methodological answer will focus on the single informal area. The economic resources listed in the institutional arena are the focus of theoretical research. For this reason, the empowerment evaluation theory is going to prescribe the methodological pathways. **As the methodology can give the leading indicators to measure territorial resources⁵⁸, it does not give answers directly to the policy efficiency and effectiveness.** Only core chapter three is going to address other specific questions but based on the indicators measured in the second core chapter.

From the theoretical point of view, the Empowerment Evaluation is a focused evaluation. It knows its limits of the investigation and highlights the importance of actor's resources and their exchange. From the epistemological point of view, it is a post behavioral study since it focuses not on the evaluation of the whole U.A, described in the institutional arena, but only on measurable resources. So, the object of the research is already defined; to measure economic resources.

According to (Fetterman & Wandersman, 2005), who defines empowerment evaluation, the focus in a policy evaluation should;

aim to increase the probability of achieving program success by

(1) providing program stakeholders with tools for assessing the planning, implementation, and self-evaluation of their program, and

(2) mainstreaming evaluation as part of the planning and management of the program/organization.

Picture number six (Picture 6) suggests in a theoretical scheme how empowerment evaluation should proceed.

⁵⁸ Territorial Resources for the U.A are; Land, Settlement and Urbanization (Infrastructure)



Picture 6: Empowerment Evaluation Theory (E.E). By Fetterman & Wandersman, (2007).

1) Developing a mission and vision is the first phase of the Empowerment Evaluation.

The U.A on legalization, urbanization, and integration of the informal areas already has defined the objectives. The first is legalization, where it is possible, and the second to bring the urbanization in the informal areas. Both of them, legalization and urbanization, are economic resources. However, with a difference, legalization means direct public revenues for the public authorities engaged in the U.A for the legalization fee. Instead, urbanization means direct cost in order to bring the infrastructure and urbanization in each informal area.

For Revenues, the U.A refers to the public income from the legalization fee. From the Institutional Decision Arena, and the laws listed in the chapter 3.2.1 three actors are in charge of competence: the National Council of the Territory, A.L.U.I.Z.N.I regional agency and the Municipalities. Each of these actors collects the revenues from specific territorial resources. The first two, The National Council of the Territory, A.L.U.I.Z.N.I regional agency, collects the legalization fee from the land. Instead, the Municipality collects the settlement legalization fee.

Hindering Costs derives from the probability that the two main territorial resources, land and settlement, fail or not to get the legalization process. The methodology describes four macro hindering factors and each of the territorial resources can be expressed in value in order to get the hindering costs.

Urbanization is also part of the objective of the U.A. From the nature of economic resources, it represents a cost from the public authorities. From the institutional decision arena, it is possible to identify the role of the Municipal Urban Planning Department as the main actor to fulfill this objective. For Urbanization in the policy evaluation, the infrastructural network would be considered.

The **territorial impact** of all these indicators, land/settlement fee, hindering costs and urbanization cost, has created a high fragmentation on land and low mobility network. Although it cannot be measured and evaluated in the U.A, it shows externalities of more than 10 years of U.A.

2) **Taking Stock is the next phase described by the Empowerment Evaluation.** It focuses on the territorial indicators to measure the economic resources and to give a final result among revenues and costs. Formula A, described in the methodology, is first assessment to measure the economic resources for a single area.

Final Investment on Single Informal Area (F.I.S.I.A)⁵⁹=

(Revenues)x0,2(revenue's reversibility)- Costs on Urbanization- Hindering Costs

Formula B: Measuring final investment on the single area.

3) While F.I.S.I.A express the economic resources for each area, the distribution of the revenues is not equal to urbanization costs. For this reason, it is essential to ask the research question "How much?". For how much revenues are higher or lower than urbanization. The theoretical phase addressed in Planning for the future answers to which objective the U.A should focus on, revenues or costs. While some areas might have a positive F.I.S.I.A, others do not. High urbanization costs characterize these informal areas which do not fulfill this objective, urbanization, even if all internal revenues are collected, considering the hindering factors to get a legalization. External economic resources can achieve this objective. Core chapter three offers a different decisional model to get the needed revenues' reversibility to achieve urbanization.

6.1 Revenues and Hindering Factors.


This part of the research focuses on two territorial resources and their ability to generate revenues or not, as the empowerment evolution suggests. Land and Settlement are the territorial resources that in the U.A are considered as informal practice on legalization process. From the combination of these two territorial resources, it also depends on their success or not on the legalization process. The hindering factors that might stop the legalization process are legal restrictions that persist on the territory or due to multiple environmental cases. Theoretically⁶⁰, from the two territorial resources we can have four macro hindering factors. The next chapter is going to explain their legal nature and probabilistic situation on territory and is going to give the theoretical and methodological frame of their definition as macro hindering factor.

⁵⁹ F.I.S.I.A is the acronym of the Final Investment on a Single Informal Area.

⁶⁰ Probabilistic opportunities of hindering factors on the combination between land and settlement. (2²) . Prisoner's dilemma example. See next chapter.

6.1.1 Public Revenues. Territorial Resources and Revenue's Reversibility.

Public revenues, or incomes from the legalization fee are different from one actor to another. The U.A on Legalization, Urbanization and Integration of the informal areas and settlements is a public priority of different actors⁶¹ since 2004. From that year many laws, regulations, and directives have been approved and applied. Picture number one shows the most important till now.



Picture 22: Historical administrative phases of U.A on legalization, urbanization and integration of informal areas in Albania.

The laws approved in different years show a policy with a strong focus on cognitive and economic resources. Different colors marked shows the difference between them (Picture 22).

With grey are all those laws which have been approved and added to the U.A and show the establishment of procedures for collecting data, managing, and graphical language. In public policy studies, these procedures are a matter of cognitive resource that the actors behold.

With black are marked all those laws which have been approved and added to the U.A in order to define public revenues from land and settlement legalization. In public policy studies, these resources are considered economic.

⁶¹ Actors involved in the U.A for the Legalization, Urbanization and Integration of the Informal Areas are; (i) the Council of Ministries, (ii) ALUIZNI regional agency and, (iii) Municipalities. (iv) Qarku and (v) Ministry of Culture.

Both public resources, economic and cognitive, are a public interest matter, defined and managed by the national government and the regional agency for the U.A.

According to the Albanian Constitution⁶², article number thirteen, the two public resources, economic and cognitive, should be managed by the Municipalities. Instead, what really happens is that higher administrative levels⁶³ are in charge of it.

The local government in the Republic of Albania is based on the principle of decentralization of power and exercised according to the principle of local autonomy.

Actually, Municipalities are in charge only to accomplish the urbanization process with the economic resource that the Council of Ministers reverses from the revenues. According to the VKM⁶⁴ No. 860, dated 10.12.2014, **revenues** are defined by the **land legalization fee** and **settlement legalization fee**. These two territorial resources are distributed 80% to the Council of Ministers and to 20% to Municipalities. Directive No.37, dated 20.11.2008, "Use of Revenues from the Legalization Fee", defines the **revenue's reversibility to (20%)** for each informal area. Below we give an illustration of both territorial resources that generate revenues, what to measure and how to value in accordance to the laws and regulations.

1) Land Size measured in meter square is the dimension that each single applicant for the legalization process has occupied on the real territory. Usually, they are in agricultural areas and the value for each meter square is relatively low. In these cases, although the land takes new juridical status after the legalization process the value is estimated as agricultural. The decision from the Council of Ministers, VKM No. 488, dated 22.7.2014, "Determining the Land Price for Legalization process", defines the amount of revenues that should be generated by each meter square of land. Actually, it is (50%) of the market price. For methodological reasons, it would be taken in a medium of 25 euro per meter square⁶⁵ (first legal reference).

Other decisions from the law are on the limitation of this reduction of (50%) for those informal lands occupying a surface more than 300 m². Every additional meter would be considered as the market price for the informal area. These revenues according to the **revenue's reversibility**⁶⁶ goes (20%) to the Municipalities and (80%) to the National Council for the Territory and to the

⁶² Albanian Constitution, approved on 1998.

⁶³ Since VKM Nr. 860, date 10.12.2014, the ALUIZNI agency is uncharged to collect data, cognitive resources, and the municipalities are shifted way from the U.A.

⁶⁴ V.K.M is a Decision made from the Council of the Ministries.

⁶⁵ This scenario represents the biggest part of the informal areas, they may vary +/- 5 euro/m².


⁶⁶ Defined by Directive Nr.37, date 20.11.2008.

Council of the Ministers. Later, this (80%) is divided into (30%) to the regional agency of A.L.U.I.Z.N.I and the rest remains to the National Council for the Territory.

2) **Settlement Size** measured in meter square is the dimension that each single applicant for the legalization process has built on land parcel. The decision from the Council of Ministers, VKM No. 860, dated 10.12.2014, "Determining the method of collecting and managing revenues", defines the revenues from the legalization fee of the informal settlement and other various public services, such as the cartographic elaboration. As a medium in the methodology, 5 euro per meter square (second legal reference) would be considered. These revenues go to Municipalities in order to accomplish various registrations of the land and settlement once legalized.

As described above, graph number one (Graph 1) shows the final distribution of the revenues to each actor from an informal area.

Informal Area A with (X) Revenues, (%) of Revenue's Reversibility



Graph 1: Revenue's Reversibility to each actor.

6.1.2 Macro Hindering Factor.

The urban planning laws in Albania have undergone several changes in the last 27 years, but the most significant was 2009 addition that changed municipalities' perspectives on their territories, changing the interpretation from 'On Urbanism'⁶⁷ to 'On Territorial Planning'⁶⁸. This period also signifies the expansion of the competences of the municipalities to manage the rural area outside the yellow line⁶⁹, defined since the communist regime to maintain the centralization of the cities. This planning instrument, the yellow line, has also represented the inability and limits of the municipalities to manage the urban sprawl that has characterized the Albanian territory for more than 27 years. Informal settlements have been raised outside the yellow lines of the biggest cities

⁶⁷'On Urbanism' was the Albanian law regarding urban planning.

⁶⁸'On Territorial Planning' is the actual law with new changes regarding territorial planning beyond the yellow line.

⁶⁹The yellow line was defined by 'On Urbanism' in 1998 and before tracing the urban borders and competences of the municipality.

in Albania, such as Shkodra, Durrës, Tirana and Elbasan. However, in 2004, the main government created a new regional agency to deal with informal settlements, A.L.U.I.Z.N.I. Since then, these two territorial actors, A.L.U.I.Z.N.I and the municipality, have been challenging the same competences with different resources and policies. As we saw on the last chapter, cognitive resources are an unconstitutional dispute and the economic resources are distributed in the same way for each informal area.

The following methodology is going to explain why revenue's reversibility percentage among actors is not fair for the territorial and spatial planning. The territorial resources that define the revenues are 1) land legalization fee and 2) settlement legalization fee, which are two processes that should occur in the legalization process. If one of them fails to get the legalization, the whole application for legalization is declined. The failure is strictly related to legal, juridical and environmental constraints. The multiform of these constraints is called as a hindering factor to get a legalization process.

The first probabilistic result is that land and settlement can get the legalization process, but there are hindering factors outside the land that do not make the process to obtain the legalization. This macro hindering factor is called **"Outside the Land"**.


The second probabilistic result is that settlement can get the legalization process, but the land has legal constraints. This macro hindering factor is called **"On the Land"**.

The third probabilistic result is that land can get the legalization process, but settlement has legal constraints. This macro hindering factor is called **"On the Settlement"**.

The last probabilistic result is that both land and settlement have legal constraints to get a legalization process. This macro hindering factor is called **"On the Single household"**.

Picture fifteen (Picture 15) illustrates the four macro hindering factors of table twelve in a schematic way. The assumption, as the prisoner's dilemma theory⁷⁰, is that all combinations are going to fail to legalization. The payoff of the territorial resources may consist on their hindering factors or other from outside - as the first probabilistic result shows.

⁷⁰The prisoner's dilemma is a standard example of a game analyzed in game theory that shows why two completely rational individuals might not cooperate.



Picture 15: Four macro hindering factors. From the methodology to diagrammatic expression of variables for hindering factors.

Each macro hindering factor is related to single, or many, restriction to get the legalization. Their nature depends another actors not directly involved in the U.A. Table number twelve (Table 12) lists some of them in order to understand the nature of the macro hindering factors - even if they are not part of the policy analysis, since outside the U.A.






				
	Macro Hindering Factor, group1 "Outside the Land"	Macro Hindering Factor, group2 "On the Land"	Macro Hindering Factor, group 3 "On the Building"	Macro Hindering Factor, group 4 "On Single Family"
<u>Hindering Factors from "The Sixth Mystery survey: What Is the Trap That Hinders Development and the Integration of the Albanian Economy with the Modern World?"</u>	These Settlements are built on agricultural land.	These are built on public land or property belonging to someone else. Having obtained construction permits, but may not comply with de facto implementation.	Having obtained construction permits, but may not comply with de facto implementation.	Having inheritance, marriage, property claims or compensation, this group has no income for the legalization fee.
<u>Hindering Factors from the A.L.U.I.Z.N.I Agenda, Law and Regulations.</u>	This group violates the strict zone of protection for seas, rivers, canals and other natural water systems; main water supplies and networks, airports, ports and dams; pipelines, oil wells and their infrastructure; and energy power stations or interconnection zones.	This violates the category Integrity of the Monuments of Culture, I, II and archaeological areas, as well as requirements for distance from the main streets.	This violates the category of the Monuments of Culture, I, II and archaeological areas, as well as requirements for distance from the main streets.	n/a
<u>Hindering Factors from the General Regulatory Plan.</u>	This violates proposed or existing protected natural areas in various categories.	The Urban Planning Office of the municipality can express public interest.	This group has no building permission. The municipality's Urban Planning Office can express public interest, or may change the development indicators.	n/a
<u>Hindering Factors Cadastral Office</u>	n/a	n/a	n/a	This group has no income for registration fees.

Table 12: Four Macro Hindering Factors to regroup each single hindering factor, or legal constraints based on settlement and land conditions.


Results on the nature of the macro hindering factors are listed below. We have to highlight that in this research it is essential the value of the economic resource and not the descriptive nature of the hindering factors. However, the identification of hindering factors can lead to the territorial resources and their possible assessment.



Picture 23: Regular informality on F.I.S.I.A Assessment

According to the theory described by (Aliaj, Shutina, & Dharmo, Between energy and the vacuum, 2010) the growth transition in Albania has followed three phases, (S) setting a settlement, (P) Parceling and last (U) Urbanization. For methodological reasons this will expressed $S > P > U$. This order of the three phases represents how the informal growth that has been sprawled in the agricultural land, without the urbanization. Other cases of informal growth are located in urban areas, where infrastructure exists, respectively in industrial areas, central urban areas, and Soviet blocks.

For the territorial impact of the growth transition, two processes on land and settlement are identified; Land fragmentation and Land/Settlement densification.



(S) fails | (P) fails
 Macro Hindering Factor, group1
"Outside the Land" 1

Picture 24: FirstMacro Hindering Factor. "Outside the Land". Group 1 from Micro Hindering Factors (tab.12)


This group first hindering group cost represents the most significant portion of prescriptions of the legalization phases. The contents of these prescriptions, laws, and regulations are strictly related to the protection of land status and destination of use. Usually, these are hazardous areas, close to river basins, highways or other unspecified locations, and violated laws. The hindering factors in such a condition will persist if nothing is done to re-establish the natural condition or what is prescribed by the G.L.P⁷¹. To understand the housing emergency of this condition, we look at the consequences of land flooding, unhealthy air and water, and unstable terrain.

- There's no remedy to land, and so even settlement cannot get legalization.
- This group violates the strict zone of protection for seas, rivers, canals and other natural water systems; main water supplies and networks, airports, ports and dams; pipelines, oil wells, and their infrastructure; and energy power stations or interconnection zones.
- Other factors may violate proposed or existing protected natural areas in various categories.

Units to measure for the assessment:

- (m²) of Settlement build. The initial investment of the householder.
- In case of expropriation the land occupied remains a public resource.

⁷¹ GLP is the General Local Plan.



(S) ok | (P) fails
Macro Hindering Factor, group 2
"On the Land"


Picture 25: Second Macro Hindering Factor. "On the Land". Group 2 from Micro Hindering Factors (tab.12)

This group of hindering factors represents one of the most intersected problems that housing faces, as described by (Aliaj, Misteri i Gjashte. Cili eshte kurthi qe mban peng zhvillimin dhe integrimin e ekonomise shqiptare ne boten moderne., 2008): the conflicting and imprecise cartography used by different actors. Inhabitants that have raised settlements in such conditions face a continuous institutional barrier.

- Hindering factors only on land shape and/or third parties ownership.
- These are built on public land or property belonging to someone else.
- Having obtained construction permits, but may not comply with de facto implementation.
- Other factors may violate the category Integrity of the Monuments of Culture, Ist category, IInd category and archaeological areas, as well as requirements for distance from the main streets.

Units to measure for the assessment:

- (m²) of Parcel occupied.



(S) fails | (P) ok
Macro Hindering Factor, group 3
"On Single Settlement"


Picture 26: Third Macro Hindering Factor. "On Single Settlement". Group 3 from Micro Hindering Factors (tab.12)

This group of hindering factors is less prescribed by the regulations and may vary based on municipality and G.L.P laws. It is related to the physical and architectonic incompatibility with the law or the (G.L.P) where in some cases they have surpassed the limiting indicator for development in the zoning area. This macro hindering factor relies on the single investment for the building, and it may vary from partial reconstruction, in unsafe conditions to live in, to entire investment.

- Land and Settlement are not on the same parcel, or, building outside land.
- Alternatively, the settlement has obtained construction permits, but may not comply with de facto implementation.
- This group has no building permit.
- The municipality's Urban Planning Office can express public interest or may change the development indicators.
- Other factors may violate the category Integrity of the Monuments of Culture, I, II and archaeological areas, as well as requirements for distance from the main streets.

Units to measure for the assessment:

- (m²) of Settlement build. The initial investment of the householder or other adjunctions out of standards.



(S) fails | (P) fails
Macro Hindering Factor, group 4
"On the Householder"

Picture 27: Fourth Macro Hindering Factor. "Outside the Land". Group 4 from Micro Hindering Factors (tab.12)

In this group of hindering factors are all those families who cannot pay the legalization fees or the registration to the Cadastral Office. Other taxes may be included in the hindering factors to the legalization and formalization processes. The cost for future investment for this group is the lowest if confronted with other macro hindering factors and it may vary from 250 euro for a single building to 1000 euro in case of socio-economic activities.

- The settlement is out of living standards, no roof or windows as defined by law.
- This group has no income for legalization fees.


Units to measure for the assessment:

- (m²) of Settlement build and
- (m²) of land.

6.2 Urbanization Costs and Territorial Impact.

Assuming the below-mentioned results of revenues, hindering factors and revenue's reversibility a first assumption is that informal area has different amounts of final revenues, although the distribution among actors remains the same as in graph number one.

Moreover, this depends strictly on the number of householders with hindering factors to legalization. More significant is the land hindering factors, less is going to be the revenues, and the same thing applies to the settlement hindering factors, and vice versa. Graph two (Graph 2) shows this diversity in proportional illustration. Example A has an (X) final amount of revenues because as an informal area, it may have many land and settlement hindering factors. Example B has (3X) more revenues, because it may have less land and settlement hindering factors. The percentage of revenue's reversibility would not change since even if there's a hindering settlement factor, it would block the process of legalization for the land and so on. So all the actors will have the same percentage of disadvantage from the total revenues.



Graph 2: Revenue's Reversibility and Amount of Revenues in A and B.
(A and B has different hindering factors).

Another reason why A has fewer revenues than B is the dimension of the informal area. Apparently, the bigger the informal area is, the bigger the probability of having higher revenues would be. From this moment there are two big territorial justice issues.

1) First is that the revenue's reversibility is not fair among actors and the hindering factors reduce the economic resources for each of the actors in a different way.

2) Second is the spatial dimension of the informal area, divided between in an arbitrary way and different areas have a different amount of revenues, even if we measure the hindering factors.

Core chapter three addresses these two problematic questions. For the research evaluation, according to the U.A, there's another territorial resource that influences the revenues. Urbanization is the second process and objective of the U.A. As listed from the institutional decision arena on the first core chapter, the evaluation perspective is a cost that should be achieved by the actors involved in the U.A.


6.2.1 Urbanization Cost

Urbanization, on the U.A perspective, and as defined by the laws, means to bring infrastructure to the informal area directly. The infrastructure network is a territorial resource as Land and Settlement for the revenues, but in this case, it is a cost. More extensive is the infrastructural network, higher the urbanization cost would be. As a measurement unit for the infrastructural units, it is expressed in meter square. Every meter square of infrastructure has a value. By considering the market value⁷², It varies from one case to another. For methodological reasons it a medium of 100 Euro per meter square would be considered. (Reference 3).

For a better understanding informal area, A has the same dimensions as B. For various macro hindering factors the informal areas have different amounts of Revenues, respectively (X) for the informal A and (3X) for the informal area B. Both areas have the same infrastructural network to bring urbanization, respectively (1/2X). The result is picture graph number three (Graph 3).

By also considering that the revenue's reversibility to urbanization is only the (20%), which goes to Municipalities, we can come to the result that informal area B has a higher chance to get urbanization. The informal area A would risk to never accomplish this objective of the U.A for this specific informal area.

⁷² Market value for setting infrastructure in the informal areas. in meter square.



Graph 3: Revenue's Reversibility to each actor and the diversity in total amount for different areas.

6.2.2 Territorial Impact. Land Fragmentation and Mobility Impact.

The U.A on legalization, urbanization, and integration of informal settlements and areas in Albania exists since 2006. For this purpose the national government created a regional agency to deal with these three objectives, 1) the legalization of informal areas, where it is possible, 2) the urbanization to these areas - significantly meaning the infrastructure and 3) integration, which has never found specific priorities or projects on the informal areas. The agency named as A.L.U.I.Z.N.I brings as well the acronyms of these three objectives, standing for Agency for the Legalization, Urbanization, and Integration of Informal Areas and Settlements in Albanian version. From this perspective, we can say that the means of national planning are already defined, but what remains important is the policy analysis and impact on the real territory of these objectives.

Nowadays, only the region of Durres and Tirana count more than 400.000 applications for a legalization process by covering a total of 8050 ha. On the administrative point of view, the informal areas are divided into 55 units.

A half assumption is that where urbanization is missing, in informal practices the multiform has flourished. In most of the cases, this inability to act on time has left no space for public spaces and other aggregative places to meet for the inhabitants. Densification and development have evolved and put into practice freely for 27 years.

This research on territorial impact aims to start from the recent theories on the forms of the urban development to create a precise matrix of the multiform that consists on informal practices on different phases till to the legalization.

For this reason, the research focuses on this multiform of these three objectives, legalization, urbanization and integration.

For **legalization** on the territorial condition, we should consider the land position, if there are natural or physical and legal restrictions or other forms, and if the settlement meets the municipal standards or not (shanties or formal buildings). In other words, this legal statement, legalization, constitute different financial revenues. Such is the land and settlement fee. For this purpose, the national government has created various regulations for the land fee⁷³, which varies from 25euro/m² to 100euro/m². On the other hand, municipalities collect revenues from the settlement fee⁷⁴, based on housing or economic activities. From this perspective, these total public revenues are limited, and determined, by the number of settlements in an informal area and their building surface, size of the land occupied, kind of activity of housing or economic, and/or other forms.

Also, all these circumstances have mostly different and additional costs for the applicants. Many have answered to these circumstances by developing tactics to avoid additional costs. For example, by creating two fences on the same land, in order to reclaim different land dimensions occupied. According to the national regulations, for the land fee, when the land size is larger than 300 square meter, every meter, in addition, would increase to the market value - which may result four times higher than the price given by A.L.U.I.Z.N.I, respectively 25€/m².

Other cases are when fences and walls, parceling, are built to be hidden from the front street when buildings take economic purposes. In some circumstances, these cases are when secondary settlements are built on the same land parcel for economic activities but are registered as housing units. This last physical condition may also result in the informal labor market. Other circumstances are when applications consist of semi-built settlement and fences, in most of the cases with no inhabitants inside.

The multiform of this informality is essential not only for the public revenues but Mostly for the territorial impact that they have and generate. **Land fragmentation** is one of these impacts.

⁷³ Land fee for the legalization process. Defined by the National Council for the Territory and collected by ALUIZNI.

⁷⁴ Building fee for the legalization process. Defined by the National Council for the Territory and collected by Municipalities and Cadastre Office.

Other effects are on the institutional capability to deal in a transparent way with the applicants, which in many cases has brought to corruptive and speculation practices. The roles of director and gatekeeper of A.L.U.I.Z.N.I have generated an informal practice that in many cases has created privileges for certain informal conditions and other not, such as in cases when legal restrictions are not explicit. The long and bureaucratic process to give legalization is not a responsive⁷⁵ process to the single inhabitants and it is not clear on what conditions they can get the legalization or not.

Urbanization, described directly as an objective to bring infrastructure, is an important element that has shaped the urban morphology of the informal settlements and buildings. Here it is important to underline that not all the informal areas have been applied to this objective⁷⁶, and many areas have no infrastructure at all. This inability to manage the informal areas and to bring in the informal areas infrastructure has created further effects on the territory, strictly related to the **mobility**.

Beyond the administrative costs expressed in the previous chapter, the process of legalization, urbanization, integration and the process of informal practices seems a process of infinite self-reshaping and tactics due to legal constraints. Firstly, to the land by creating a more profound fragmentation. And secondly, to the mobility network and spaces. This perpetual condition has somehow affected all the informal areas by creating a fractal problem on the issues of land **fragmentation and low mobility network**.


Based on these territorial impacts, the objectives of the U.A, it is possible to highlight three processes that have occurred in the informal areas, a) setting a settlement, b) occupying a land lot by fencing it, and c) put in infrastructure and urbanization. However, the examples of land tactic, described above, are useful to understand that there is a multiform of shaping and reshaping the land occupied and settlement, before and after the urbanization. This continuity of informal practice has created various alternations between process a), b) and c). Moreover, the transition from one process to another has created various degrees of territorial impact on land fragmentation and mobility network.

⁷⁵ Responsive is an element of good governance, as defined by many international and governmental organizations, and it is one of the key indicator to measure it.

⁷⁶ As described above, urbanization is one the objectives of the U.A for the Legalization, Urbanization and Integration of the informal areas and settlements.

A half assumption is that 'where c) infrastructure is missing, the informal practices have flourished in multiform of land shaping and settlement raising, with high impact on land fragmentation and mobility network.' Theories described below show that in different countries and periods, the alternation among a), b) and c) has created various urban morphologies. Also, each of those has a different territorial impact. Although many of these theories remain a planning utopia, others show their theoretical and local description of what happened in an informal context.

Theories and controversies. We know from previous researches that the informal process in Albania has followed an opposite direction to the traditional western development. Picture number twenty-three (Picture 23) shows in a schematic way what (Aliaj, Shutina, & Dhamo, Between energy and the vacuum, 2010) describes in their research on informal settlements and areas in Albania.



Picture 23: Processes of the informal urban growth in Albania. (described by Aliaj).

According to the author's description, the process of providing legal tenure/legalization of tenure for the informal settlement comes after the urbanization. While this might be true, unfortunately, for some informal areas, the urbanization has never come, although the legal tenure/legalization, has been given by the public authorities. From this theoretical perspective it's important to highlight the three elements of the informal practice which we are looking for a legalization process; a) setting a settlement⁷⁷, b) occupying a land⁷⁸, c) build infrastructure⁷⁹. While the existence of these processes might be present and observed⁸⁰, the alternation is not at the same direction, as examples suggest. In some cases, (S) and (P) has occurred, but not (U). In some circumstances, this process has left room for a second (P) process, which can be described as (S)>(P)>(P). This probabilistic process has been subject to observation and research even in


⁷⁷ Setting a settlement, or (S).

⁷⁸ Occupying a Land, or (P).

⁷⁹ Put in Infrastructure, or (U).

⁸⁰ (S)>(P)>(U) the Albanian informal urban growth.

other countries by various authors. Some of these are described as urban utopias, others as local theories born from informal practices (Picture 24). But, even when they are urban utopias they show their impartiality in the realization. For a better reading of these urban utopias and territorial circumstances, in the work of (Rubió, 1998, p. 21) has been chosen, (S), (P) and (U) as main determinants.



Picture 24: Processes of the urban growth in various theories. (described by Rubio)

Many of these planning theories, listed in the picture number twenty-four (Picture 24), are not new to those studied since the early years of the academic background and as we know they represent the specific period in which they are born and their territorial context.

For example, the theory of Garden City⁸¹, born in the late 18th century. As listed by the author⁸², it follows a consecutive process (U)>(P)>(E). It answers to a practical and planning model to achieve a compact city in the industrial booming of London's territory. Later it was expanded in European cities as well. Although it remained a utopia in planning models, it reclaims the need for a better decision making for urban growth on the future cities. As nowadays we can find

⁸¹Howard's plan for the garden city was a response to the need for improvement in the quality of urban life, which had become marred by overcrowding and congestion due to uncontrolled growth since the Industrial Revolution. The main features of Howard's scheme were; (1) the purchase of a large area of agricultural land within a ring fence; (2) the planning of a compact town surrounded by a wide rural belt; (3) the accommodation of residents, industry and agriculture within the town; (4) the limitation of extent to the town and prevention of encroachment upon rural belt; (5) the natural rise in land values to be used for the town's own general welfare.

⁸²(Rubió, 1998)

many cities which have partially applied this theory, we can assume that even our case, the informal urban growth in the Albanian context, might have its partialities. The utopia in the case of the informal Albanian settlements is the never-ending urbanization. According to our assumptions, this never-ending urbanization is one of the main indicators which has boosted the informal practices to different conditions and partialities.

As the local Albanian theory shows a spontaneous on different territorial circumstances, others show their maturity of planning to get in the design phase since the first process of land fragmentation and mobility, to conclude to settlement - such as the well-known case of Barcelona and Ildefons Cerdà i Sunyer⁸³. As listed by the author⁸⁴, it follows a consecutive process (P)>(U)>(E).

From controversies to methodology. While the processes described the theoretical forms of the urban growth, in different countries and periods it has generated different urban practices. It's important not to draw one ultimate conclusion, but to give different probabilistic possibilities of the combination between (S), (P) and (U) and their possible alternations. In the table below we have the various circumstances of alternation among these processes for the Albanian case. In the first column, of table number one, the processes are listed as the local theory describes⁸⁵, the next shows their probabilistic circumstances on the territory. And as we know from the examples of land tactic, a high impact on **land fragmentation** and **low mobility** network has occurred in the transition phases of the three processes, a) setting a settlement, b) parceling by fencing and) build infrastructure.

According to the classification on table 15, Land fragmentation has two probabilistic opportunities, or by expansion or by reduction, column number two and three. And, both circumstances happen before and after building infrastructure process. In table number one they are marked as S>P>P (twice), S>P>P>U, and S>P>U>P.

⁸³In 1841 the **Barcelona City Council** organized a design competition for expanding the city beyond its ancient walls. In 1860 the central government, after studying many different proposals, approved the plan by the engineer and urban planner **Ildefons Cerdà**, to develop the city according to a grid structure, forming the district which is nowadays known as **l'Eixample** (Catalan for The Expansion). The plan took almost a century to complete. The most noteworthy formal solution of the plan was the incorporation of the block. Its vital shape, which is absolutely unique in comparison to any other European city, is distinguished by its square structure, with sides measuring 113.33 meters and chamfered corners at 45°. The original plan established a maximum building height of 16 meters, and attributed a key role to parks and gardens within the blocks. Subsequent speculation altered the original design greatly.

⁸⁴(Rubió, 1998)

⁸⁵(Aliaj, Shutina, & Dhamo, Between energy and the vacuum, 2010)

Land fragmentation by expansion, second column, shows circumstances which for one reason or another there are legal constraints to get a legalization process. Usually, under such situation inhabitants are also threatened by hazardous environmental constraints, such as settlements in a river basin or close to main interurban roads. Others live in miserable housing conditions. For more details on these legal constraints to the legalization process, see VKM⁸⁶ nr. 280, dated 1.4.2015. For a better understanding of these hindering factors here's another assumption from Aliaj (2008);

The first lesson is that informal constructions are not merely a legal problem, even when recognized that this phenomenon has considerable implications and takes different legal forms. Constructions may be illegal for many reasons: they are built on land public or property belonging to someone else, having problems of marking or registration, having inheritance, marriage, property claims or compensation, disregarding urban norms, or having obtained construction permits. Or the documents do not comply with de facto implementation: the constructions do not respect the environmental conditions or built in the protected historic area, they are located in areas of low durability and pose a danger to the safety of people, are built on agricultural land, etc.

(Aliaj, Misteri i Gjashte. Cili eshte kurthi qe mban peng zhvillimin dhe integrimin e ekonomise shqiptare ne boten moderne., 2008, p. 70).

On this category we can also add that those land fragmentations which occurred from partial processes, since the beginning of the informal practices. These examples are given in the first row on table number one - setting a settlement.

Land fragmentation by reduction, third column, shows circumstances where informal tactic occurred in order to avoid extra fee for land bigger than 300 m², as defined by Law⁸⁷. In such conditions inhabitants makes a second process of parceling or reshaping after, or before, the urbanization process. This process of land reduction (fragmentation) creates marginal public spaces or in many circumstances totally neglected.

Column number four and five show the probabilities of impact on mobility due to the

⁸⁶ VKM, is the acronym for the Decision taken at the Ministerial level. VKM 280 specifies "On the determination of the criteria, procedures and documentation applicable to qualifying illegal constructions, side and / or height supplements, in construction permits" and it lists various constraints for the legalization process.

⁸⁷ Directive no.37, dated 20.11.2008, Use of the Revenues from the Legalization fee.

high concentration of settlements and densification. On one side, densification, occurs from the process of setting new buildings inside the existing parcel and the other by increasing the number of floors on the existing settlement. Both circumstances occur with or without urbanization. In table number one they are marked as S>P>S, S>P>P>S, S>P>S>U.


Densification on the parcel, fourth column, shows circumstances where informal tactic has occurred to increase the density of land by setting new settlement inside the same land, or after the infrastructure.

Densification on the settlement, fifth column, are all those circumstances where an increasing process has occurred on the settlement total surface, by adding new floors to the existing.


Table number thirteen (Table 13) shows pictures from each of circumstances and land tactics, on different informal areas, as described above with the corresponding territorial impact.

				
Settlement	S.1	S.2	S.3	S.4
				
Parceling	(S)>(P)>(P+)	(S)>(P)>(P-)	(S)>(P)>(S)	(S)>(P)>(S)>(S)
				
Urbanization	(S)>(P)>(P+)>(U)	(S)>(P)>(P-)>(U)	(S)>(P)>(U)>(S)	(S)>(P)>(U)>(SP)
Informal settlement Approach in Albania.	Fragmentation by Land Expansion	Fragmentation by Reduction	Densification on Land	Densification on Settlement.


Table 13: Pictures from the methodological matrix.



(S)
regular informality




(S)>(P)
regular informality




(S)>(P)>(U)
regular informality


Picture 25: Regular Informality on Territorial Impact.



(P)
only land occupation



(S) > (P) > (P+)
fragmentation by land expansion



(S) > (P) > (P+) > (U)
fragmentation by land expansion before urbanization


Picture 26: Fragmentation by land expansion on Territorial Impact.



(S)
hazardous area, legal restrictions.




(S)>(P)>(P-)>(S)
fragmentation by land reduction




(S)>(P)>(P-)>(U)
fragmentation by land reduction with urbanization

Picture 27: Fragmentation by land expansion on Territorial Impact.




(S)

half build settlement (no inhabitats)



(S)>(P)>(S)


densification on existing parcel



(S)>(P)>(U)>(S)

densification on existing parcel with urbanization.

Picture 28: Settlement Densification on Territorial Impact.




(S)

hazardous settlement (with inhabitats)



(S)>(P)>(P-)>(SP)

densification on new parcel



(S)>(P)>(U)>(SP)

densification on new parcel with urbanization

Picture 29: Land Densification on Territorial Impact.

6.3 F.I.S.I.A. From Economic Resources to Cartographic illustration.

Thanks to the probabilistic results of the four macro hindering factors it is possible to understand the nature of the economical resources. As defined above they are of two sort, land and settlement. Both territorial resources, as seen above, may have hindering factors which blocks the legalization process. In order to create a communicative tool to distinguish the regular informality with those on hindering factors it has been created the sheet table⁸⁸ in cartographic expression.

From the cartographic expression a total of seven territorial resources are listed, 1) settlement, 2) parcels occupied, 3) urbanization, 4) first hindering factors, 5) second hindering factors, 6) third hindering factors and, 7) fourth hindering factors.

As expressed in the methodology the units used in this step of the research will consist in meter square and are the key factors for F.I.S.I.A assessment. The values in the references expressed in the sheet table nine will be addressed in specific informal areas. Below the formula, (Formula B), on how to measure and assess the territorial resources in one final investment needed, or done already, to accomplish the second objective of the U.A.

There's to underline that the research question is not only to answer if "yes" or "not" but to assess it. **By how much are the cost of expressed objectives of the UA, legalization, urbanization, and on the hindering factors?**

The first two objectives are direct and expressed cost, and the last four (hindering cost) are hidden on the territory - the more they are, the more will be the cost for the waste and transport management.

The assessment of the hidden costs (hindering costs) is a public interest matter, because it may address future investments in the specific area, assesses the building investment (although it is informal) and the land value in one single area.

Below the formula of for F.I.S.I.A for and how it can be assessed. It may express a negative value, so the missing investment, or as final revenue from one single informal area.

⁸⁸ see (Sheet Table 1).

F.I.S.I.A (Final Investment for the Single Informal Area) =

$$\{ \sum [(m^2 \text{ settlements}) \times \text{ref.1}] + \sum [(m^2 \text{ land}) \times \text{ref.2}] \} \times 0.2 \text{ (revenue's reversibility)} - [(m^2 \text{ infrastructure}) \times \text{ref.3}] - [(m^2 \text{ sett. H.189}) \times \text{ref.4}] - [(m^2 \text{ land H.2}) \times \text{ref.5}] - [(m^2 \text{ sett. H.3}) \times \text{ref.6}] - [(m^2 \text{ sett. H.4}) \times \text{ref.7}] =$$

If F.I.S.I.A < 0 it wouldn't be possible to accomplish the second objective.

If F.I.S.I.A > 0 it is possible to accomplish the second objective, urbanization.

Formula B: F.I.S.I.A and the Revenue's Reversibility at 20%.

(for single informal area)

6.3.1 Measuring F.I.S.I.A by the territorial resources, land, settlement and urbanization.

Critiques to the shape/division of the informal areas are many, from the arbitrary way which has been drawn to the decision making that recognizes them as informal area. As expressed in the first step of the evaluation, policy content, this last process, recognize informal areas, has passed in an unconstitutional way to third actors such as A.L.U.Z.N.I from the local authorities, the new born Municipalities⁹⁰. Although a process of enlargement of the territory has occurred on the local and administrative level, the boundaries of the informal areas has not changed. This means more costs for the municipalities to accomplish the second objective of the U.A, urbanization.

Here to mention also the disparity in size that exist among different informal areas, the smallest one in Blloku⁹¹ area, 10ha, till to Keneta Durres, 750ha.

In order to not fall into a biased investigation on the territory it has been choose three smaller units of the informal areas, respectively around 12 and 15ha.

It is supposed that the first scenario (15ha) is in a better condition than the second and third, starting from regular informality. Picture thirty (Picture 30) shows the three territorial scenarios on two different informal areas in Durres Region.

The result on the first scenario on the final investment are on negative value. Although the total revenues are higher than the urbanization cost and with the actual hidden costs, hindering

⁸⁹Where H.1 stands to the first macro hindering factor, and so on H.2, H.3, and H.4.

⁹⁰ See the territorial and administrative reform in Albania (2016).

⁹¹ Where the life-night of Tirana is located. "Blloku" as "Block" because before it was the residence area of political regime during communism.

costs, with the actual revenue's reversibility it is impossible to accomplish the second objective of the urbanization. So the missing investment is $F.I.S.I.A = 3.375.000 \text{ €}$. Picture thirty-one (Picture 31) illustrates the cartographic survey with the relative assessment and references.


The result on the second scenario on final investment are on negative value. Differently, from the first scenario, the second has revenues lower than the urbanization costs. So, if we want to apply different revenue's reversibility to accomplish the urbanization, it would be impossible without exogenous resources, or, by fixing the hindering factors in the informal area. The missing investment is $F.I.S.I.A = 3.667.000 \text{ €}$. Picture number thirty-two (Picture 32) illustrates the cartographic survey with the relative assessment and references.

The result on the third scenario on final investment is on a negative value. Differently, from the first two cases the second, it shows a better condition of the final investment. Picture number thirty-three (Picture 33) illustrates the cartographic survey with the relative assessment and references.

This result is important to emphasize that not all the informal areas are same, although they can be very close to each other. Some of them may be at the edge of the city others on the entrance. Also, however, the fact that one area is at the edge of the city, it may show a better condition of F.I.S.I.A than the other on the city entrance.

The importance to not fall into biased research, descriptive, or historical (what has happened to the specific area) is even more critical when a comparison should occur.

To keep the units expressed in the methodology for this evaluation step, meter square, and values is a key-factor to read and assess the disparities of spatial justice matter, opportunities, and strengths due to hindering factors that persist on the territory. F.I.S.I.A on this case is a social, and economical "thermometer" for the city, to understand legal vulnerabilities and abilities of U.A to accomplish urbanization.




Picture 30: Three Scenarios on F.I.S.I.A assessment. (Durres Region and the Informal Areas).

6.3.1 Cartography

Seven territorial resources are listed in cartographic expression.

1. settlement - to assess this territorial resource in F.I.S.I.A measurement has been done on the single informal area, each scenario. In the formula, it is expressed with the sign (Σ).
2. Parcels occupied - to assess this territorial resource in F.I.S.I.A measurement has been done on the single informal area, each scenario. The parcels occupied considers only those cases where regular informality has been legalized. In the formula, it is expressed with the sign (Σ).
3. urbanization - refers to a degree of infrastructure existing on urban morphology of the single informal area. It can be measured with different software as the previous territorial resources.
4. first hindering factors - rely on land factors and the position of the informal settlement where it has been built. F.I.S.I.A measures and assess only the settlement size, since it is the only investment made on the area. The cases of expropriation should take on consideration this investment made by inhabitants.
5. second hindering factors - rely on the land factors since it should belong economically to third actors.
6. third hindering factors - rely on the settlement factors which might have different legal constraints. The investment assesses the meters square of settlement that is called to change in order to get the regular legalization, and it may vary from the entire settlement to smaller units, such can be balcony or stairs outside the parcel.
7. fourth hindering factors - rely on the settlement size. The single householder does not have enough income to proceed with the legalization fee although his settlement and parcel are technically confirmed with the regulations.

The information about the three scenarios in the informal areas has been possible thanks to the public archive of A.L.U.I.Z.N.I for Durres region.




First Scenario

150.000 m²


TOTAL AREA

	m2	€/m2	value
S	30000	5	150000
P	90000	25	2250000
U	34000	100	3400000
H1	1300	250	325000
H2	0	100	0
H3	0	250	0
H4	1000	250	250000

FISIA at 20% -3375000



Picture 31: First Scenarios on F.I.S.I.A assessment. (Durrës Region and the Informal Areas).



Second Scenario


130.000 m²

TOTAL AREA


	m2	€/m2	value
S	18000	5	90000
P	74000	25	1850000
U	29000	100	2900000
H1	3000	250	750000
H2	500	100	50000
H3	0	250	
H4	1500	250	375000

FISIA at 20%

-3637000




Picture 32: Second Scenarios on F.I.S.I.A assessment.(Durrës Region and the Informal Areas).



Third Scenario
125.000 m²
 TOTAL AREA

	m2	€/m2	value
S	4000	5	20000
P	11000	25	275000
U	14000	100	1400000
H1	1000	250	250000
H2	0	100	0
H3	0	250	0
H4	1200	250	300000

FISIA at 20% -1891000



Picture 33: Third Scenarios on F.I.S.I.A assessment. (Durrës Region and the Informal Areas).

Final remarks on policy implementation. Measuring revenues and costs.

As we saw on the last chapter, cognitive resources are an unconstitutional dispute and the economic resources are distributed in the same way for each informal area.

The evaluation on policy implementation phase explains why revenue's reversibility percentage among actors is not fair for the territorial and spatial planning. The territorial resources that define the revenues are: 1) **land legalization fee** and 2) **settlement legalization fee**, which are two processes that should occur in the legalization process. If one of them fails to get the legalization, the whole application for legalization is declined. The failure is strictly related to legal, juridical and environmental constraints. The multiform of these constraints are called hindering factors to get a legalization process.

1. The first category. **Outside Land** - Land and Settlement outside the destination of use provided by the Local General Plan (G.L.P). An example is the protected area, or at high risk of flooding or soil erosion.
2. Second category. **On the Land** - The land is owned by others. Or other reasons related to land use.
3. Third category. **On the Settlement** - The process of legalization fails, because the settlement is built outside the land lot of the owner.
4. Fourth category. **On single household** - all practices fail, because the household does not have enough income for the legalization fee.

Economic resources generated by the first objective, legalization, and by the second objective as costs, urbanization, can be expressed in a single formula that summarizes the costs of the hindering factors - to have a more empirical and sensitive evaluation .

F.I.S.I.A, acronym for Final Investment for the Single Informal Area, has been selected to express and assess the amount of economic resources that come from the legalization process, the costs of urbanization and the costs that require 4 different situations with hindering factors to obtain full legalization or for real estate valuation.

F.I.S.I.A (Final Investment for the Single Informal Area) =
 $\{\sum[(m2 \text{ settlements}) \times \text{ref.1}] + \sum [(m2 \text{ land}) \times \text{ref.2}]\} \times 0.2 \text{ (revenue's reversibility)} -$
 $[(m2 \text{ infrastructure}) \times \text{ref.3}] - [(m2 \text{ sett. H.92}) \times \text{ref.4}] - [(m2 \text{ land H.2}) \times \text{ref.5}] - [(m2 \text{ sett. H.3}) \times$
 $\text{ref.6}] - [(m2 \text{ sett. H.4}) \times \text{ref.7}] =$

If F.I.S.I.A < 0 it wouldn't be possible to accomplish the second objective.

If F.I.S.I.A > 0 it is possible to accomplish the second objective, urbanization.

F.I.S.I.A is a numerical evaluation that demonstrates a positive or negative result. If it is negative, it means that public revenues from legalization are not sufficient to bring urbanization, since the hindering

⁹²Where H.1 stands to the first macro hindering factor, and so on H.2, H.3, and H.4.

factors are high. If positive, it means that the second objective of the urban agenda has been achieved and now politics must move forward to the third objective of the urban agenda, the integration of informal areas.

The assessment has been applied to three different territorial scenarios on two different informal areas in Durres Region. All the three scenarios show a negative FISIA. It means that revenues from legalization fee are lower than urbanization costs and hindering costs together. Although they show more or less the same value, the three scenarios have a crucial difference between them.

First scenario and second may seem to close between them on the final result of the missing investment, but there is a crucial difference. The revenue's reversibility, on the second scenario, from legalization fee even if at 100% it can not accomplish the second objective of the U.A. Instead on the first scenario it can be realized if partial revenue's reversibility would be considered to accomplish the urbanization objective. The difference consists in endogenous resources which on the first are higher than the urbanization and hindering factors costs together. Next chapter deals with the precise percentage of FISIA assessment needed. (7.1.1)

The third scenario has a better FISIA than the other two although negative. This because not all the land from the total informal area has been occupied from informal settlements.

FISIA results also emphasize the importance that not all the informal areas are the same, although they can be very close to each other. Some of them may be at the edge of the city, others on the entrance. However, also the fact that one area is at the edge of the city, it may show a better condition of F.I.S.I.A than the other on the city entrance.

Final remarks on policy implementation. Territorial impact.

Beyond the administrative costs expressed in the above, the process of legalization, urbanization, integration and the process of informal practices seems a process of infinite self-reshaping and tactics due to legal constraints. Firstly, to the land by creating a more profound fragmentation. And secondly, to the mobility network and spaces. This perpetual condition has somehow affected all the informal areas by creating a fractal problem on the issues of land **fragmentation** and **low mobility network**.

A half assumption is that where urbanization is missing, in informal practices the multiform has flourished. In most of the cases, this inability to act on time has left no space for public spaces and other aggregative places to meet for the inhabitants. Densification and development have evolved and put into practice freely for 27 years.

On territorial impact this research aims to start from the recent theories on the forms of the urban development to create a precise matrix of the multiform that consists on informal practices on different phases till to the legalization.

According to the theory described by (Aliaj, Shutina, & Dhamo, Between energy and the vacuum, 2010) the growth transition in Albania has followed three phases, (S) setting a settlement, (P) Parceling and last (U) Urbanization. For methodological reasons this will be expressed as S>P>U. This order of the three phases represent how the informal growth have been sprawled in the agricultural land without the urbanization.

From the international and theoretical point of view it is unique. The matrix described by (Rubió, 1998) shows different alternation among these three phases. Like the well known of the Barcelona is described as U>P>S. Or only the baracacca as S.

In the Albanian case, for the territorial impact of the growth transition, two processes on land and settlement are identified, such as; fragmentation and densification. Picture number sixteen (Picture 16) shows in a diagrammatic way the probabilities of these two growth transition phases. To understand the Territorial Impact, the research sees the transitory phases and the two processes that may occur on parcels and/or settlement. Fragmentation or Densification.

The territorial result gives 12 transient situations, as described below.

1. S1, only land occupation.
2. S2, hazardous area, legal restrictions.
3. S3, half built settlement, no inhabitants.
4. S4, hazardous settlement, with residents.
5. (S)> (P)> (P +), Fragmentation by Land Expansion
6. (S)> (P)> (P -), Fragmentation by Land Reduction.
7. (S)> (P)> (S), Densification on Land.
8. (S)> (P)> (S)> (S), Densification on Settlement.
9. (S)> (P)> (P +)> (U), Fragmentation by Land Expansion with urbanization.
10. (S)> (P)> (P -)> (U), Fragmentation by Land Reduction with urbanization.
11. (S)> (P)> (U)> (S), Densification on Land with urbanization.
12. (S)> (P)> (U)> (SP). Densification on Settlement with urbanization.

See drawings on picture 26, 27 and 28.

The diversity of twelve transitory phases are important for the U.A to identify in a responsive way the various conditions of informal settlements.

From twelve, the first four should find solution to focused programs and investments.

The next two, and number nine and ten, are a matter of landscape and solutions to land shaping. The other four cases left, number seven, eight, eleven and twelve are a good case that should be boosted to increase revenues from densification.

7

EVALUATING POLICY IMPACT

Governance of the U.A

7.0 EVALUATING POLICY IMPACT: OPERATIONING WITH INFORMAL AREAS.

This last third core chapter focuses on the Revenues, Hindering Factors to legalization and Urbanization differently from the previous one. Three Territorial Resources have been identified in the core chapter two, Land, Settlement and Infrastructure to assess the focused evaluation of the U.A. Given that these territorial resources vary from one informal area to another, a measurement indicator has been presented, called F.I.S.I.A⁹³. It summarizes the Final Investment for a Single Informal Area by focusing on revenues, hindering factors and urbanization. The assumption is that the revenue's reversibility to urbanization, (20%) as the law defines, is not **responsive⁹⁴ to the infrastructural** resource that each area has. It means that the process of self setting a settlement and parceling has occurred in a fast process. The revenue's reversibility has been quoted the same for different territorial resources. In decisional making studies this is called a Bounded Rationality⁹⁵. For a more responsive assessment a different decision model is proposed, following the principles of good governance. (7.1 F.I.S.I.A for a Responsive Focused Evaluation). By assessing the needed revenue's reversibility to accomplish the urbanization and resetting the (20%), the decisional model shifts to Rational Model. In public studies the difference between Bounded Rationality and Rational Model⁹⁶ is that in the first the main actor involved in the public agenda does not assess the resources and acts in a satisfaction criteria. For this reason, in the first part of this core chapter, a methodological way on how to assess the revenue's reversibility is proposed, in order to achieve the second objective of the U.A, urbanization. (7.1.1 Resetting Revenue's Reversibility). As the Utilization Focused Theory suggests to assess what actors do with the territorial resources, do they use them? Do they misuse, disuse or refuse them? Utilization-Focused Evaluation (UFE), developed by Michael Quinn Patton, is an approach based on the principle that an evaluation should be judged on its usefulness to its intended users. According to this last definition of the Utilization Focused Evaluation goes to those resources that have been refused in the assessment and consequently

⁹³ Final Investment for the Single Informal Area.

⁹⁴ Good governance requires that institutions and processes try to serve all stakeholders within a reasonable timeframe.

⁹⁵ Bounded Rationality Decision Making Model, see (Simon H. A., 1947).


⁹⁶ Rational Decision Making Model. see (Simon H. A., 1947).

has generated less revenues. Hindering Factors are these refused territorial resources that have not been assessed. By assessing the Hindering Factors into costs to get the legalization process it would be possible to have a **sensitive** and local based F.I.S.I.A. The difference of the Hindering Factors and Hindering Costs also determine the Decisional Model. The result is a Rational Decision Making which assesses the territorial resources.

As the Utilization Focused Theory suggests, assessment should occur in many phases. On picture eight (Picture 8), from the state of art, five phases have been listed.

1) Assessing a program readiness, 2) identifying the primary users, 3) situational analysis, 4) simulation of use, and 5) data collection.

*Utilization Focused Evaluation
(Michael Quinn Patton, 1996)*



Picture 8: Steps to Utilization-Focused Evaluation Theory (U.F.E). by Patton (1996).

1) According to "Assessing a program readiness", we have to point out that the assessment is based on the territorial resources, land, settlement and infrastructure, that defines the revenues, hindering factors and urbanization costs.

2) "Identifying the primary users", users in this core chapter remain the same as the previous chapter, already identified on the institutional arena. Following a focused evaluation only three actors have been selected; the Municipality, A.L.U.I.Z.N.I and the National Council of Ministries.

3) "situational analysis", consists in the assessment of the F.I.S.I.A from revenues, hindering factors and urbanization.

4) "simulation of use", is the proposal assessment methodology following four principles of Responsive Focused Evaluation, i) responsiveness to urbanization, ii) sensitive by assessing the hindering factors and efficiency and effectiveness evaluation.

5) "data collection", last but not least it refers to how this data can be stored. This last phase opens the last chapter on "Thesis importance and Divuligation".

Table number fourteen (Table 14) shows in a consecutive way each of the phases listed from the methodology of the Utilization Focused Evaluation and how to achieve the Principles of the Responsive Focused Evaluation (R.F.E).

Decisional Model	Actual Situation. Bounded Rationality	Proposed Assessment Rational Model.
Principle 1 of (RFE) Methodology to Achieve 1.	Non Responsive Skip to proposed.	Responsive Change Revenue's Reversibility.
Principles 2 of (RFE) Methodology to Achieve 2.	Non Sensitive Hindering Factors to Legalization.	Sensitive to Hindering Costs. Assessing Hindering Costs.
Principles 3 of (RFE) Methodology to Achieve 3.	No Policy Effectiveness Skip to proposed.	Assess Policy Effectiveness Assessing Hindering Costs and Total Revenues.
Principles 4 of (RFE) Methodology to Achieve 4.	No Policy Efficiency Skip to proposed.	Assess Policy Efficiency. Cost - Benefit Analysis.

Table 14: Utilization Focused Evaluation and the methodology to achieve the Responsive Focused Evaluation.

7.1 F.I.S.I.A on the Decision making models.

For a Responsive Focused Evaluation, it is essential to follow a strict methodology of the Utilization-Focused Evaluation. This last theory, as described in state of the art, is part of the RFE with the other two theories, respectively THDE and EE, analyzed in the first and second core chapter. Starting from the research question, "How much is the policy efficiency and effectiveness and how to improve it" the F.I.S.I.A assessment refers to the actual condition. Only in this last chapter, it is possible to answer this question in a Responsive and Sensitive approach.

Before the assessment takes place, it is also essential to stop and analyze the decisional models related to the actual condition and proposed methodology.

The actual condition of the policy evaluation and assessment is based on unknown potentialities since it estimates the F.I.S.I.A as a result of direct revenues and costs to urbanization. The hindering factors to get legalization are many and they are not assessed. In public policies, this decisional model is called Bounded Rationality. According to Herbert Simon (Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences) in “Administrative Behavior,” published right after the end of the Second World War (Simon H. A., 1947) the actors who use the Bounded Rationality in decision making face a constant problem, that of missing assessment. In such circumstances, actors play with prefixed methodologies, like in our case the Revenue's Reversibility is static to 20%, although the territorial resources, land occupied, settlement dimensions, and infrastructure dimensions are different for different informal areas. This condition has created a spatial injustice and unconstitutional U.A. Urbanization has never been achieved responsibly because it has never been a measurement based on an informal area and how to achieve it with the revenues. The U.A has not answered those who cannot get a legalization permit, and this has reduced the revenues by directly affecting the objective to achieve the urbanization.

In order to have a more realistic assessment, there is a need to evaluate the hindering cost starting from the four macro hindering factors. To do such a thing it is a must that actors involved in the U.A should change the revenue's reversibility. This change would come only if actors evaluate the urbanization cost and put it as a primary objective on revenue's reversibility. For this reason, many authors in decision making have raised the question on which decisional model decisions should be taken. On this consideration, the Rational model for the decision making is also useful for the actors to assess the potential revenues if hindering costs are evaluated as a sensitive part of the policy efficiency and effectiveness.

7.1.1 Resetting 'Revenue's Reversibility to Urbanization'.

In this chapter session as the methodology suggests, it's important to understand the actual condition, how the revenues are measured and how they return for the urbanization process. According to the actual condition, the revenue's reversibility is at 20%. Maintaining this percentage the assumption is that the urbanization will never occur for different informal areas,

and this due to different territorial resources, land occupied, settlement, infrastructure size and Hinderling costs 1,2,3, and 4, the F.I.S.I.A will be economically negative.

$$F.I.S.I.A = (Revenues - Hinderling Factors) \times 0,2 - \text{Urbanization cost} - \text{Hinderling Cost} (1 + 2 + 3 + 4).$$

Formula B: F.I.S.I.A in a simple way. (for single informal area)


As the three scenarios shows, in all the cases F.I.S.I.A is negative value. In order to have a positive F.I.S.I.A the formula is converted as the formula below. This assessment is created in order to have a **responsive**U.A to the urbanization process.

% of Revenue's Reversibility needed for the Urbanization

$$= \frac{\text{URBANIZATION COSTS} + \text{HINDERING FACTORS}}{\text{REVENUES}} \times 100\% =$$

Formula B.1: Measuring Revenue's Reversibility for the Urbanization objective. (for single informal area)


At the end different informal areas would have different revenue's reversibility. But what if we apply the Revenue's Reversibility at 100%, it is not enough to accomplish the urbanization process? Actually the U.A assesses and collects only revenues from all the territorial resources that can be legalized according to actual laws and regulations. All those territorial resources that cannot be legalized are considered as hinderling factors and not estimated. Picture thirty-four (Picture 34) shows the graph where the revenue's reversibility to urbanization is at 20% and the revenues are assessed only from those territorial resources that by law can be legalized.



Picture 34: F.I.S.I.A in Hinderling Factors. Bounded Rational decision making model.

7.1.2 Resetting "Revenue's Reversibility" for the three Sceneries.

Assessing Hindering Cost to get a legalization process might not immediately bring to higher revenues but rather to less, and increase the need to a higher revenue's reversibility to urbanization costs. However, this process is crucial to have a *sensitive evaluation* of the F.I.S.I.A. By estimating the missing part from the revenues, and public authorities can open a transparent process of territorial planning and investments from third parties public, private or single applicants for the legalization process. The assessment of the hindering costs is not only useful to offer the possibility for future investments but also can offer the possibility to reshape the informal areas in order to have a more balanced distribution of urbanization cost. Informal areas where revenues are higher enough to accomplish the urbanization process can be reshaped with the informal neighbor areas or open transacting planning. Picture thirty-five (Picture 45) shows a graphical illustration if hindering costs are added to the F.I.S.I.A assessment.



URBANIZATION* cost assessed as needed REVENUE'S REVERSIBILITY. (see Formula)

Picture 35: F.I.S.I.A in Hindering Costs.Rational decision making model.

At least there's another reason why the F.I.S.I.A assessment should consider the hindering cost. The U.A cannot collect entire revenues from a single legalization applicant even if one territorial resource cannot be legalized and this hinders the revenues of the other territorial resources. For example, hindering factor three (3), on Single Settlement, hinders the revenues that can be generated from the Land, or the opposite, while both can be solved if one of these territorial resources is solved. So, the sensitiveness of each macro hindering factors and its estimation in

cost gives full revenues that can be generated in a single informal area. This process would increase the policy efficiency and policy effectiveness. Below formula to represent F.I.S.I.A in simple way;

$$F.I.S.I.A = (\text{Revenues}) \times 0,2 - \text{Urbanization cost} - H.1 - H.2 - H.3 - H.4.$$

Formula B: F.I.S.I.A and the Revenue's Reversibility at 20%. (for single informal area)

Only now that the hindering costs are assessed, it's possible to readdress the question on how much it should be the Revenue's Reversibility to accomplish the urbanization process.

Below the formula B on three different scenarios.

% of Revenue's Reversibility needed for the Urbanization

FIRST SCENARIO

$$= \frac{\text{URBANIZATION COSTS} + \text{HINDERING COSTS 1,2,3,4.}}{\text{REVENUES}} = \frac{3400000 + 575000}{2400000} = 165 \%$$

Formula B.1.1: First Scenario. Measuring Revenue's Reversibility for the Urbanization objective. (for single informal area)

% of Revenue's Reversibility needed for the Urbanization

SECOND SCENARIO

$$= \frac{\text{URBANIZATION COSTS} + \text{HINDERING COSTS 1,2,3,4.}}{\text{REVENUES}} = \frac{2900000 + 1175000}{1940000} = 210 \%$$

Formula B.1.2: Second Scenario. Measuring Revenue's Reversibility for the Urbanization objective.

% of Revenue's Reversibility needed for the Urbanization

THIRD SCENARIO

$$= \frac{\text{URBANIZATION COSTS} + \text{HINDERING COSTS 1,2,3,4.}}{\text{REVENUES}} = \frac{1400000 + 550000}{295000} = 493 \%$$

Formula B.1.3: Third Scenario. Measuring Revenue's Reversibility for the Urbanization objective. (for single informal area)

Results on the revenues reversibility shows that the need to accomplish the urbanization objective on the third scenarios are higher than the other two scenarios. Although F.I.S.I.A gives a lower final investment on the third area the need for endogenous resources is higher.

Political resources on the local level should address the decision through the G.L.P if these areas will gain future investments or should be redirected to closer areas of the city.

7.2 Measuring Governance Indicators.

Only now thanks to the assessment of the hindering cost it is possible to have a measuring of the indicators of good governance for better use of the U.A. Efficiency and Effectiveness are useful to monitor and direct future investments. The illustration on a larger scale, as the regional area of Durres and Tirana, of these two indicators can give a direct answer to the priority of territorial resources. If Responsive and Sensitive Focused Evaluation gives the methodological way on how to achieve urbanization and hindering factor, the Indicators of good governance show in which informal area these territorial resources are higher or less. It is considered as a communicative tool for the public authority and those interested to invest in specific informal areas.

The difference between the policy effectiveness and efficiency are on the sort of costs. Effectiveness sees the hindering cost directly in relation to revenues from the single informal area. The activation and/or investment on the hindering factors is an endogenous factor - which requires a good institutional and transparent process among inhabitant, third parties such as architect, landscapers, and engineers, and public institutions.

Efficiency sees the urbanization cost directly in relation to revenues from the single informal area. The activation and/or investment on the urbanization is an exogenous factor - which requires political and economic resources.

The difference and among these two factors, endogenous and exogenous is a crucial point for the next chapter "Thesis importance and divulgation."

7.2.1 Measuring Policy Efficiency from Urbanization objective.

Policy Efficiency is an indicator of good governance as effectiveness. Differently from the effectiveness it puts the main objective of the U.A, urbanization, as a priority. Both indicators are a communicative tool in order to address different priorities of the U.A.

The formula below shows how it can be measured and the gradients of the urbanization level.

The policy efficiency would be = $\frac{\text{VALUE of URBANIZATION COSTS}}{\text{REVENUES}} =$

(1) if $0 < x < 1$ good urbanization.

(2) if $x = 1$ mid urbanization.

(3) if $x > 1$ low urbanization.

Formula C: Comparing policy Efficiency of the U.A.(for single informal area)

The policy efficiency would be = $\frac{\text{VALUE of URBANIZATION COSTS}}{\text{REVENUES}} = \frac{3400000}{2400000} = 1,4$

Results: $x > 1$. The informal area has a low urbanization efficiency.

Formula C.1: Comparing policy Efficiency of the U.A. (for single informal area)

The policy efficiency would be = $\frac{\text{VALUE of URBANIZATION COSTS}}{\text{REVENUES}} = \frac{2900000}{1940000} = 1,5$

Results: $x > 1$. The informal area has a low urbanization efficiency.

Formula C.2: Comparing policy Efficiency of the U.A. (for single informal area)

The policy efficiency would be = $\frac{\text{VALUE of URBANIZATION COSTS}}{\text{REVENUES}} = \frac{1400000}{295000} = 4,7$


Results: $x > 1$. The informal area has a low urbanization efficiency.

Formula C.3: Comparing policy Efficiency of the U.A. (for single informal area)

Picture below (Picture 36, 37, and 38) shows an example of how the scenarios can be applied in different informal areas by illustrating different gradients of policy efficiency.

POLICY EFFICIENCY (RATIO) URBANIZATION COSTS / LEGALIZATION REVENUES

First Scenario




Picture 36: First Scenario. Gradients of the Policy Efficiency for the U.A.

POLICY EFFICIENCY (RATIO)

URBANIZATION COSTS / LEGALIZATION REVENUES

Second Scenario



Picture 37: Second Scenario. Gradients of the Policy Efficiency for the U.A.

POLICY EFFICIENCY (RATIO)

URBANIZATION COSTS / LEGALIZATION REVENUES

Third Scenario



Here urbanization costs
and legalization revenues
are equal.



Picture 38: Third Scenario. Gradients of the Policy Efficiency for the U.A.

7.2.2 Measuring Policy Effectiveness from Hindering Costs.

While the policy efficiency might call in evaluation the objectives of the U.A, the urban effectiveness is an external process which depends on contingent reasons, such as the hindering costs. They may derive from the urban morphology or the informal practices in the informal areas and are more related to policy impact from the territorial resources assessed.

The formula below shows how effectiveness can be evaluated.

$$\text{The policy effectiveness would be} = \frac{\text{VALUE of HINDERING COSTS}}{\text{REVENUES}} =$$

(1) if $0 < x < 1$ regular informal area.

(2) if $x = 1$ mid regular.

(3) if $x > 1$ high impact on land fragmentation and mobility.

Formula D: Comparing policy effectiveness of the U.A.(for single informal area).

$$\text{The policy effectiveness would be} = \frac{\text{VALUE of HINDERING COSTS}}{\text{REVENUES}} = \frac{575000}{2400000} = 0,23$$

Result: $0 < x < 1$ it is a Regular Informal Area.

Formula D.1: First Scenario. Comparing policy effectiveness of the U.A.(for single informal area).

$$\text{The policy effectiveness would be} = \frac{\text{VALUE of HINDERING COSTS}}{\text{REVENUES}} = \frac{1175000}{1940000} = 0,60$$

Result: $0 < x < 1$ it is a Regular Informal Area.

Formula D.2: Second Scenario. Comparing policy effectiveness of the U.A.(for single informal area).

$$\text{The policy effectiveness would be} = \frac{\text{VALUE of HINDERING COSTS}}{\text{REVENUES}} = \frac{550000}{295000} = 1,8$$

Result: $x > 1$. It means that the area has a high impact on land fragmentation and mobility.


Formula D.3: Third Scenario. Comparing policy effectiveness of the U.A.(for single informal area).

Picture below (Picture 39, 40, and 41) shows an example of how the scenarios can be applied in different informal areas by illustrating different gradients of policy effectiveness.

POLICY EFFECTIVENESS

HINDERING COSTS / LEGALIZATION REVENUES

First Scenario



Picture 39: First Scenario. Gradients of the Policy Effectiveness for the U.A.

POLICY EFFECTIVENESS

HINDERING COSTS / LEGALIZATION REVENUES

Second Scenario



Picture 40: Second Scenario. Gradients of the Policy Effectiveness for the U.A.

POLICY EFFECTIVENESS

HINDERING COSTS / LEGALIZATION REVENUES

Third Scenario



Picture 41: Third Scenario. Gradients of the Policy Effectiveness for the U.A.

Final remarks on the decision making models.

For a Responsive Focused Evaluation, it is essential to follow a strict methodology of the Utilization-Focused Evaluation. Starting from the research question, "**How much is the policy efficiency and effectiveness and how to improve it?**" the F.I.S.I.A assessment refers to the actual condition of a single informal area. Before the assessment takes place, it is also essential to stop and analyze the decisional models related to the actual condition and proposed methodology.

The actual condition of the policy evaluation and assessment is based on unknown potentialities since it estimates the F.I.S.I.A as a result of direct revenues and costs to urbanization. The hindering factors, to get legalization, are many and they are not assessed. In public policies, this decisional model is called Bounded Rationality. According to Herbert Simon (Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences) in "Administrative Behavior," published right after the end of the Second World War (Simon H. A., 1947) the actors who use the **Bounded Rationality** in decision making face a constant problem, that of missing assessment. In such circumstances, actors play with prefixed methodologies, like in our case the Revenue's Reversibility is static to 20%, although the territorial resources, land occupied, settlement dimensions, and infrastructure dimensions are different for different informal areas. This condition has created a spatial injustice and unconstitutional U.A. **Urbanization has never been achieved responsibly, because it has never been a measurement based on an informal area and how to achieve it with the revenues. The U.A has not answered those who cannot get a legalization permit, and this has reduced the revenues by directly affecting the objective to achieve the urbanization.**

In order to have a more realistic assessment, there is a need to evaluate the hindering cost starting from the four macro hindering factors. To do such a thing it is a must that actors involved in the U.A should change the revenue's reversibility. This change would come only if actors evaluate the urbanization cost and put it as a primary objective on revenue's reversibility. For this reason, many authors in decision making have raised the question on which decisional model decisions should be taken. According to (Bobbio, 1996) the Rational Model promises to "*create a space taken away from politics*", in which essential choices, not the ones on big options and general goals, but the ones representing the heart of public policies, can be made exclusively at a technical level without requiring long and harsh debates. Making the right decision is just a matter of technically defining the form and the parameters of an equation and inserting data in a computer.

On this consideration, the **Rational model** for the decision making is also useful for the actors to assess the potential revenues if hindering costs are evaluated as a sensitive part of the policy efficiency and effectiveness. As regards the efficiency of the urban agenda reached by F.I.S.I.A, there are three types of territorial results.

$$\text{Efficiency (x)} = \frac{\Sigma \text{urbanization costs}}{\Sigma \text{public revenues from the legalization of a specific informal area .}}$$

- (1) if $0 < x < 1$ good urbanization.
- (2) if $x = 1$ mean urbanization.
- (3) if $x > 1$ low urbanization

This division, in three parts, also permits to understand the need for **exogenous resources** or not, which means that the **endogenous resources** cannot fulfill the second objective of the U.A if revenue's reversibility is at 20%.

$$\text{Effectiveness (x)} = \frac{\Sigma \text{cost of 4 blocking factors to obtain legalization}}{\Sigma \text{public revenues from the legalization of a specific informal area .}}$$

- (1) if $0 < x < 1$ regular informal area.
- (2) if $x = 1$ regular average.
- (3) if $x > 1$, has a strong impact on soil fragmentation and mobility.

In order to demonstrate the three gradients described above in the territory, three different scenarios are assessed on the outskirts of the city of Durres.

The first territorial scenario, with higher density and closer to the center. The second scenario a little towards the suburbs and a third scenario in the industrial area. All three scenarios have the same surface area, around 30 (ha).

The results of the efficiency gradient show that the first high-density scenario, and with its own urban and network morphology, is more efficient in urbanization. This result also comes thanks to high public revenues from high densification.

The results of the efficiency gradient also show that the first scenario is where the costs of the hindering factors are lower than the revenues from legalization - compared to the second and third scenario.

The suggestions for urbanization can be numerous.

Firstly, a change of the percentage, of "reversibility of revenue to urbanization," from 20%, set arbitrarily for each informal area, in accordance with the economic needs that urban morphology requires.

To realize the second objective of the U.A in the first scenario, it takes about 165% of the public revenues that can be generated by the legalization process.

For the second scenario, 210% for the revenues, and the third scenario 493%.

From decision-making models, this means moving from a limited rational model to an incremental model.

The results are clear that the urbanization costs are higher than the public revenues deriving from the legalization process. For this reason, it is necessary to **work first with the gradient of effectiveness** that expresses the cost of those that cannot be legalized (hindering factors) and sees them as endogenous sources from where it can generate revenue from legalization and draw future policies on priority area.

Summing up, we can say that informality in Albania must be channeled into sensitive assessments to guarantee spatial justice and a responsible U.A in order to avoid misunderstandings, unclarities which sometimes have led to corruptive or irrational choices in the selection of informal settlements.

Beyond effectiveness and efficiency, the results among the three scenarios show that the periphery has a lower F.I.S.I.A, below zero. In this formulation, we must be careful that the opposite is not true - that the peripheral areas have a lower F.I.S.I.A than the more central ones. This is because the areas do not have the same density, fragmentation, and urban morphology and only the measurement (F.I.S.I.A) can confirm this.

8

THESIS DIVULGATION

Responsive Focused Evaluation | F.I.S.I.A

8.0 THESIS IMPORTANCE AND DIVULGATION. COGNITIVE RESOURCES


8.1 Timeline of the policy phases.

Responsive Focused Evaluation aims to demonstrate in empirical, responsive and focused way the costs and revenues of the UA. To do so the RFE⁹⁷ includes three theories in one methodological process step by step; i) Evaluating Policy Content, ii) Evaluation of Policy Implementation, iii) and Evaluating Policy Impact. The second step recognizes the critiques to the first one and focuses on policy determinants. At this moment there are two possibilities or focus on the interpretative matter of the nature of the policies, or straight to empirical resources, such are economical. The second step is not only essential to frame the research methodology but also to focus on that economic resources. In order to have an evaluation which deals with responsibilities, the third step should focus on utilization process. So the question is “who manage these resources?” and “How?”. Do there are “Revenues” and “Cost” and on “which scale?”. An evaluation of the cost benefits for each informal area could give a communicative tool to direct future investments. Picture number eleven (Picture 11), shows the consecutive and methodological process to get to a Responsive Focused Evaluation.

The importance of a Responsive Focused Evaluation in the U.A is also useful to understand the policy cycles and their decisional making model. Now-days the policy maturity is at the phase minus one (-1) where decisions are made not on the evaluation of the single informal area but on the **satisfactory criteria** of the single applicant to get the legalization tenure. To an incremental approach, it's needed a rational model assessment, empiric and responsive on the revenues and costs. This phase can be considered as the ‘thermometer’ before the targeted policies could take place, such can be on those on Energy Poverty, Local Capacities and other Housing Policies.

Picture number forty-two, (Picture 42), shows four policy cycles that can determine the U.A development on the political, institutional and academic direction.

⁹⁷ R.F.E acronyms to Responsive Focused Evaluation.



Picture 42: Policy Maturity for the U.A.

But, before to get to phase "0" a decision making on a scale should occur. The different conditions of F.I.S.I.A efficiency and effectiveness can also be expressed in transformation areas - and not only on informal. The case of city ring of Tirana, or at the old Train Station, where a hundred families were left without any assistance and/compensation, shows an arbitrary way to direct investments without considering any cost of the hindering factors of the informal areas. So before to think on a different scale of use of F.I.S.I.A, firstly it should occur inside the U.A or Legalization, Urbanization and Integration of Informal Areas and Settlements. This phase is called as phase "0," and it is a rational assessment for an incremental approach on territorial resources, such are land, settlement, and urbanization.

8.1.2 Perspective for future policies. Decision Making and Endogenous Resources.

Improving Local Capacities, Upgrading settlements, or Energy Poverty, are all problem solutions and engagements of public policies related and experienced in informal areas.

But before to get to these problem solutions is essential to highlight the importance of F.I.S.I.A, the territorial resources, and costs that take on consideration, and their relation with constitutional rights. Before putting on focus "needs," it is necessary to see if rights have been violated or not. Such is right of land ownership, water furniture by infrastructure, or to be reimbursed for the own settlement if for the land has public interest expressed.

The use of F.I.S.I.A efficiency and effectiveness is a significant tool to put in coordination various public authorities and to transmit the message from A.L.U.I.Z.N.I, to Municipal Department of Planning and finally to the Cadastral Office. Nowadays these three public institutions have different cognitive resources, and so maps about the state of fact on the territory.

The reallocation of cognitive resources, with the political veto of the municipal council about the informal areas and integration of F.I.S.I.A assessment, would increase the policy effectiveness and efficiency - and at the same time solve an unconstitutional condition on local autonomy. (Article 13 of the Albanian Constitution).

After this process of resources allocation and F.I.S.I.A assessment, two directions are essential.

- Changing the decisional model, from satisfactory criteria to area priorities in order to accomplish the second objective efficiently. The revenue's reversibility to urbanization should change following the informal area efficiency. Differently, are called exogenous resources.
- Also, explore different solutions to the hindering factors and cost on the territory throw academics and independent research institutes in order to increase policy effectiveness of the U.A. Find solutions to living in vulnerable conditions and purpose to public authorities and local inhabitants with their consensus and participation. Differently, are called endogenous resources and can be identified through the territorial impact in any country where informal areas are settled.

8.1.2 Importance to get to Phase "0" on the U.A.

The more significant are the data assessment on all region of Durres, and Tirana more extensive will be the nature of the policies that would generate. So smaller would be the scale of the assessment closer would be the policies to the inhabitant needs. The visualization of the hindering factors on a small scale is not a public domain since we are talking about housing

vulnerability on legal tenure. However, can be a good communicative tool for decision makers on neighborhood scale to attract investments through the G.L.P and Municipal Council.

Academic and Research Institutes are not behind this process. Vanguard assessments and scenarios should reach the territory before ad-hoc investment would generate further conflict on the territory with vulnerable inhabitants. The more it goes ad hoc the worst it would be for the rest of 66%⁹⁸ of inhabitants not legalized - on national scale.

The case of "Astiri" neighborhood in Tirana shows in an unequivocal way the failure of public institutions to deal with the inhabitants before the interest to build the city ring came. Here to mention that the city ring was projected and carried from more than 30 years in all the city G.L.Ps⁹⁹. Nowadays more that 320 inhabitants would lose their home for a municipal program of three years of renting in housing market estate.

Other "lucky" cases are when families has been brought to the only social housing that Tirana Municipality has - in Shkoze¹⁰⁰. It is a big complex of housing block where living different categories from ethnic minorities (Roma citizens) and families with low income.

If all those families would be considered as a group on Hindering Factor 2 "On the Land", the initial investment, on the own settlement, should be assessed and taken on consideration.

The expropriation that is happening, without taking onto consideration the hindering cost two would generate further fear on citizens for the wellbeing and future investments in the city.¹⁰¹

⁹⁸ According to ALUIZNI report of 2016 only 33% of informal settlements are legalized on national scale - from more than 350000 applications.

⁹⁹ GLP, General Local Plan.

¹⁰⁰ Social Houses in Tirana are part of a project that started in 2008 for providing the first social housing stock in 8 cities. This project was a response to a growing need for affordable housing solution for persons that cannot afford market housing and was an experiment for local authorities. The project was financed by a loan from Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB) and co-financed by a combination of national and local contributions.

The project site is located on the eastern periphery of Tirana, in an ex-industrial area. The area includes also the ex-industrial area, which is transformed into a residential area by people that have squatted the ex-industrial buildings.

¹⁰¹ The case of city ring of Tirana and "Astiri" neighborhoods represents a "normal" culture of public policies, where no different scenarios exists, or, "multi criteria analysis" has been taken on consideration - but it's only one investor with one scenario.



Photo 1: Inhabitants from "Astiri" neighborhood protesting against the city ring project of Tirana. ("we protect our homes home with our life", 15th day of protest. November 2018).



Photo 2: Shkoza Social Housing Residences in Tirana. ("Tirana ENHR2017 Conference". 4th September 2017).

8.1.3 Role of Academic Institutions and Research Centers.

Reclaiming the assumption. Getting back to the research assumption, in areas where the urbanization is missing, or delayed, informal practices have flourished, we have to admit that till

now from the methodology we have shown only the probabilistic alternations between (S), (P) and (U).

To reclaim this assumption, we have to bring attention to the territorial matters and their existence. Picture number forty-three brings the reflection of territorial impact on the map for two different areas inside an informal area, case of Keneta in Durres city.

From first evidence, we can highlight the existence of many half-built settlements, or the only land parceling without building on it, named respectively as S.1 and S.3. Both cases are marked in red color due to their legal constraints to get a legalization tenure. In many cases, as the maps show, these conditions (half-built settlements and land parceling) are away from the main infrastructure where urbanization has occurred. Other relevant conditions are where due to the late urbanization a land fragmentation by expansion on the infrastructure grid has occurred, such as in the case of S>P>P> U. There are even other conditions where the inhabitants have reduced the land occupied living behind a high fragmented territory. For this tactic, we can list a long list of reasons, from those to land conflict, avoiding additional taxes, or just because the urbanization has occurred - marked in a blue color close to the main infrastructure.



Picture 43. Territorial Impact on Map. Keneta, Durres Region.

The two cases brought to investigate the diversity of the three elements (S), (P) and (U) are an illustrative example. The process of identifying correctly on the real context is a must for academics, policy makers and architects of various disciplines.

Importance of Land fragmentation and Mobility Impact. The land tactics described above, from the theory to the methodological analysis and the territorial impact reclaiming, should not be seen as a weakness on the territory, but rather as an opportunity to explore more and give answers to those who live in territories where law and plans do not arrive yet or are in conflict.

Learning from the 'informal' land tactics can bring future opportunities for public services or other forms of investments which might occur from private actors willing to invest in the territory. The case S>P>P, for example, shows a clear distinction for land fragmentation by reducing the size occupied. This fractal opportunity, land not occupied, is present in mostly all the informal areas and it shows its diversities even when urbanization occurs.

Another lesson from the transition of the three processes is the fragmentation from land expansion. Even if they are not an opportunity, they should be seen as determinants in the future investments of the informal area. A significant part of this impact¹⁰² has hindering factors and legal constraints to the legalization tenure. So more are the hindering factors, the less the revenues would be, as so the return on urbanization. Examples S1, S2, S3, S.4, S>P>P, and S>P>P>U illustrates their probabilistic description on table one. Under these territorial circumstances and land tactics, A.L.U.I.Z.N.I, the public administration dealing with the informal areas, should be unequivocal and open a dialogue with single applicants, independent landscapers, and architects. The hindering factor and the territorial circumstance which brings to legal constraints are of public interest. The role of director and gatekeeper, of A.L.U.I.Z.N.I, should be separated among various actors.

For better policy responsiveness, A.L.U.I.Z.N.I can also declare land tactics which hinder the legalization tenure, identified the applicants, and open a dialogue with third legally recognized parties. Direct policies and U.As can address various actors in the mid-process to get formal legalization. Architects, landscapers and social workers can contribute to methodological solutions, starting from the single settlement and then enlarging to the regional scale of all 55 informal areas.

¹⁰² Land fragmentation by expansion.

In the pictures below (Picture 44, 45 and 46) shows the suburban growth in six different countries of Balkans where the informal practice has been practiced since the fall of the dictatorial regimes.

Their characteristic is that all of them, even if informal or not, rely on parceling processes, differently from shanty towns or slum. Starting from the territorial impact as in the case of Keneta in Durres would be only the beginning for a F.I.S.I.A assessment.

For a future urban agenda.

1. Cognitive resources.

Cartographic data, documents, certificates should be brought back to the Municipal Planning Departments. There are many reasons why it should occur, from constitutional to technical matter related to G.L.P and future investments in the city. Informal settlement and informal areas are a territorial matter since the new law on Planning has overpassed the concept of yellow line - which til in 2009 has limited the municipal authority to the urban area. Informal settlements as any building permission should pass throw the same authority, and there is no reason why they should be treated differently. The diversification into two different public bodies has increased the technical complexities and disadvantages.

In this phase, it is essential to assess the informal areas in the base of F.I.S.I.A formula. Understand the dimension of hindering factors and city expansion with a high cost on urbanization. This phase of assessment needs rational decision making, unbiased and responsive to each hindering factor.

A full report on F.I.S.I.A efficiency and effectiveness for each informal area are needed. On this considerations F.I.S.I.A should identify and address the three categories for policy efficiency and effectiveness separately.

- I. There where the policy efficiency results from $0 < x < 1$ there is good urbanization. A full urbanization degree can be achieved if the revenue's reversibility changes accordingly. (Political resources needed). Further, it means that endogenous resources are enough to accomplish the full urbanization. Integration policies to the urban city management can take place, such as those on waste management and transport.
- II. There where the policy efficiency results $x = 1$ there is mid urbanization. It means that the cost of urbanization is equal to revenues from the legalization fee.
- III. There where the policy efficiency results $x > 1$ there is low urbanization. Political resources should call in action economic, legal cognitive resources, or by calling exogenous resources, such as investments and other forms, for specific informal areas. Investments can be on direct form to urbanization, or indirect, by offering information and advantages on further Land or Settlement Densification.

Furthermore, cognitive resources are important to have a more responsive U.A. It's essential to share and communicate the hindering factors that have each household to open to an incremental approach, far from the corruptive, and 'director-gatekeeper' on one single actor.

2. Political resources.

Furthermore, in some circumstances, the urban network, pattern, needs a reconfiguration according to the G.L.P and this may increase the vulnerability of those who have not a legalization permit. To avoid it, F.I.S.I.A effectiveness should occur before the efficiency — the hindering factors identified by F.I.S.I.A effectiveness should find solutions from specific housing policies. (Political and Economic resources needed).

In a base of F.I.S.I.A assessment for each informal area the political resources, deriving from the elections on the municipal council, should engage to attract the needed attention to get the economic resources for urbanization. If not on urbanization, there should be clear advantages, prescribed by boosting policies, on building in certain informal areas in order to increase the revenues from land and settlement densification and find solutions to vulnerable housing conditions with hindering factors.

Decisions that should occur on the Municipal Council, form the political resources, should answer to each of the three categories of the F.I.S.I.A efficiency and effectiveness analyzed from the cognitive, economic and legal resources and be in accordance with the G.L.P - if not should find solutions through it.

3. Economical resources.

Economic resources for the moment are centralized to one actor, such as the regional agency, and the hindering costs and revenue's reversibility are not determined by the territorial condition, including urban morphology and hindering factors. Settlements with hindering factor costs to be covered by the single household are also administrative costs for the regional agency. Such are hindering factors 2 (On Land) and 3 (On settlement).

Economic resources should vary from the ability of a single informal area to generate revenues from the legalization fee, from the urbanization costs and from the four hindering factors. Once the revenue's reversibility covers the urbanization costs, the policy efficiency, the rest of the economic resources destination should be a matter of Municipal Council. Hindering costs are the first that should be considered, later specific oriented housing policies. The most vulnerable of the four housing factors is the first (Outside Land) and the fourth (On the Single Household). Instead, hindering factor two (On Land) and three (On Settlement) is a private matter that should occur in the destination of economic resources. Public policies can address the finalization of the settlement half-constructed or poorly shaped and/or outside the land parcel.

Decisions that should occur on the Municipal Council, form the political resources, should answer to each of the three categories of the F.I.S.I.A efficiency and effectiveness analyzed from the cognitive, economic and legal resources and be in accordance with the G.L.P - if not should find solutions through

it.

4. Legal Resources.


Legal resources should be limited to the General Local Plan and by the strategies and programmes defined by it. But with particular attention - that the more they are, laws and regulations, the more it would be difficult to legalize the settlements and so the hindering costs would be higher.

Before any urban transformation may occur, it is important to assess sensitively and responsively all the informal areas involved in the project. The assessment of the hindering factors should occur before the urban transformation. Future investment should consider the cost of the hindering factors as a responsive part of the Urban Agenda and the Albanian Constitution.


General Local Plans, divided into three consistent parts, i) the deep analysis of the territory, ii) the strategic plan, and iii) the development plan, considers the informal areas only on the development plan. The hindering costs, assessed in F.I.S.I.A, should be integrated since in the first phase of General Local Plans, the deep analysis of the territory. This integration should occur only to empower the decision making into a more significant strategy and not to fall into ad-hoc evictions. On the macro scale (F.I.S.I.A) assessment expresses the missing investment, and the decision is an economic matter, but, on the micro scale it is the ethical use of it which can lead to possible solutions for the hindering factors to housing legalization, and toward a responsive evaluation.



East Belgrade, SERBIA (2018, Google Earth) Informal Suburban Growth



South Skopje, MACEDONIA (2018, Google Earth) Suburban Growth



North East Sarajevo, BOSNIA (2018, Google Earth) Suburban Growth

Picture 44. Suburban growth in Belgrade, Skopje and Sarajevo.



South Prishtina, KOSOVO (2018, Google Earth) Informal Suburban Growth



North Shkoder, ALBANIA (2018, Google Earth) Informal Suburban Growth



North West Podgorica, (2018, Google Earth) Suburban Growth

Picture 45. Suburban growth in Prishtina, Shkoder and Podgorica.



South Bucharest, ROMANIA (2018, Google Earth) Informal Suburban Growth



North Athens, GREECE (2018, Google Earth) Suburban Growth



North East Sofia, BULGARIA (2018, Google Earth) Suburban Growth

Picture 46. Suburban growth in Bucharest, Sofia and Athens.

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Thesis dictionary

1. **A.L.U.I.Z.N.I** is the acronym of Agjensia e Legalizimeve, Urbanizimit, Integritit të Zonave Informale. Regional Agency for the Legalization, Urbanization, and Integration of Informal Areas and Settlements in Albania.
2. **Cognitive Resources** means the availability of relevant information or conceptual models for the decisional process. In our case, it represents the cartographic data to deal with informal settlements and areas.
3. **Costs** are the economic resources used to accomplish the objectives of the U.A, and such are those for urbanization, integration, and macro hindering factors.
4. **Council Of Ministries** it is made by members of ministries and the prime minister, which by a proposal of lower public institutions approves the 'Informal Areas.' From 2006 to 2014 it was on the decision of the local municipality council.
5. **Decision-Making Models** are conditions on which actors take the decisions. According to public policy studies, there are four models, the rational, the bounded rationality, the incremental and garbage can model.
6. **Democracy** is considered as a procedural commitment among actor's network, and it is measured by density and centrality.
7. **Economic Resources** consist of the ability to mobilize money or any form of wealth in order to modify other actors' behavior. In the U.A, the legalization fee s determined on land size and settlement size. The total gives the F.I.S.I.A, measuring public revenues from the legalization process, urbanization costs, and hindering costs.
8. **E.E** is the acronym of the evaluation theory based on empowerment (empowerment evaluation). It is from the post-behavioral branch of studies, and it focuses on empowerment.
9. **Efficiency** sees the ration of cost on revenues in a single informal area.
10. **Effectiveness** sees the ratio of legalized settlement to total settlement in a single informal area.
11. **F.I.S.I.A**is the acronym of the net formula to assess the final investment in a single informal area. It deducts legalization fee from the urbanization costs and hindering costs, considering the revenue's reversibility.

- 12. Informal Areas** are a homogenous legal statement of settlements and neighborhoods defined as 'informal areas.' In 2016 are reported by law to be 277 informal areas around the big cities such as Tirana, Durrës, Shkodër, etc. - including more than 300.000 families.
- 13. Informal Settlements** are settlements build without building permit. In Albania, it includes the land and the settlement raised on it. For further information see (Aliaj, Shutina, & Dharmo, Between energy and the vacuum, 2010).
- 14. Integration** is the third objective of the U.A. It refers to qualitative data of the inhabitants living the informal areas. For methodological reasons and priority objectives of the evaluation, the research does not deal with it.
- 15. Irregular Informality** are the informal settlements which has planning and regulatory constrains to get the legalization tenure.
- 16. Legal Resources** is the advantages or disadvantages, attributed to particular subjects by legal regulations and in general by legislative and administrative authority's decisions. In the U.A, legal resources are regulations that make a settlement conform or not to the planning regulations, and such can be the micro hindering factors.
- 17. Legalization is the first objective of the U.A.** In Albania means the process of obtaining alegal tenure of the settlement build on informal practice. It is a legal commitment which considers the recognition of the regular informality in the process to gel legal tenure. It passes into two processes, the civil code verification, if there's a third ownership, and the planning regulations.
- 18. Macro Hindering Factors** are the four groups created to describe in micro hindering factors based on land and settlement probabilities that have to defect. (from prisoner's dilemma).
- 19. Micro Hindering Factors** are all the laws and regulations that hinder the legalization process. According to the analysis of the U.A, at least 26 regulations are passing from land restrictions to building shape.
- 20. National Territory Council Or K.K.T** is made representative of five ministries: Environment, Transport, Urban Planning, Energy and Finance.
- 21. Phase "Zero"** is the period on which the research gets into the evaluation, understanding the policy efficiency and effectiveness. From the policy maturity, it can be considered as a 'thermometer' before future policies can take place.

- 22. Political Resources** are the amount of consensus an actor can get. It can refer to the whole population or specific social groups involved in the different public policies. In this research the political resources are held by the public actors involved in the U.A, such are, the national territory council (K.K.T), and the municipal council.
- 23. Revenues** are the economical resources collected by the public actors for public purposes from the legalization fee.
- 24. Revenue's Reversibility** is the amount of economical resources collected by the A.L.U.I.Z.N.I for the legalization tenure, the land fee and settlement fee.
- 25. Regular Informality** is the informal settlement which on single land lot has been raised in informal practice and it is conform the civil code and regulatory and planning laws. According to (Aliaj, Shutina, & Dharmo, Between energy and the vacuum, 2010) in Albania it has followed the S>P>U direction, where S stands for settlement, P for parceling and U for urbanization.
- 26. Self Declarations** are statements that the householders make in authorized public institutions by sending pictures of the building and a declaration about the neighboring settlements or landmarks, such as streets, open water canals, etc).
- 27. R.F.E** is the acronym of Responsive Focused Evaluation developed in this research. It uses a consecutive evaluation process through other three theories, THDE, EE and UFE.
- 28. TH.D.E** is the acronym for Theory Driven Evaluation. It's is from the behavioral branch of studies and it focuses on the linear model of the evaluation.
- 29. V.K.M** acronym of a Decision taken by the Council of Ministries, usually it is related to the each specific 'informal areas', it defines the perimeter and the number of settlements included, by law more than 5 ha.
- 30. U.F.E** acronym of Utilization Focused Evaluation. It's is from the post-behavioral branch of studies and it focuses on utilization of the evaluation.
- 31. U.A**, it refers to the Legalization, Urbanization and Integration of the Informal Settlements and Areas in Albania. The U.A exists from 2006.
- 32. Urbanization** is the second objective of the U.A. It means to put in infrastructure in informal areas, sewing and electric line and other infrastructural services.

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
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MANUAL FOR F.I.S.I.AASSESSMENT

Manual "Measuring the policy efficiency and effectiveness of the U.A".

Now-days, in 2018, there are 55 informal areas around Tirana and Durres Region for a total of 8050ha. There are no reasons to explain the public reshaping of these informal areas, but many can rely on urban expansion, and/or due to the decentralization of the regional offices in different parts of the city. While these might be arbitrary, the need to reshape and think about these informal areas even from the urban morphological perspective is essential.



Informal Areas for Group	ha	Total Informal Areas for Tirana and Durres Region. (ha)
Total Informal Areas for the Municipality of Tirana	2506	
Total Informal Areas for the Municipality of Kamez	1983	
Total Informal Areas in the small villages outside Tirana.	1229	
Total Informal Areas for Paskuqan	672	
Total Informal Areas in the small villages outside Tirana.	538	
Total Informal Areas for the Municipality of Kavaje.	473	
Total Informal Areas for the Municipality of Durres.	1418	8819

MANUAL FOR F.I.S.I.AASSESSMENT

A. Territorial Resources sheet

F.I.S.I.A, acronym for Final Investment for the Single Informal Area, has been selected to express and assess the amount of economic resources that come from the legalization process, the costs of urbanization and the costs that require 4 different situations with hindering factors to obtain full legalization or for real estate valuation. To assess it seven territorial resources, references and actions are essential to be considered.

The territorial resources that define the revenues are 1) land legalization fee and 2) settlement legalization fee, which are two processes that should occur in the legalization process. If one of them fails to get the legalization, the whole application for legalization is declined. The failure is strictly related to legal, juridical and environmental constraints. The multiform of these constraints is called as a hindering factor to get a legalization process.

The first probabilistic result is that land and settlement can get the legalization process, but there are hindering factors outside the land that do not make the process to obtain the legalization.

This macro hindering factor is called "**Outside the Land**".

The second probabilistic result is that settlement can get the legalization process, but the land has legal constraints. This macro hindering factor is called "**On the Land**".


The third probabilistic result is that land can get the legalization process, but settlement has legal constraints. This macro hindering factor is called "**On the Settlement**".

The last probabilistic result is that both and land settlement have legal constraints to get a legalization process. This macro hindering factor is called "**On the Single household**".



Actions on the territory	Unit	Reference for m ²	Decisions
Settlement Build	m ² of Settlement	In €. nr.1	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Occupy Land.• Break down settlement.

MANUAL FOR F.I.S.I.AASSESSMENT



Actions on the territory

Unit

Reference for m^2


Decisions

Settlement build and Parcel Occupied.

m^2 of Land

In €. nr.2

- Fee and and Legalization



Actions on the territory

Unit

Reference for m^2


Decisions

Invested on Infrastructure

m^2 of Infrastructure

In €. nr.3

- Follow urban morphology



Actions on the territory

Unit

Reference for m^2


Decisions

Build with Hindering Factor 1.
The cost should cover only settlement cost as private investment.

m^2 of Settlement

In €. nr.4

- Housing Policies needed for the householder.



Actions on the territory

Unit

Reference for m^2

Decisions

Build with Hindering Factor 2.
The cost should cover only the land occupied and owned by third parties.

m^2 of Land

In €. nr.5

- Cost should cover the price of land occupied.



Actions on the territory

Unit

Reference for m^2

Decisions

Build with Hindering Factor 3.
The cost should cover only the settlement costs.

m^2 of Settlement

In €. nr.6


- Housing Policies needed to shape the physical condition of the settlement.

MANUAL FOR F.I.S.I.AASSESSMENT



Actions on the territory	Unit	Reference for m ²	Decisions
Build with Hindering Factor 4. The cost should cover only settlement cost as private investment.	m ² of Settlement	In €. nr.7	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Housing Policies needed for the householder.

A.1 Territorial Resources on the map.



MANUAL FOR F.I.S.I.A ASSESSMENT

B. F.I.S.I.A Assessment sheet

F.I.S.I.A (Final Investment for the Single Informal Area) =

$$\{ \sum [(m2 \text{ settlements } \text{ (S) Settlement}) \times \text{ref.1}]$$

$$+ \sum [(m2 \text{ land } \text{ (S)>(P) Settlement > Parceling}) \times \text{ref.2}]$$

x 0.2 (revenue's reversibility)

$$- [(m2 \text{ infrastructure } \text{ (S)>(P)>(U) Settlement > Parceling > Urbanization}) \times \text{ref.3}]$$

$$- [(m2 \text{ sett. } \text{ (S) fails | (P) fails Macro Hindering Factor, group 1 "Outside the Land"} \text{ H.1}) \times \text{ref.4}] - [(m2 \text{ land } \text{ (S) ok | (P) fails Macro Hindering Factor, group 2 "On the Land"} \text{ H.2}) \times \text{ref.5}]$$

$$- [(m2 \text{ sett. } \text{ (S) fails | (P) ok Macro Hindering Factor, group 3 "On Single Settlement"} \text{ H.3}) \times \text{ref.6}] - [(m2 \text{ sett. } \text{ (S) fails | (P) fails Macro Hindering Factor, group 4 "On the Householder"} \text{ H.4}) \times \text{ref.7}]$$

= _____ €

If F.I.S.I.A < 0 it wouldn't be possible to accomplish the second objective.
 If F.I.S.I.A > 0 it is possible to accomplish the second objective, urbanization

MANUAL FOR F.I.S.I.AASSESSMENT

C. Revenue's Reversibility needed for the Urbanization sheet

$$\frac{\text{URBANIZATION COSTS + HINDERING COSTS}}{\text{REVENUES}} \times 100\% =$$

$$\left(\begin{array}{c} \text{m2 infrastructure x ref. 3} \\ \text{m2 sett} \end{array} \right) + \sum \left[\begin{array}{c} \text{m2 sett} \\ \text{H. 1 x ref. 4} \end{array} \right)$$

$$+ \left(\begin{array}{c} \text{m2 land} \\ \text{H. 2 x ref. 5} \end{array} \right) + \left(\begin{array}{c} \text{m2 sett} \\ \text{H. 3 x ref. 6} \end{array} \right)$$

$$+ \left(\begin{array}{c} \text{m2 sett} \\ \text{H. 4 x ref. 7} \end{array} \right)$$

$$= \sum \left(\begin{array}{c} \text{m2 settlements} \\ \text{x ref. 1} \end{array} \right) + \sum \left(\begin{array}{c} \text{m2 land} \\ \text{x ref. 2} \end{array} \right)$$

$$= \quad \%$$

MANUAL FOR F.I.S.I.AASSESSMENT

D. Measuring Policy Efficiency from Urbanization objective

The policy efficiency is= $\frac{\text{VALUE of URBANIZATION COSTS}}{\text{REVENUES}} =$

$$= \frac{\left(\begin{array}{c} \text{m2 infrastructure x ref. 3} \\ \text{(S)>(P)>(U)} \\ \text{Settlement > Parceling > Utilization} \end{array} \right)}{\sum \left(\begin{array}{c} \text{m2 settlements} \\ \text{(S)} \\ \text{Settlement} \end{array} \right) \times \text{ref. 1} + \sum \left(\begin{array}{c} \text{m2 land} \\ \text{(S)>(P)} \\ \text{Settlement > Parceling} \end{array} \right) \times \text{ref. 2}}$$

= _____ ratio

- (1) if $0 < x < 1$ good urbanization.
- (2) if $x = 1$ mid urbanization.
- (3) if $x > 1$ low urbanization.

MANUAL FOR F.I.S.I.AASSESSMENT

E. Measuring Policy Effectiveness fromHindering Costs.

The policy effectiveness is = $\frac{\text{VALUE of HINDERING COSTS}}{\text{REVENUES}} =$

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \sum \left[\begin{array}{c} \text{m2 sett} \\ \text{H. 1 x ref. 4} \end{array} \right] + \left[\begin{array}{c} \text{m2 land} \\ \text{H. 2 x ref. 5} \end{array} \right] \\
 & + \left[\begin{array}{c} \text{m2 sett} \\ \text{H. 3 x ref. 6} \end{array} \right] + \left[\begin{array}{c} \text{m2 sett} \\ \text{H. 4 x ref. 7} \end{array} \right] \\
 = & \frac{\sum \left[\begin{array}{c} \text{m2 settlements} \\ \text{x ref. 1} \end{array} \right] + \sum \left[\begin{array}{c} \text{m2 land} \\ \text{x ref. 2} \end{array} \right]}
 \end{aligned}$$


= _____ratio

- (1) if $0 < x < 1$ regular informal area.
- (2) if $x = 1$ mid regular.
- (3) if $x > 1$ high impact on land fragmentation and mobility.

MANUAL FOR F.I.S.I.AASSESSMENT

E.1 Efficiency and Effectiveness on the map.

POLICY EFFICIENCY (RATIO) URBANIZATION COSTS / LEGALIZATION REVENUES



POLICY EFFECTIVENESS HINDERING COSTS / LEGALIZATION REVENUES

