We run an experiment based on a model in which agents have the option of reducing the probability of failure by investing towards their decisions. In this case, asymmetric (unequal) benefit schemes appears to enhance agents' productivity, compared with schemes in which benefits are equally distributed across agents. Our evidence also shows how discrepancy between theory and evidence can be explained in terms of social preferences and social norms of reciprocity.
Inequality or Strategic Uncertainty? An Experimental Study on Incentives and Hierarchy
PONTI, Giovanni;
2008
Abstract
We run an experiment based on a model in which agents have the option of reducing the probability of failure by investing towards their decisions. In this case, asymmetric (unequal) benefit schemes appears to enhance agents' productivity, compared with schemes in which benefits are equally distributed across agents. Our evidence also shows how discrepancy between theory and evidence can be explained in terms of social preferences and social norms of reciprocity.File in questo prodotto:
Non ci sono file associati a questo prodotto.
I documenti in SFERA sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
