The Regulatory Use of the Ideas of Reason in Kant and Husserl

This paper explores the regulatory use of the ideas of reason within the philosophical discourses of Immanuel Kant and Edmund Husserl, focusing on how each philosopher interprets the scope and function of these ideas within their respective frameworks. Kant’s treatment in the “Critique of Pure Reason” emphasizes the transcendental ideals as heuristic devices to guide scientific inquiry without claiming ontological status, fostering a systematic and unified understanding of natural phenomena. Husserl, conversely, extends these ideas in his “Cartesian Meditations” through the method of phenomenological reduction and eidetic intuition, aiming to access the essential structures underlying all experiences. By engaging in a comparative analysis, this paper illustrates how Husserl both adopts and adapts Kantian principles to fit the demands of his phenomenological approach. This involves a critical examination of the methodological divergences between the two, particularly in terms of their views on the conditions of possibility for experience and the role of consciousness in constituting reality. The discussion sheds light on the distinctive paths taken by Kant and Husserl in using transcendental philosophy to address issues of knowledge, experience, and reality, ultimately highlighting both convergence and significant reformulation in Husserl’s adoption of Kantian ideas.