Moral and legal implications of the continuity between delusional and non-delusional beliefs.

In this chapter we explore two aspects of gradualism about mental illness by arguing that it is difficult to distinguish pathological and non-pathological beliefs on the basis of their epistemic features, and by examining and ultimately defending the claim that there is no categorical difference between delusional and other epidemically faulty beliefs (what we shall call the continuity thesis). In section 2 we argue that no effective demarcation between pathological and non-pathological beliefs can be achieved on the basis of mere epistemic criteria and we appeal to considerations about the factors that influence belief formation. This supports the continuity thesis. In section 3 we consider some of the moral and legal implications of the continuity thesis, focusing in particular on the role of epistemically faulty beliefs in the attribution of moral responsibility and legal accountability for criminal actions that are motivated by those beliefs.