Philosophers’ attention has recently been drawn to the phenomenon of delusions with clear organic causes. Delusions are usually defined as beliefs with very implausible content that are maintained in the face of strong counterevidence.1 A satisfactory analysis of delusions must account for their being irrational beliefs and this raises interesting philosophical issues. First, the same phrase ‘irrational beliefs’ is considered by some to be paradoxical, or at least very problematic.2 If, in order to ascribe beliefs to a system S, we have to assume that S is rational, then how can we ascribe irrational beliefs to S? And, even if we are indifferent to the concerns derived from the rationality constraint on belief ascription, delusions remain a puzzle. Are they genuine beliefs? Are they really irrational? If so, how do they differ from other irrational beliefs?
Marks of irrationality
Bortolotti L
Primo
2002
Abstract
Philosophers’ attention has recently been drawn to the phenomenon of delusions with clear organic causes. Delusions are usually defined as beliefs with very implausible content that are maintained in the face of strong counterevidence.1 A satisfactory analysis of delusions must account for their being irrational beliefs and this raises interesting philosophical issues. First, the same phrase ‘irrational beliefs’ is considered by some to be paradoxical, or at least very problematic.2 If, in order to ascribe beliefs to a system S, we have to assume that S is rational, then how can we ascribe irrational beliefs to S? And, even if we are indifferent to the concerns derived from the rationality constraint on belief ascription, delusions remain a puzzle. Are they genuine beliefs? Are they really irrational? If so, how do they differ from other irrational beliefs?I documenti in SFERA sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
