Fictional persuasion, transparency, and the aim of belief: reviving the teleologist's dilemma. CHAPTER 9

This chapter argues that some beliefs from fiction present a problem for the truth-aim teleological account of belief. It outlines Nishi Shah’s teleologist’s dilemma, which challenges the teleologist to explain the focus on truth in deliberation over what to believe, but to do this in a way which does not exclude attitudes which are less regulated for truth from counting as beliefs. This chapter has responded to the dilemma by arguing that what demarcates belief from other attitudes is the descriptive characteristic of weak truth regulation, secured by the aim of truth. This chapter draws on empirical literature to give a version of the dilemma which appeals to beliefs from fiction. It argues that these beliefs are problematic for the teleological account, since they indicate that there is not a basic level of truth regulation common to all beliefs, as the account claims, and thus the teleologist’s dilemma remains.